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Abstract 
Cities across sub-Saharan Africa are faced with challenges in urban planning and service delivery due to 
insufficient capital for long-term investment projects.  Despite the success of municipal bonds as a tool to 
assist in closing this financing gap in much of the rest of the world, there have been limited examples of 
success in this region.  This study looks at the universal obstacles limiting sub-national governments from 
using municipal bonds as a financial instrument before examining four case studies – Johannesburg, 
Douala, Dakar and Kampala – to better understand their approaches to municipal bond issuance.  Based on 
the findings from research, the thesis concludes that the chief obstacle blocking the uptake of municipal 
bond issuance as a means for raising funds stems from a variety of elements in the constitutional and 
regulatory systems in each country.  This represents a significant departure from the commonly-held 
understandings that cities in the region are not eligible for long-term debt and are ill-managed, lack capacity, 
or are not viewed as creditworthy by institutional investors and other purchasers of municipal bonds. 
The success of municipal bond issuance appears to be contingent on strong interlinkages between central 
and subnational governments.  This dissertation offers a critical review of the explicit and implicit powers 
granted to local governments under the constitutions of each of the countries, specifically the legislation 
that enables or prohibits municipalities from issuing bonds.  Reform to the existing regulatory and legal 
environments across the African continent, ones that govern a financially-sustainable level of indebtedness 
for sub-sovereign governments, is an essential step in ensuring the future growth of Africa’s cities.  
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Introduction 
Cities in sub-Saharan Africa are growing at an unprecedented rate due to internal migration and general 
population growth. Urban population growth brings with it many benefits, but in cash-constrained 
municipalities, this can be particularly problematic as the available financial resources cannot keep pace 
with municipal infrastructure needs.  Urban growth was not as challenging to African local governments in 
the past for several reasons: (1) cities were not growing as rapidly; (2) cities could rely on national 
governments for transfers of resources sufficient to meet municipal investments; and (3) national 
governments were themselves not pressured by international agreements and external, unfunded mandates 
to meet global development goals. In short, the confluence of these factors has widened the infrastructure 
finance gap in cities in sub-Saharan Africa and has made municipal leaders recognize the need to expand 
the variety of mechanisms available to help to close the infrastructure finance gap.  
Academic literature suggests that the reasons why cities in sub-Saharan Africa have not been able to 
successfully access finance for capital investment in infrastructure are related to internal challenges 
including: (1) low capacity of municipal workers to consider different financial instruments, (2) lack of 
long-term capital investment plans at a City-wide level, (3) lack of financially sustainable, revenue-
generating projects, and (4) a mismatch between the lifespan of municipal assets and the investment 
preferences of institutional investors. While these factors, which have much in common with the 
experiences of local government everywhere in the world, have some traction in the African context, they 
are necessary but not sufficient to explain the inability of municipalities to meet the demand for the requisite 
capital investment. I argue instead that the principal reason why cities in sub-Saharan Africa have not been 
able to successfully access finance for infrastructure investments is related to an extrinsic challenge: the 
lack of a clear devolution of power from the central government to municipal government.   
All cities need access to capital, and the relative fiscal power of the sub national authorities is a deeply 
political construction. Moreover, the current configuration of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements is 
typically a product of past practices and power struggles.  Cities, which are aggregations of human 
settlements, arose from the belief in “success in numbers,” whether for agricultural purposes, protection, or 
the idea of cost-sharing for public goods. In most societies, over time, these cities were subjugated to 
national polities, where power and decision-making were concentrated in a single person or agency, a trend 
which has continued in a number of instances to the present day. Some countries, particularly those that 
had profound influence over contemporary development patterns in sub-Saharan Africa based on their 
colonial-era dominance, have limited decentralization; this phenomenon has impacted the post-colonial 
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politics and practices across much of the African continent. Accordingly, and of critical importance for a 
more comprehensive consideration of municipal finance, this thesis focuses on the recognition that without 
a clear commitment to the practical decentralization of powers, irrespective of the strengthening of internal 
fiscal capacity of local government, utilization of the full range of tools (including bonds) for municipal 
finance will be limited. 
For much of the post-colonial period, cities have been heavily reliant on transfers from the central 
government to cover the costs of urban infrastructure. Large sums of money were not involved, in part 
because cities were small. Yet, even at this lower magnitude, insufficient monies were allocated and there 
is now a massive infrastructure backlog as well as lack of clarity on how future urban infrastructure needs 
might be met. Where there is a shortfall, cities have considered other mechanisms: loans from municipal 
development funds administered by central government agencies, loans from development finance 
institutions, and (in rare cases) loans from commercial banks. Based on the lack of a clear devolution of 
power from the central government to municipal governments which would be constitutionally protected 
and enshrined, cities in sub-Saharan Africa have generally been barred from considering one of the most 
potent financial instruments widely used elsewhere in the world: municipal bonds.  
Municipal bonds are arguably one of the most transparent of financial instruments available to 
municipalities: relative to the other tools, they require a higher degree of reporting in documents available 
to a wide variety and number of investors, are less subject to interference by national government or other 
stakeholders, and are priced at the time of their issuance based off of and driven by investors’ perceptions 
of the creditworthiness (willingness and ability to repay debt) of the City relative to prevailing market 
conditions for other issuers. More importantly, bonds typically offer the longest term for financial 
repayment on projects that require a large injection of capital (typical conditions for urban infrastructure 
investments). This is particularly meaningful in sub-Saharan Africa, where municipalities face an ever-
increasing infrastructure investment gap and have exhausted other avenues (transfers, loans) as 
mechanisms. Curiously, cities in Europe are less frequent issuers of municipal bonds than their North 
American counterparts; this may be a factor of both the lack of political and fiscal decentralization in Europe 
as well as the preference for less transparent loans over more transparent bond issuances.  
Previous analyses of municipal finance claim that the reason why cities in sub-Saharan Africa do not raise 
funds through municipal bond issuances lies in the concept of African exceptionalism: the idea that Africa 
is unique and that its growth and development pathways are markedly different from those found elsewhere 
around the world. This thesis argues that African exceptionalism may be relevant in general terms but that, 
in terms of the financial decentralization required to issue a municipal bond, there is nothing particularly 
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unique about the African experience; the current uniqueness of Africa is not its development pattern but 
instead its progression along the pathway towards financial decentralization that has already been 
undertaken in other countries. That said, each of Africa’s 54 countries is unique, and its development during 
the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras makes it such that there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach 
that would prescribe the steps necessary to unlock additional financial resources. During the pre-colonial 
era, African civilizations allowed for a higher level of decision-making than that allowed during the colonial 
era, which was driven by the desire of mercantilist European economies to extract resources with the highest 
level of efficiency possible. The two prevailing systems in colonial sub-Saharan Africa – the French policy 
of assimilation and the British one of indirect rule – both centralized power at the colonial level, not at the 
sub-colonial level, and this continued into the post-colonial era. The legacy left by the colonial powers 
hampered decentralization, which directly negatively influenced the likelihood of financial decision-
making and urban planning taking place at the sub-national level; this meant that Cities until recently did 
not even consider how to finance needed urban infrastructure since this was handled at the national level. 
Former colonial powers, which themselves have issues with decentralization, have continued to exert strong 
influence over sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in francophone countries; this has not been as pronounced 
in former British colonies, which have encouraged more independence. With rare exceptions, and based on 
this colonial heritage which has carried over into political decision-making today, Cities in sub-Saharan 
Africa have largely been unable to raise finance through bond issuances.  
Cities in sub-Saharan Africa have largely been unsuccessful in using municipal bonds as meaningful 
instruments, despite the fact that they have met many of the pre-conditions laid out above (matching 
investment needs with available finance, development of creditworthiness, bankable projects and internal 
capacity), highlighting the fact that the challenge can be found in the lack of decentralization. Cities that 
have been successful in issuing bonds – Johannesburg and Douala – have done so through either a 
significant amount of decentralization (South Africa) or no meaningful decentralization (Cameroon), such 
that decision-making at the local level is codified to allow municipalities to act confidently and within a 
larger governmental ecosystem, either as fully empowered Cities or as extensions of central government. 
Cities that have not been successful – Dakar and Kampala – have faced challenges because of the lack of 
functional fiscal decentralization to sub-national governments.  
This begs the important question: why are national governments across Africa so leery of decentralization, 
particularly financial decentralization? Financial decentralization, on the surface, should be desirable for 
national governments: when done correctly, it frees up capital traditionally earmarked for cities that can 
instead be used in less financially sustainable areas (typically rural areas), and allows national governments 
to hand over responsibilities for urban management to sub-national ones. However, with this ceding of 
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power over financial decision-making come perceptions of increased power at the sub-national level, which 
can lead to political challenges in the future. Further, in financially weak countries, additional obligations 
and contingent liabilities taken on by sub-national governments may lead to a weakening of the national 
government’s ability to take on additional debt in the future (although it should be noted that most cities 
borrow a fraction of the overall national debt, and this is generally policed by the financial markets and 
their demonstrated interest in taking on sub-national debt).  Another critically important consideration is 
the relative financial immaturity of municipalities within the broader political system in Africa – a limited 
credit history coupled with a plethora of credit enhancements could be harbingers of a higher risk of default 
driven by a reliance on a safety net provided by external bodies as Cities experiment with different types 
of instruments.  Politicians and decision-makers at the national level use these three arguments to their 
advantage in arguing against decentralization and to substantiate their fears over a loss of power to sub-
national governments. 
To demonstrate the weaknesses of the arguments against financial decentralization and to debunk the 
longstanding theories about the reasons why cities in sub-Saharan Africa cannot issue municipal bonds, this 
thesis turns for an in-depth review of two of the four cities identified above: the two that are stalled in the 
process.  The prerequisites of decentralization, whether nearly full (as in the case of South Africa) or nearly 
fully incomplete (as in the case of Cameroon), led to two closed financial transactions, based primarily on 
the implementation of and strict adherence to constitutional systems.  Less encouraging examples, those in 
Senegal and Uganda, serve as a demonstration of how mixed messages on decentralization at the sub-
national level created confusion and, ultimately, led to failures to launch in both instances.  Senegal, a 
former French colony, is an archetypal example of a country with a highly centralized government with 
limited devolution of power, despite some efforts made by forward-thinking leadership at both the national 
and sub-national levels. Despite the limited devolution of power, Senegal’s capital – Dakar – was able to 
creatively finance its urban infrastructure through a series of increasingly autonomous tools. This started 
with an increasing reliance on transfers of funds from the central government and moved on to borrowing 
from a government-run municipal development fund, as a precursor to a loan from a development finance 
institution and, later, loans from domestic commercial banks. Although most of the conditions for a 
successful municipal bond issuance were met – both internally (from a financial and planning perspective) 
and externally (through sufficient available finance from interested investors and a favorable interest rate 
for bonds relative to loans) – the national government halted the transaction, citing constitutional reasons, 
which most understood to be politically driven. 
 
Uganda, a former British colony, is representative of the British tradition of indirect rule, which allowed 
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for a higher degree of sub-national government autonomy. With the legislation introduced by the Ugandan 
government allowing for more power to be held in the hands of the sub-national government in Kampala, 
the Ugandan capital was well-poised to launch a municipal bond based on its financial strength, 
transparency, accountability, and comprehensive master plans coupled with investor interest. Kampala was 
ultimately unsuccessful in its efforts to launch a municipal bond due to constitutional limitations on the 
amount of money that it could borrow (the amount of debt that it could constitutionally take on was 
insufficient to meet its financial needs for planned infrastructure investments); the national government has, 
to date, been unwilling to change these limits, which some claim is indicative of its lack of full commitment 
to decentralization. 
Ultimately, this thesis’s main argument is that cities face a significant barrier in their quest to access the 
magnitude of finance required to meet their long-term infrastructure investment needs – namely, an inability 
to achieve sufficient autonomy to make long-term financial decisions as manifested through financial 
decentralization. Ideally, it will help to inform national policy-makers, City officials, aid workers, and other 
key stakeholders involved in the process to better understand the challenges facing the expansion of the 
financial instruments available to municipalities in sub-Saharan Africa.  To address this, the thesis seeks to 
explore the answers to the following questions: 
1) What are the reasons why bonds are appropriate tools for municipal leaders to use in financing their 
urban infrastructure needs?  How do bonds differ from other tools and instruments that Cities have 
used, and continue to use, today? 
2) Why have there been so few successful (i.e., closed) municipal bond issuances in sub-Saharan 
Africa?  Is it due to internal factors, such as a lack of capacity at the municipal level to demonstrate 
financial responsibility and/or to launch a complex instrument, or is it driven by external factors, 
such as incomplete decentralization? 
3) How, and what, does the experience of municipal bond finance add to our understanding of 
intergovernmental politics in sub-Saharan Africa?    
Following this Introduction, Section 1 of the thesis begins with a consideration of the existing literature on 
decentralization, its history, and its challenges, and demonstrates that decentralization is needed to allow 
for financial decision-making at the local level (Chapter 1). Chapter 2 presents a literature review of the 
history and description of municipal bonds, drawing from examples in the global north and providing a 
comparison between the European approach of bank-direct lending to municipalities and the American 
approach of institutional investor-driven capital markets activities through municipal bonds. Having built 
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the argument that municipal bonds are an appropriate tool for financing urban infrastructure and that they 
function best within a context of decentralized, empowered local governance, the thesis turns to a review 
of the unique situation in sub-Saharan Africa in Chapter 3, reviewing both its ethno-cultural historical 
preferences as well as the European-imposed political constructs that shaped highly centralized nation-
states, with little power constitutionally designated to the local level. Armed with this information and the 
full abstract theoretical picture of the difficulties encountered by those local governments in sub-Saharan 
Africa that are considering municipal bonds, the thesis moves on to Section 2, in which the experiences of 
four cities with mixed successes in municipal bond launches are reviewed in greater detail: Johannesburg, 
South Africa, and Douala, Cameroon (Chapter 4), Dakar, Senegal (Chapter 5),  and Kampala, Uganda 
(Chapter 6). 
Ultimately, it is my hope that this thesis will explore and unpack the question of how municipal bonds can 
be meaningfully used to finance urban infrastructure needs across sub-Saharan Africa as well as why they 
have been facing opposition in instances where their issuance has been attempted.  It is important to 
remember that municipal bonds are not the only way for cities to raise capital for their projects, but they do 
represent a rational and reasonable solution that has, to-date, been under-used. 
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Situating the Problem of Local Government Finance in Africa  
Today, one-half of the world’s population lives in cities, which generate more than 80% of global Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) (Trujillo & Parilla 2016).1 During the period from 2006 to 2020, all ten of the 
fastest-growing cities are projected to be located in the global south (City Mayors Foundation n.d. ). The 
future development of the global south now depends significantly on how well urban population growth is 
managed in cities (Dobbs 2012). If well-managed, cities can be engines for economic growth and for 
expanding access to basic services for large sections of the national and regional population; sound 
management can also ensure that existing high levels of urban poverty are reduced, particularly in Africa 
(Swilling 2017). But to date, the correlation between urbanization and economic growth has been weaker 
in developing countries than in developed countries (Fox 2012; Gollin, Jedwab & Vollrath 2016). This can 
most notably be seen in Africa relative to other parts of the world, where rates of unemployment have risen 
and real average wages have fallen (International Labour Organization 2018).  This can partially be 
attributed to a fundamental mismatch between the expectation that urbanization is necessarily accompanied 
by industrialization, as elaborated by Potts in her argument that some urban areas are simply enlarged rural 
settlements without the key characteristics of urban centers, which themselves carry with them new job 
functions and economic opportunities (Potts 2017).  Notwithstanding the challenges of defining urban areas, 
“urbanization promotes proximity between diverse activities that feed off each other in various ways” 
(Turok 2016: 34).   
There is abundant evidence that countries in sub-Saharan Africa are struggling to face the challenges of 
urban population growth (Ebeke, Nstama & Mireille 2017; Edoun 2017; Glaeser 2014; Onjala & K’Akumu 
2014). In line with the previous paragraph, urban population growth can increase substantially in the 
absence of urban economic growth, which further compounds the problem and can lead to dramatically 
high rates of urban unemployment (Crankshaw & Borel-Saladin 2018).  The typical emerging City lacks 
control of land use or provision of adequate services.2 This means that traffic congestion wastes productive 
time and pollutes the air (Cervero 2013); poor populations are concentrated on sites subject to a myriad of 
hazards (Sattherwaite et al. 2007); and disparities between rich and poor create social tensions and 
 
1 It is worth noting that this figure understates the total value of urban economies, as it does not account for the 
informal economy (i.e., those economic activities that fall outside of the purview of official regulation). Informal 
employment, which includes informal employees in formal enterprises, accounts for more than 66% of non-
agricultural employment in sub-Saharan Africa (Vanek et al. 2014). 
2 The differentiation of the city from the City is an important and sensitive academic device dealt with in this thesis 
with the understanding that the “city” references an urban settlement while the “City” indicates its governing 
authorities, as discussed by Cirolia (2018) in her analysis of the application of the terms in a study of Kisumu, 
Kenya. 
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insecurities that can turn the hopeful vision of life in a modern city into a nightmare, especially for the poor 
(Webb 1998). The economic potential of cities will not be fully realized until City governments have both 
the tools to manage the development challenges being thrust upon them and the resources to improve 
economic, environmental, and social conditions. Municipal leaders recognize the importance of financial 
management and long-term capital investment planning, but are often constrained in their abilities to 
prioritize strategic investments that match future growth when they are unable to successfully source the 
financing required to meet their operational budgets (UCLG GOLD 2010). 
Urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa has rapidly increased over the past decade (UNDESA 2014). Africa 
has increasingly become an urban continent, with the average urbanization rate reaching 37% in 2014, an 
increase of about 10 percentage points since 1990.3 During the period 1990–2000, the average annual 
growth rate of the number of urban dwellers was 3.3%, the highest in the world (Pieterse 2014). Labor has 
rapidly moved away from traditional sectors and rural areas to take up job opportunities in urban zones, in 
a manner that has not always led to an improvement in living standards, nor to economic growth in general. 
One of the main consequences of rapid urbanization has been the rapid development of the informal service 
sector in many African economies (Obeng 2011). 
Another direct implication of the rapid urbanization process in Africa has been the growing size of primal 
cities (i.e. the largest city in a country). As discussed by Brückner (2012), the average primacy in Africa is 
much higher than in other regions; in particular, it is much higher than in industrialized countries. According 
to Brückner, increases in the urbanization rate have had a significant average negative effect on GDP per 
capita growth in Africa. Ades (1995) highlighted the association of a high incidence of dictatorship and 
political instability with large primal cities.  The urbanization literature has also demonstrated the negative 
effect of large primal cities on aggregate economic growth (Brückner 2012; Henderson 2003). This is 
consistent with negative externalities arising from increases in squatter settlements in large primal cities; 
these are exacerbated by the confluence of a rapid increase in the number of squatter settlements, the 
constant growth of the number of families in these settlements, and the increases in the growth rate in these 
communities driven by rural-to-urban migration (Hardoy & Satterthwaite 2014). 
A recent study published by the World Bank in its World Development Report (2013a) indicated that not 
all countries experienced higher levels of GDP when a larger share of the population moved to urban areas. 
Henderson (2005) finds no econometric evidence linking the extent of urbanization to either economic or 
productivity growth or levels. Importantly, Henderson (2003) finds that large primal cities exert a negative 
 
3 World Development Indicators data set (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS, accessed 
October 2018). 
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impact on aggregate growth. In a multivariate analysis of cross-country panel data from 1970 to 2000, 
Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2008) found no evidence that the level of urbanization affects the rate of 
economic growth. Gollin, Jedwab, and Vollrath (2016) distinguish between two types of urbanization 
developments which have distinct developmental implications. One pattern is that urbanization can occur 
with structural transformation and therefore cities are “production cities”, with a mix of workers in tradable 
and non-tradable sectors.4 The other pattern is associated with an increase in urbanization not linked to 
structural transformation. In these countries, urbanization takes place in “consumption cities” where the 
mix of workers is heavily skewed toward non-tradable and low-productive service sectors (Gollin, Jedwab 
& Vollrath 2016). 
As a result, unfortunately, the world at large still under-invests in the infrastructure required to meet long-
term growth expectations. To cope with massive population growth, human development needs, and climate 
change as well as to sustain economic growth and productivity, more needs to be done to boost and retrofit 
infrastructure capacity. The world must invest an estimated USD 1 trillion more than its current allocations 
per year for the foreseeable future to meet basic infrastructure needs. These figures translate into global 
infrastructure needs of 3.8–6.6% of GDP: 3.8% in the global north, 6.6% in the global south (Dobbs 2013). 
Increasingly, institutional investors, companies, and foundations have been approached to provide private 
capital to help fill this financing gap. One important source of funds, particularly in rapidly growing cities 
in sub-Saharan Africa, is municipal debt. This is because municipal bonds lend themselves to the lengthy 
repayment period required by sub-national governments, which in turn is determined by the willingness 
and ability of end users (citizens) to pay for the costs of the investments. Case studies of two cities in sub-
Saharan Africa presented later in this thesis will demonstrate that, even with sound financial management, 
constitutionally mandated and predictable transfers from national government, and annual tax collection, 
municipalities do not have access to the type of funding required for the delivery of capital-intensive 
projects; in a 2017 interview with the author, Marco Kamiya of UN-Habitat shared that “the availability of 
finance for critical infrastructure is insufficient to meet the pace of rapid growth in sub-Saharan Africa”.5 
A noteworthy observation here is that municipalities in Africa, regardless of their British colonial heritage 
(which provides for tax collection from individuals by agents of municipalities directly for municipal 
accounts) or French colonial heritage (which provides for tax collection from individuals by agents of the 
 
4 The term “production cities” refers to those cities where a large fraction of workers are engaged in manufacturing 
or in tradable services, such as finance; this is in contrast to “consumption cities,” where a large number of workers 
are employed in non-tradable services, such as commerce and transportation or personal and government services 
(Gollin, Jedwab & Vollrath 2016). 
5 Interview with Marco Kamiya, 19 June 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
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central government indirectly for municipal accounts), are all coming to the conclusion that municipal 
bonds represent one of the most efficient and effective tools in the search for long-term, competitively 
priced funds for infrastructure (Siddique 2015).  
Municipal finance is especially important in the global south because of (1) the relatively recent 
decentralization of power away from central government towards provinces and cities; and (2) the rapid 
unplanned urban population growth found in the world’s low- and lower-middle-income countries. Many 
politicians, whether at the national or municipal level, conflate municipal finance with municipal bonds, 
and further think that “the best way to ease the pressure on the shrinking national fiscus will be through the 
introduction, en masse, of municipal bonds to cash-strapped districts.”6  But municipal bonds are not a 
development panacea. In countries across sub-Saharan Africa, the challenges and obstacles associated with 
accessing repayable finance at the municipal level to fully close the financing gap between public funds 
and those available from the private sector can be highly damaging, because sub-national governments have 
clear mandates to provide certain public services and infrastructure. While the responsibilities delegated to 
local governments by law vary considerably from one country to the next, Cities in the global south often 
have mandates to provide a wide range of services covering: (1) local basic services and infrastructure, 
including water, sanitation, public transportation, public lighting, and solid waste management, among 
others; (2) resilience building, and climate mitigation and adaptation, including energy efficiency, flood 
management, and retrofitting of public buildings, among others; and (3) local social services and 
infrastructure, including health, education, and childcare facilities, among others. These services, however, 
are expensive and require investments that typically far exceed municipal budgets. Within the African 
context, the easiest place to see this discrepancy is in South Africa, where a growing number of municipal 
governments have chosen to adopt unfunded budgets. According to figures from South Africa’s National 
Treasury, in 2017, of the country’s 257 municipal councils, 81 voted to adopt unfunded budgets, an increase 
of more than 15% from 2016’s tally of 69. Figure 0.1 underscores the point: approximately one-third of 
each budget is unfunded and therefore at high risk of financial distress. 
  
 
6 Interview with Herbert M. Asiimwe, Director Banking and Non-Banking, Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning, Financial Sector Development Department, 11 October 2018, Kigali, Rwanda. 
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Figure 0.1: Municipal budgets in South Africa by percentage covered through available 
programmed funds, 2013/14–2017/18 
 
Source: National Treasury, Republic of South Africa (2018a) 
Note:  The category “other” here refers to amounts that are provisional or based off of municipal performance in their efforts 
to meet goals set by external development partners who provide “performance-based finance”.  In instances where the local 
government fails to meet those goals, the development partner retains the right to pay only a portion of the anticipated funding 
package. 
The situation is further compounded when considering the budgetary allocation between operating expenses 
and capital (investment) expenses. Operating expenses (or OpEx) refers to the day-to-day expenses incurred 
by a city; the largest OpEx for a city is typically for salaries and building maintenance.  Capital expenditure, 
on the other hand, is for longer-term purchases, which have a functional lifetime for longer than the fiscal 
year in which they are purchased.  Cities are often governed by regulations that stipulate that all obligations 
under operating expenses need to be met prior to capital expenses.  This often leads to a situation where, as 
Figure 0.2 shows, cities program to meet their funded budgets, and are left with a shortfall for their capital 
expenditure – a gap that is rarely filled without the injection of capital from outside sources through 
repayable financial instruments like municipal bonds.  
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Figure 0.2: Allocation of 2016/17 South African metro budgets between operating and capital 
expenditures (ZAR millions) 
 
Source: National Treasury, Republic of South Africa (2018b); SACN (2017) 
Most telling though, as Figure 0.3 vividly depicts, is the finding that sub-sovereign governments across 
South Africa have continually overspent on their operating accounts while underspending on their capital 
expenditures, driven by the lack of funds available to meet their expenses in both categories without 
additional injections of capital.  An underspend on the capital budget occurs when a municipality struggles 
to find sufficient cash-on-hand to meet its basic obligations for function, such as salary, utilities, and other 
basic expenses; when pressed to make a decision about the ways to spend limited resources, municipal 
leaders will “rarely prioritize investments in future projects over payment for today’s expenses.”7 
  
 
7 Interview with Patrick Musoke, KCCA, 3 June 2019 (Kampala, Uganda), and 28 July 2019 (London, England). 
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Figure 0.3: South African municipalities that have overspent on budgeted operating expenditures 
(>25%) and underspent on budgeted capital expenditures (<30%), 2013–2017 
 
Source: National Treasury, Republic of South Africa (2018c) 
The use of South Africa as a case here is helpful as it shows financial performance and decision-making 
for large- and medium-sized cities; in much of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, this information is either non-
existent or unaudited, which calls into question the reliability of the data.  However, South Africa should 
not be used as a proxy for the entirety of the African continent, and is helpful to illustrate a point, not to 
make a definitive case.  Effectively, South Africa is an appropriate case study as it has the highest number 
of reporting municipalities with audited statements in sub-Saharan Africa. There is a risk that, in other parts 
of sub-Saharan Africa, the problem is even more pronounced, but insufficient data makes reaching 
definitive conclusions nearly impossible. 
This phenomenon is not limited to cities in the global south; cities in Canada, the United States, Italy and 
Australia have been shown to teeter on the brink of bankruptcy or austerity budgets for the same reason 
(Klingelhofer, Erasmus & Mayo 2015). Most cities across sub-Saharan Africa are significantly resource-
constrained and have difficulties in meeting their budgetary projections on essential services, leaving no 
additional funds available for investment in non-essential or long-term projects. As an example, for the past 
eight years the City of Dakar has approved an average municipal budget of approximately USD 75 million 
but shows, through its year-end accounting, that it has barely been able to cover the costs of its average 
annual operating budget of USD 35 million, leaving the municipality with no residual flexibility to pay for 
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any of the items on its ever-growing list of desirable capital investments.8  
The inadequacies of government transfers and the growth of urban areas make functional decentralization 
more viable and more necessary, particularly as countries around the world often suffer from insufficient 
budgets to support Cities with capital investment needs that may not be priorities for decision-makers at the 
sovereign level (Ahrend, Curto-Grau & Vammalle 2013; Devas & Delay 2006). This is particularly 
pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa, where local governments are forced to compete against other political 
entities, including line ministries (which are often led by political appointees and cronies of the national 
government) (Fox & Goodfellow 2016; Resnick 2014a). From a financial perspective, fiscal devolution is 
critical in allowing cities to demonstrate to potential sources of capital their commitment to City-level 
accountability for financial management and municipal efficiency in service delivery, which can help them 
to secure crucial investment. In some instances, this can also help to better institutionalize citizen 
expectations of government accountability and democracy (Cabannes 2004; Mberu, Beguy & Ezeh 2017).  
While urban needs and aspirations may grow, the financial options available to cities in most countries in 
the global south have not kept pace with the growth and increasing complexity of the Cities themselves. 
Cities are stuck in a vicious cycle of limited resources leading to a constrained response, while the 
population of the city and the demand for services continue to expand. Ironically, many local government 
capital investments have high economic and social returns, and therefore should be attractive to 
governments (seekers of capital) as well as to businesses (sources of capital) (Canning & Bennathan 1999). 
For instance, there is strong demand for electricity and housing in most African cities, and investments in 
these sectors could plausibly offer commercial returns. Therefore, in a number of countries across sub-
Saharan Africa, Cities are looking to domestic capital markets as a potential additional source of finance; 
for sub-national governments, these transactions take the form of municipal bonds. This phenomenon, 
indicative of a fundamental shift towards acceptance of and eagerness for repayable funds as a way to close 
the infrastructure finance gap, has been captured in the growing work being done, primarily by international 
donor agencies, on financialization, which explicitly incorporates a broader range of stakeholders, including 
financial institutions and other intermediaries, as relevant and interested parties with influence over political 
and economic functions (Pike & Pollard 2010). 
The conditions required to provide local governments with capital market access were not designed with 
21st-century Africa in mind, and in some respects are not fit for purpose. Sub-national bonds were tested 
and developed in Europe and North America, initially in Italian city-states in the pre-Renaissance era and 
 
8 City of Dakar Financial Statements – Provisional Budget and Year-End Accounting, 2008 – 2016. 
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with a more recent resurgence as early as the first decades of the 18th century for the construction of New 
York’s Erie Canal (Temel 2001). In these instances, municipal bonds were successful due to a strong 
interest in the financial instrument shown by all parties concerned: the sub-national government seeking 
finance, the investors seeking a reliable and steady return on their capital invested, and the national 
government seeking alternative ways to source the financing required for significant capital investments 
rather than through direct transfers to sub-national government. Although there are now more investors 
with larger magnitudes of money and with more appetite to diversify their investments into new and 
unfamiliar geographies and projects, the historic successes of Italy and the United States are unlikely to be 
replicated without a commitment from the national government to devolve power to the sub-national level.  
Borrowing at the municipal level is quite different from borrowing by senior levels of government. Unlike 
central and state/provincial governments, which can and do borrow to meet operating requirements (such 
as to pay wages and salaries, purchase materials, etc.), municipalities can generally only borrow to make 
capital expenditures. In most countries, municipalities are not allowed to run a deficit in their operating 
budgets. When the benefits of a capital investment, such as the construction of a water treatment plant, are 
enjoyed over a long period, it is both justifiable and efficient to fund the project partially through borrowing 
so that benefit and cost streams are balanced as the debt is paid. Nevertheless, local access to capital markets 
is often heavily restricted in the global south. Smaller municipalities, even in countries with well-developed 
capital markets, may be able to borrow only through a financing authority or state/provincial body, partially 
to reduce borrowing costs by pooling the requirements of different municipalities. In principle, provided 
there is no central subsidization of such borrowing (e.g. through guarantees, explicit or implicit), this 
method of financing capital investment is a good idea. In practice, however, many countries in the global 
south have experienced substantial difficulties that have resulted in tighter restrictions being imposed on 
sub-national borrowing.  
In most countries, some form of limitation is placed on the amount of funds that can be borrowed by local 
governments. For example, the central government may limit long-term borrowing to capital projects 
(Rodden, Eskeland & Litvack 2003). It may limit the aggregate amount of long-term debt to a fixed share 
of the local tax base. Some central governments place limits on debt charges, for example that such debt 
charges (principal repayment plus interest) cannot exceed a specified percentage of expenditures or own-
source revenues. Municipalities need to be concerned about maintaining a sustainable level of borrowing 
or optimal level of debt, relative to future operating budgets and anticipated population and economic 
growth; each municipality has its own level of tolerance for debt. In doing so, they take account of the 
statutory limits set out by the senior levels of government, competition with other municipalities in 
accessing capital markets, and maintenance of a good credit rating. 
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Borrowing may occur in one of two ways: (1) by taking a loan from a commercial bank or other specialized 
financial institution in a process known as financial intermediation; or (2) by issuing debt obligations 
(bonds), calling on the public’s savings in a process known as disintermediation or direct funding. Whatever 
the system – with or without intermediation – for a long time, competition between potential providers was 
distorted by tax breaks, central government guarantees, legal protections, and access to subsidized funds. 
This remains largely the case in many countries. For instance, in the United States, interest income received 
by holders of municipal bonds is exempt from federal taxes and from many state and local taxes, and several 
public sector loan funds provide subsidized loans for certain types of infrastructure and services 
investments. In Europe, most countries have had (or still have) specialized municipal finance institutions 
that enjoyed a de facto monopoly on loans to local governments; these institutions also received highly 
preferential terms, preventing competition from all other financing sources. This situation originated in 
central governments’ desire to furnish long-term funds, often with subsidized, below-market interest rates, 
for local infrastructure investments; it also helped central governments to control and supervise local 
governments’ borrowings. The municipal credit market has only recently become completely commonplace 
in a limited number of countries, where local governments can freely borrow from commercial banks and 
specialized institutions via loans or from capital markets directly via bonds, either individually or in groups. 
Local governments can make lenders compete, and may choose between direct and intermediated financing 
according to their best interests and the financing characteristics they require. 
No objective reason to favor one system over the other appears evident. Direct financing has been presented 
as the ultimate stage in the system’s evolution (Inter-American Development Bank  2002), but this opinion 
hardly seems well founded. On the contrary, European countries show that bank loan financing and bond 
issuance together furnish optimum efficiencies in a non-distorted market; competition drives rates lower, 
and borrowers can decide which type of financing is best suited to the type of investment planned. From a 
central government’s perspective, both systems share the virtue of collecting and using local savings. In the 
least developed countries, direct municipal debt financing on capital markets is not widespread. Its viability 
depends on the existence of adequate legislative and regulatory infrastructure, sufficiently developed capital 
markets, and technically and financially adept bond issuers. In African countries, these conditions rarely 
coexist; developing this mode of financing represents a crucial challenge, not least for its potential to collect 
and transform local savings. 
Donors continue to play a preponderant role in the financing of capital investments on the African continent. 
In most cases, they provide financing to central governments or to ad hoc financial intermediaries, when 
present; the funds are then reassigned to local governments as a loan or a grant. In some cases, donors make 
central government-guaranteed loans directly to local governments. There are a few, very rare examples of 
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what are known as sub-sovereign loans, which are loans without a central government guarantee made by 
donors directly to municipalities or other local governments. But for a few exceptions, commercial banks 
remain absent from the municipal credit market, and the number of local governments that have issued 
bonds can be counted on one hand. It should be noted that some countries’ statutes prohibit local 
governments from borrowing. In many cases, the funds that local governments could borrow from a bank 
or raise on capital markets would have prohibitively expensive characteristics, such as high interest rates, 
short durations, no grace period, and so forth. In general, access to borrowing remains very limited in Africa, 
primarily because most local governments are insolvent or have too weak or too random repayment 
capacities. Commercial lenders see no market, a too risky market, or a market that costs too much to service. 
Methodology and Research Questions 
The audience for this thesis is threefold: (1) political economists interested in decentralization and its 
impacts on financial autonomy and decision-making; (2) financial practitioners with a particular focus on 
the tools available for City leadership; and (3) Africanists who are considering the exceptionalism of sub-
Saharan Africa in the broader context of human development. The first half of the thesis frames each of 
these subject areas, building – through desk review – on the experiences and observations of others, while 
the second half deeply examines the confluence of these three issues in two cities in sub-Saharan Africa: 
Dakar, Senegal, and Kampala, Uganda. To be able to gather the necessary data, the researcher used the case 
study approach within the broader field of qualitative research. Data were collected from publicly available 
documents and a series of interviews with individuals directly involved in questions of municipal finance. 
The researcher was also able to use information gathered in his role as an advisor to the two in-depth case 
study cities in Senegal and Uganda: he was the Lead Technical and Financial Advisor to the City of Dakar 
from 2011 to 2016, and has served as the advisor to the City of Kampala’s Nakawa Division since 2016. 
The credibility of findings and conclusions extensively depends on the quality of the research design, data 
collection, data management, and data analysis. This part of the chapter will be dedicated to the description 
of the methods and procedures followed in order to obtain the data, how they will be analyzed and 
interpreted, and how the conclusion will be arrived at. 
Before addressing the specifics of the methodology, it is helpful here to reiterate the research questions that 
the thesis seeks to answer, which are namely: 
1) What are the reasons why bonds are appropriate tools for municipal leaders to use in financing their 
urban infrastructure needs?  How do bonds differ from other tools and instruments that Cities have 
used, and continue to use, today? 
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2) Why have there been so few successful (i.e., closed) municipal bond issuances in sub-Saharan 
Africa?  Is it due to internal factors, such as a lack of capacity at the municipal level to demonstrate 
financial responsibility and/or to launch a complex instrument, or is it driven by external factors, 
such as incomplete decentralization? 
3) How, and what, does the experience of municipal bond finance add to our understanding of 
intergovernmental politics in sub-Saharan Africa?   
The first part of this thesis, which addresses the theory behind decentralization, municipal finance and 
African exceptionalism, helps to lay the groundwork for the relevance of each of the cases explored in the 
second part of the thesis.  Based on the nature of the information available on the topic of the thesis – 
municipal bonds in sub-Saharan Africa – research was conducted using a qualitative approach, relying 
heavily on non-numerical information available through a wide variety of media (Rossman & Marshall 
2010). Within the area of qualitative academic studies, the researcher opted to follow the case study 
approach to substantiate his thesis, particularly as the use of examples helps to demonstrate successes and 
failures in attempts to experiment with municipal finance in instances where incomplete decentralization 
has been the largest obstacle. 
Understanding the case study approach  
Within the larger field of qualitative approaches, case study research involves the study of an issue explored 
through one or more cases within a bounded system (in this instance, municipalities interested in issuing 
bonds, and their associated opportunities and constraints) over time, through detailed, in-depth data 
collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g., observations, interviews, documents, and 
reports). The data are fused into a case description from which the researcher draws results and 
recommendations. In a collective case study (one which uses more than one case, as in this thesis), a single 
issue or concern is the focus of the research (Stake 1995), but the researcher selects more than one case  for 
study to illustrate the issue – in the present thesis, the cities of Dakar and Kampala. In this thesis, the 
researcher also uses the cities of Johannesburg and Douala as examples against which the case study cities 
can be measured. Some academics (Merriam 1998; Yin 2003) suggest that the multiple case study design 
uses the logic of replication, in which the inquirer replicates the research procedures for each case. As a 
general rule, qualitative researchers are reluctant to generalize from one case to another because the contexts 
of cases differ. To best generalize, however, the inquirer needs to select representative cases for inclusion 
in the qualitative study.  
Although there are several ways to conduct a case study review, this thesis employs Stake’s approach 
(Stake 1995): 
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1. Determine if a case study approach is appropriate to the research problem; this is achieved by 
identifying bounded cases that can easily be compared. 
2. Select cases that help to demonstrate the issue under consideration through “purposeful maximal 
sampling” (Creswell & Clark 2007: 112). 
3. Conduct extensive research, drawing on multiple sources of information, including documents, 
archival records, interviews, direct observations, and participant-observations (Yin 2003). 
4. Interpret the findings from research through analysis and comparison of cases, collected as lessons 
learned and recommendations for the future (Lincoln & Guba 1985). 
Challenges of the case study approach 
Case selection 
Intrinsic to the case study approach is the selection of the cases to be analyzed through purposeful maximal 
sampling, a phenomenon which displays the researcher’s bias and may seem like a fait accompli, with cases 
being chosen that help to concretize the underlying thesis. Identifying the cases requires that the researcher 
establish a rationale for his purposeful sampling strategy for selecting each case and for gathering 
information about the case. Not having enough information to present an in-depth picture of the case limits 
the value of some case studies. In this thesis, the researcher has been able to provide a detailed picture of 
the two cities considered in Section 2, because of his roles and responsibilities in each of the two cities 
profiled there. 
Researcher biases 
The present researcher has committed much of his professional career to supporting municipalities in sub-
Saharan Africa in their efforts to launch municipal bonds. This bias has impacted the thesis in three ways: 
1. The researcher enters the discussion from the point of view that municipal bonds are, de facto, an under-
used but necessary tool for municipalities to use to raise the money that they need to reach their goals 
of financing much-needed infrastructure. 
2. The participants in the interviews spoke to the researcher with the knowledge that he was both 
conducting research on municipal bonds for his thesis and sympathetic to the idea of municipal bonds.  
3. Despite efforts on the part of the researcher to conduct a balanced set of interviews, only those 
interviewees who were themselves interested in supporting municipal bonds agreed to participate. 
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These conditions influenced the narrative and the conclusions of the thesis, as the analysis it presents 
is firmly entrenched in the argument that municipal bonds are appropriate tools which are challenged 
exclusively by existing conditions outside of the control of sub-national governments.  
Issues of consent and confidentiality 
Among the significant issues that were considered in the planning of the case study research were questions 
of consent, confidentiality, and data protection. These issues were identified in advance so as to prevent 
problems that could have arisen during the research process. As some elements of the claims made in the 
argument of this study include conversations with public officials and financial intermediaries on the topic 
of municipal bonds, the researcher explained to each informant that all opinions would be bundled and kept 
confidential, without any specific attribution of comments to individuals. Specifically, the researcher sought 
to gather proprietary or confidential information from respondents on various issues, including: (1) the 
deliberations of municipal councils prior to the decision to pursue municipal bonds as a tool for meeting 
long-term capital needs; (2) the appetite of various potential institutional investors for municipal bonds 
from Cities without a demonstrable credit history. Maintaining anonymity was necessary in order to ensure 
the privacy as well as the security of the participants.  
The problem of bad data 
In undertaking data collection and subsequent review for the two cities that chiefly constitute the case 
studies in this thesis, the researcher was faced with a dilemma core to the problem: the existence of both 
bad data and limited knowledge and/or capacity on the part of the participants and municipal representatives 
which made it difficult to effectively and correctly assess the financial performance of the respective cities. 
Both of these elements were the impetus for requests for support made by the Cities to charitable 
foundations (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) and bilateral and multilateral development agencies 
(the World Bank’s Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, the Agence Française de 
Développement (AFD), the United Kingdom Department for International Development, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United Nations Capital Development Fund 
(UNCDF). This support, received on a rolling basis from 2010 to 2016, came mostly in the form of financial 
underwriting of additional resources, experts, and consultants who could externally review the process of 
data collection in the Cities rather than involve themselves in the process of data collection in the 
municipalities themselves. As an example, municipal ratings conducted by local ratings agencies (Global 
Credit Ratings in Kampala, Bloomfield and Moody’s in Dakar) relied exclusively on the information 
provided to them by the financial departments of the Cities, without significant ground-truthing of the data 
through verification at the source. The researcher reviewed the data on the basis of which the analyses were 
30 
 
made, which were often derived from audited statements from the City, but recognized on further review 
that two challenges stemmed from this approach: (1) the numbers were conflated by ratings agency in a 
way that demonstrated the potential inappropriateness of a methodology standardized for corporate 
borrowers in the case of municipalities;9 and (2) the numbers were occasionally miscalculated in the audited 
statements and were not reflective of the actual year-end calculations of the municipalities, as municipalities 
sought to avoid demonstrating large deviations from the projected budgets set at the end of the previous 
fiscal year. As a solution to this problem, the researcher reviewed the publicly available ledgers of the 
financial departments for each City to insure the accuracy of an independent review. The researcher had an 
advantage in accessing this information, as the collection and cleaning of bad data were part of the larger 
roles and responsibilities of his project, the Dakar Municipal Finance Program (DFMP), in the City of 
Dakar, and these challenges were acknowledged, if not fully addressed, during the lifetime of this program 
sponsored by external donors.10 
Similar to the challenges of bad data from a numerical perspective was the problem discovered by the 
researcher that many of the practitioners charged with addressing municipal finance were uneducated about 
basic terms. A key example of this can be found in the failure to distinguish between operating budgets 
(which cover the revenues and costs of basic municipal functioning, such as fees collected from citizens for 
civil ceremonies and certificates or salaries for municipal employees) and investment budgets (which cover 
the revenues and costs derived from long-term City investments, such as rents derived from publicly owned 
buildings or borrowing for capital-intensive projects). This inability to meaningfully discuss fundamental 
principles of municipal finance led the researcher to spend significant amounts of time during the interviews 
working through some of the more elementary ideas underpinning economics and finance with 
interviewees, and may have led some of the respondents to answer in a biased way. This was a particular 
concern in regard to their indications that increasing the amount of money available in the investment 
budgets would have strong positive impacts on the City, without fully grasping the implications of these 
increases for the City’s debt obligations or financial capacity. 
Core to the methodology of this thesis is an understanding of the rationale underlying the presence of bad 
 
9 Although related to the question under discussion, this point tangentially addresses the separate issue of the struggles 
of ratings agencies to accurately distinguish between the performance of different sovereign countries in a single 
currency bloc (as in the case of the eight West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries, of which 
Senegal is a member). This manifests itself in the fact that there is no differentiation between the risk profile of Cȏte 
d’Ivoire, a stable and rapidly growing economy, and that of Niger, which suffers from lower performance metrics on 
economics and growth. Further, and of major significance in relation to issues raised in this study, this inability to 
distinguish between different countries’ performance means that prospective lenders are challenged in attempting to 
accurately price the risk – accomplished through the setting of interest rates – of different countries in the bloc and in 
creating a yield curve that differentiates between short-term and medium-term debt. 
10 The DFMP is discussed in detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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data. Sandefur and Glassman (2014: 1–2, 23) explain this as the perverse incentives of the development 
system, insisting that  
[this] misrepresentation of statistics does not occur by accident or due to a lack of analytical 
capacity – at least, not always – but rather that systematic biases in administrative data 
systems stem from the incentives of data producers [in this case, the municipal governments] 
to overstate development progress… These inaccuracies appear to be due in part to the 
perverse incentives created by connecting data to financial incentives without checks and 
balances, and to competing priorities and differential funding associated with donor support. 
While this argument may be appropriate in the case of competition for international aid, it fails to adequately 
correspond to the presence of bad data when seeking to borrow from financial institutions with expectations 
of repayment. When comparing the financial picture that would be shown to donors – namely, the 
demonstration of a municipality with weak performance and a need for external support to deliver on core 
development goals – with that for the financial sector – the demonstration of a municipality with strong 
performance and both the willingness and the ability to meet its obligations over a sustained period of time 
– the argument could be made that the presence of bad data would stem as much from poor capacity and 
knowledge as from intentional efforts to mislead.  
In summary, in the execution of the data collection and analysis presented in the following chapters, the 
researcher considered the quality of the data sources, and their motivations in presenting information in a 
certain way, and performed significant independent research to confirm the validity of all financial 
reporting. 
Conclusion 
Resulting from the recognition of the points listed above, this thesis argues that municipal bonds in sub-
Saharan Africa are one of the best tools for Cities to use in meeting their long-term financial goals, while 
these   Cities are simultaneously plagued with challenges in the execution of these goals due to incomplete 
devolution of political and financial autonomy through decentralization of power from the national to the 
local level.  Although explored tangentially in works by many other scholars exploring how Cities grow 
and finance themselves in response to rapid urban development, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, there 
has been little focus on attempts to introduce one of the most appropriate instruments – municipal bonds.  
Even more important, there has been no focus on the impediments to municipal bond issuance or the fact 
that the interrelated issues of insufficient political and fiscal decentralization with relation to financial 
autonomy at the sub-national level circularly yields insufficient urban development and infrastructure.  
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Through an investigation of decentralization, municipal finance and the current situation of sub-national 
governments in sub-Saharan Africa, this thesis fills the gap between the practicalities of municipal finance 
and the abstractions of political theory.  
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Section 1: Theory:  
Determining the Factors Governing Municipal Finance 
 
The intent of this first substantive section of the dissertation is to review the foundational elements of 
municipal finance from a theoretical perspective.  The first chapter examines decentralization, with a 
particular focus on the reasons why it may not always be achieved in its fullest form and how this 
negatively impacts the autonomy needed at the sub-national level to contemplate sophisticated financial 
instruments required for long-term, economically-sustainable urban growth.  It leads directly to a closer 
review of municipal bonds, considering the instances where such tools help to meet the imperatives of 
urban development at a pace and level of repayment manageable by municipal governments.  The section 
concludes with a criticism of the idea of “African exceptionalism,” arguing that Africa is at a different 
point in the global development trajectory, but not particularly unique. 
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Chapter 1: Decentralization 
“Centralization is now a word constantly repeated but is one that,  
generally speaking, no one tries to define accurately” – Alexis de Tocqueville11 
 
The first of three major themes in this thesis – decentralization and its impact on financial autonomy and 
decision-making – is explored in detail in this chapter, starting with an exploration of the initial 
development of cities within a larger context. This is followed by a consideration of the root causes of, and 
arguments relating to, modern decentralization. It is placed as the first of the three academic areas of interest 
in this thesis as it is arguably the underlying cause of challenges faced in the application of a wide variety 
of financial tools at the City level (in the case of this thesis, specifically municipal bonds) and lays the 
foundation for the thesis’s argument – that the reason why municipalities in sub-Saharan Africa are not 
using municipal bonds is the distrust of decentralization at the national level, not inherent weaknesses in 
municipalities and their financial management at the sub-national level. 
According to the Social Science Encyclopedia, a city is defined as a “reasonably large and permanent 
concentration of people within a limited territory” (Hannerz 1996: 86–88). However, the word is imbued 
with myriad connotations and expectations relating to size, population density, and purpose, and today’s 
academic debate proposes multiple reasons why cities exist and how they should function as part of a larger 
political macrocosm involving other tiers of government. Social scientists have long debated the definition 
of a city as well as the reasons that first gave rise to the agglomeration of people in cities. Tilly argues, in 
Cities and States in World History, that cities are not simply a matter of dense populations within a 
geographical area where services are provided for the public good, but instead are also centralized based 
on a strong level of trust such that there is a “relation in which at least one party places a valued enterprise 
at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes or failure of another party” (Tilly 2010: 266). A direct theoretical 
descendant of the tenets of Locke’s social contract (Locke [1689] 2016), popularized during the Age of 
Enlightenment and intended to address questions about the legitimacy of the state’s authority over the 
individual, this approach assumes that civilization sprang from a collective recognition of the power of the 
group to respond better to problems than individuals. Other theorists promote different approaches, 
suggesting that people may have banded together to form cities as protection against hostile enemies; or 
that, upon the success of the Neolithic revolution in introducing more advanced technology for agricultural 
 
11 Tocqueville ([1835] 1969: 87) . 
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purposes, human civilizations no longer traveled in search of food and could instead create dense, settled 
populations; or that higher yield and better crop production led people to view surplus food as a store of 
wealth and that this wealth would be best maintained by creating facilities where excess food could be 
safely kept (Boix 2010; Ortman, Cabaniss & Sturm 2014) . Later hypotheses continued to refute these 
theories well into the 20th century: in The Economy of Cities, Jane Jacobs (1970) argued, based on findings 
from the Turkish settlement at Çatalhöyük, that cities pre-dated that agricultural revolution, implying that 
cities were essential to the production of a surplus (in food and other quantifiable goods) rather than the 
other way around. More specifically, she argued that the first substantial human settlements were stateless 
societies formed by egalitarian bands of hunters and gatherers well before the development of early 
civilization’s agrarian societies. Regardless of the reason that initially sparked the development of cities in 
early human civilization, the model proved desirable enough for people to choose to continue to congregate 
on a permanent basis in places that were optimal for agriculture and trade. Well-functioning cities have an 
interconnected framework of planning, designing, connecting, and financing patterns. These patterns have 
contributed to the success stories of cities, such as New York at the beginning of the 19th century, which 
in the span of two generations moved from extreme poverty and urban chaos to wealth, prosperity, and a 
complex and vibrant order with highly livable communities (Swilling et al. 2018). In his seminal book on 
the topic, A Pattern Language, Christopher Alexander described how, when viewed holistically, each 
pattern forms a word or thought of a true language rather than being a prescriptive way to design or solve 
an urban problem: 
Each solution is stated in such a way that it gives the essential field of relationships needed 
to solve the problem, but in a very general and abstract way, so that you can solve the 
problem for yourself, in your own way, by adapting it to your preferences, and the local 
conditions at the place where you are making it. (Alexander 1970: xi) 
The purpose of this chapter is, principally, to introduce some of the most critical concepts in the debate 
about what the ramifications of incomplete decentralization might be. To understand incomplete 
decentralization and its challenges, though, the discussion needs to consider the evolution of the city, why 
the city exists as it does within a larger national context, and how decentralization has come to be central 
to the discourse of political economy in the 21st century. By the end of this chapter, a reader should have a 
clearer understanding of the salient points argued by both sides – the proponents and opponents of 
decentralization – and be able to see how this argument factors into the practice of decentralization, and is 
later manifested in the attempts of incompletely decentralized Cities to raise finance based on challenges 
from national government. 
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The earliest human civilizations functioned as small City-states where finances were aggregated by the 
ruling family and used to cover the costs of basic infrastructure, whether in Mesopotamia or in early Greco-
Roman societies (Hasel 1994). As time passed and centralized power became a universally accepted 
concept similar to today’s concept of the nation-state, leading families in medieval and Renaissance 
civilizations took responsibility for governance and for raising funds for basic infrastructure to ensure that 
cities would function at optimal capacity (Abulafia 1997; Goldthwaite 2009). However, and regardless of 
the magnitude of the funds that cities were able to raise on their own, in all but a few instances 
(predominantly City-states around the Mediterranean, including those of ancient Greece and Carthage as 
well as the more modern Renaissance Italian City-states [Gabrielsen 2013; Jones 1997]), cities required 
more than their own-source revenues to finance all of their needs, whether these revenues were derived 
from the largesse of charitable works by leading families or taxes collected from businesses operational in 
the cities themselves. This financial dependence on other bodies, whether kings in traditional societies or 
national governments in modern societies, led to the subsumption of the City throughout much of human 
history, a phenomenon that has been challenged through the recent rise of demands for decentralization. 
This fundamental tension between the City as an independent, decision-making entity in control of its 
political and economic destiny and its reliance on external financial support builds the argument for 
decentralization, as modern Cities have access to tools that can largely transform their financial reliance on 
the nation-state.  
Understanding fiscal decentralization 
The debate over decentralization has political, administrative and fiscal dimensions. The philosophical 
debate can be traced to Alexander Hamilton and Alexis de Tocqueville in the 18th and 19th centuries (Oates 
1998). Fiscal decentralization, which entails shifting some responsibilities for expenditures and revenues 
to lower levels of government, has been successfully introduced as part of a larger framework of 
decentralization. It is generally a response to unsatisfied political demand for greater regional or local 
autonomy, or the result of a large economic divide between rich and poor.  
Fiscal decentralization, when viewed as a process and not simply an outcome, varies from country to 
country. Unitary and federal governments differ in the ways that the central government interacts with local 
governments. In unitary governments, some degree of decentralization is possible, depending on the 
framework for interaction among central and subordinate levels of government. In comparison, federal 
governments by definition are composed of sub-national governments with greater levels of autonomy 
constitutionally institutionalized (Hart 2016). 
Public services are allocated to local or regional governments based on the combination of different criteria, 
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including population size, fiscal capacity, development needs, and other factors. The cost of the provision 
of public services is covered through a mix of own-source revenue (typically taxes and tariffs), transfers 
from the central government, partnerships with the private sector, and a diversity of other financial tools.  
The theory and practice of fiscal decentralization differs greatly from country to country and region to 
region. The post-Soviet model embraces a shift in power originating from the late medieval era but 
constrained by financial limitations at both the sovereign and sub-sovereign level (Matei 2014; Moroz, 
Semtsov & Kukel 2016; Stoilova 2010). In contrast, Chinese efforts at decentralization are driven by top-
down thinking and largely conform to expectations of minor reform introduced in Beijing (Dexu & 
Wenlong 2017; He 2018). While the African experience of decentralization, which is still relatively recent, 
forges its own path based on the unique combination of colonialism, tribalism, and relatively low wealth 
compared to other societies, the theoretical challenges of financial decentralization are not markedly 
different, as discussed below and demonstrated in later chapters, particularly when enshrined in 
constitutional law and local practice. 
The rationale for (and against) decentralization 
Political scientists, policy-makers, and other observers of governance have expressed a variety of 
justifications for decentralization. First among these is an assumption that decentralized government is 
“closer to the people”, and one key corollary holds that decentralized government will thus be more 
progressive and participatory. For some, decentralization can signify deeper local democracy based on 
increased grassroots mobilization. Accordingly, one of the powerful normative arguments in favor of 
decentralization is the proper representation of local voters. Limited knowledge of individual preferences 
on the part of central government officers has often translated into sub-optimal decisions on the best 
allocation of public resources. This line of thought is an extension of Hayek’s defense of the market 
economy, which argues that local bureaucrats and political leaders are likely to know more about people’s 
preferences than are central government officers (Hayek 1945). A variation of this argument is that, while 
centralization is associated with the homogeneous provision of public services for all citizens across the 
nation, this may collide with heterogeneous local preferences across jurisdictions. Thus, devolution of fiscal 
and political powers to lower tiers of government would be a way to promote an efficient allocation of 
resources through which local demands are fully understood and properly attended to at the local (sub-
national) level of government (Oates 1972). 
A second corollary for others is that sub-national governments will exhibit higher levels of state efficacy 
and effectiveness than central governments, since decentralization can trim bloated central states. Empirical 
evidence of the “failure of the centralized state” is seen as tantamount to a need for decentralization; 
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theoretically, decentralization promotes fiscal federal ideals wherein local jurisdictions can approximate 
market-based competition by offering different clusters of public goods and taxation rates to current and 
prospective inhabitants. Decentralization thus enables high-performing sub-national governments to 
distinguish themselves from others, and facilitates better matching of societal demands with public supply 
of goods, whereas centralized governance fails to do so; local political jurisdictions operate in the same 
way as an efficient and competitive private market. Local governments come to exist in the same way as 
private firms enter a particular industry, in response to demands from a particular community. Likewise, 
they can eventually be removed from the “local public goods industry” if the administrative cost of 
operating a particular jurisdiction becomes too high with respect to residents’ tax revenue-generation 
capacity. Local jurisdictions may become “spatialized” by providing specific types of local services in the 
same way as different firms produce different varieties of products in line with differences in consumer 
desires and intended uses of market products (Tiebout 1956). Autonomous jurisdictions would compete in 
the provision of local public services, tailored for different communities based on their own preferences. 
Conceptually, voters would “reveal their preference” for local public goods through the political process, 
by supporting good performance of local governments, and holding them accountable for the quality of 
local service delivery. This “accountability advantage” would be diluted at the national level, in which 
political responsibilities are widespread, and voters’ capacity to oversee government performance is weaker 
(Seabright 1996). 
An alternative view depicts the government as a “rent-seeking” economic agent trying to take advantage of 
its power to extract Ricardian rents from taxpayers. Following this line of reasoning, decentralization may 
be seen as an institutional device to protect individuals from governments in the same way as central banks 
safeguard monetary policy from undue influence by government (Brennan & Buchanan 1980). National 
governments are regarded as being no different from private monopolies, to the extent that they are the sole 
entities collecting taxes or delivering public goods. As a result, they would tend to charge higher prices 
(taxes) and deliver lower-quality public goods relative to a competitive situation. As voters become more 
aware of the dangers of the “Leviathan”, this theory predicts that the median voter will automatically bias 
his political preferences towards more decentralized institutional arrangements. This partly explains why 
high-income countries tend to be more decentralized (Panizza 1999). In line with this hypothesis, an 
extensive empirical literature has attempted to provide evidence that fiscal decentralization leads to a lower 
tax burden, without conclusive results. 
A third purported advantage of decentralization is the concern that sub-national government in the 
developing world is historically underdeveloped, and that continued centralization due to low local capacity 
will create a vicious circle that will only lead to fewer options in the future (Caldeira, Foucault & Rota-
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Graziosi 2015). A final argument claims that decentralization improves political socialization, with stronger 
local government serving as the basis for future national leaders in politics and society (Riedl & Dickovick 
2014). In brief, with sub-national governments being closer to the people than the central government, 
increasing the scope of sub-national governments relative to the center will improve local access to political 
decision-making, and result in improved responsiveness and accountability, as local elected officials face 
incentives to reply to local demands. 
Opposing viewpoints on decentralization, particularly in fiscal terms, focus predominantly on the idea that 
a decentralized fiscal system poses a threat to macro-economic stability (Shah 2005). Practitioners 
challenge three major assumptions of theories that treat the dynamics of the “local public goods industry” 
as equivalent to those of private competitive markets. These alternative views question the arguments that 
(1) local governments are genuine representatives of their constituencies and try to compete to please 
residents through the best possible combination of prices (taxes) and local public good quality; (2) the “local 
public goods industry” is broadly competitive, with no externalities among jurisdictions, and with all costs 
and benefits fully internalized by local residents; and (3) local voters not only vote at the ballot box, but 
also do so with their feet by choosing the jurisdiction where they want to live, taking into account the type 
of local government that they want to have (Shah 2005). 
At the core of these challenges is the reality that the revelation of citizens’ preferences may be rather 
imperfect, seeing as how many national and local governments do not face the necessary incentives to 
compete or maximize the welfare of their constituencies. This is because a well-functioning democracy, 
with transparency in decision-making and citizen representation, is not always in place at both the national 
and the local levels, particularly in the global south (Batley 2004). Moreover, decentralization in imperfect 
democracies could result in excessive closeness between local authorities and big local private interests, 
which may lead to corruption and elite capture. Finally, there is some empirical evidence pointing to 
stronger professional qualifications and better availability of information for central government officers 
relative to local authorities (Prud’homme 1995). 
Additionally, the assumption of high mobility across jurisdictions is not confirmed by empirical evidence. 
First, family and labor ties may prevent citizen mobility (i.e., changing their location in search of better 
employment opportunities or access to basic services) to maximize their individual utility. Political scientist 
Daniel Treisman argues that poorly performing local governments are unlikely to be disciplined by 
residents’ mobility, as the quality of local services is mainly capitalized into property prices, making “voting 
with their feet” a costly affair for homeowners and tenants. Moreover, sub-national governments may not 
have the necessary incentives to target the local poor, for whom mobility is more costly. In addition, 
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excessive mobility across jurisdictions could also be a problem, as it may translate into additional fiscal 
pressures on local governments showing above-average performance because of an increasing number of 
potential beneficiaries coming from other jurisdictions (Treisman 2007). 
Decentralization in its purest sense is intended exclusively to denote increases in sub-national autonomy, 
as devolved from central government to sub-national government. By contrast, a number of donor agencies 
have promoted governance projects as decentralization that primarily involves direct transfers from donors 
to local governments, or support for institutional development of sub-national governments. The essence 
of decentralization must be a political process of change whereby power and/or resources are moved from 
the center to those levels of government beyond the center (Eaton 2011). Far from denying the center a 
major role in the process, this justifiably places intergovernmental relations – and not simply the 
empowerment of sub-national governments – at the heart of decentralization. National governments must 
be viewed as key players in decentralization schemes, in order to ensure improvements in the all-important 
linkages between levels of government. Improving decentralization involves greater cooperation and 
incorporation of central governments, not less.   
However, there is an inherent problem with an exclusive reliance on donor-driven decentralization found 
within the application of the theory itself: donors currently imagine that  
Africa’s disorder is a result of broken institutions, or at a slightly more sophisticated level, perverse 
incentive structures.  They have the idea that discrete interventions and aid can mend these 
malfunctioning institutions, and provide different sets of incentives.  By doing so, democracies will 
function and market-led, pro-poor growth will occur. (Kelsall 2005: 76)  
This statement underscores questions around decentralization posed by African decision-makers that are 
largely ignored; namely, if decentralization of powers – politically, functionally, and fiscally – is so 
desirable, why have the donors that are encouraging decentralization in Africa not embraced it in their own 
countries?  
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As a sidebar to the debate on decentralization in Africa, it is important to remember that the lack of 
decentralization in Africa can be attributed to the lack of decentralization in the European countries 
that directly controlled the destiny of African countries for a century. The United Kingdom is currently 
among the least decentralized of the world’s most developed countries: when comparing the 
percentage of sub-national finance to total GDP in the United Kingdom with its peers (viewed as the 
most objective indicator by practitioners and academics), it fares poorly (Figure 1.2). 
Figure 1.2: Sub-national finance as a percentage of total GDP 
 
Source: Adapted by the author from OECD, Subnational Government Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SNGF, accessed August 2016. 
In Federal Britain, Philip Booth asserts that the United Kingdom needs to decentralize to survive 
politically and financially; he cites the differences between the needs of unemployed welfare recipients 
across the country as evidence that a centralized policy is ineffective and inefficient. Further, he points 
to a recent analysis of local government financing, which concludes that  “[r]ecent work comparing 
the UK with the USA and Europe has concluded that the lack of devolution and local discretion in the 
UK is a constraint on economic performance, particularly in the cities” (Booth 2015: 6). 
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In the 1980s and 1990s, a wave of decentralization swept across much of the developing world. Along with 
democratization and economic liberalization, decentralization became a major theme in the relocation of 
political and economic power. The wave affected a wide range of countries; in Africa, democratically 
inclined governments in small, unitary states have increasingly looked to decentralizing power to overcome 
the pathologies of centralized rule. Political scientists have long recognized that the power to govern 
depends on the control of fiscal resources, regardless of the level of government in question (national or 
sub-national): questions about which level of government controls fiscal resources have profound 
implications for the most fundamental theories about where power lies. Sub-national fiscal autonomy, or 
the ability of local governments to act independently of the central government, can be used as a barometer 
for decentralization. Dickovick (2011) indicates three types of autonomy and the types of questions that 
can be used to perform a comprehensive analysis, as set out in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1: Measuring sub-national fiscal autonomy 
 Type of autonomy Measurement 
Revenue autonomy  - Do sub-national governments [SNGs] have taxation authority? 
- Do SNGs receive guaranteed transfers from the central government? 
- Are SNG revenue guarantees constitutionally protected? 
Expenditure autonomy - Do SNGs operate free of spending mandates? 
- Can SNGs set independent budgets? 
- Is spending by SNGs free of monitoring by national ministries? 
Contractual autonomy - Are SNGs legally autonomous from central governments? 
- Can SNGs contract debt in capital markets? 
- Can SNGs negotiate labor costs with civil service? 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Dickovick (2011). 
Although this is a good illustration of the types of questions that need to be considered when reviewing 
questions of autonomy, even positive answers to all of these questions are still insufficient when validating 
the enabling environment in a country in order to better understand the freedom of sub-national 
governments to enter into financial obligations, as will be demonstrated later this work through 
examinations of the experiences of the cities identified for case studies. 
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The impact of incomplete decentralization on the mobilization of capital for urban 
infrastructure 
Regardless of the level of decentralization, cities need to find a way to meet their financial requirements. 
In the least decentralized of systems, cities simply rely on the national or state/provincial government to 
fully fund their budgets through direct transfer; however, even in the most decentralized of systems, cities 
receive some portion of their budget from transfers from government.  
As summarized in the World Bank’s 2014 publication Municipal Finances: A Handbook for Local 
Governments, municipal finance, especially as a concept linked with decentralization, is pivotal in looking 
towards the future of global urban development (Farvacque-Vitkovic & Kopanyi 2014). While no country 
is free from the challenges of municipal finance, the dangers of a failure to act are more pressing in the 
global south, and are primarily driven by two key phenomena: (1) the relatively recent decentralization of 
power away from central government towards sub-sovereign levels; and (2) the rapid increase in urban 
population growth rates found in the world’s least developed countries. The shortcomings of municipal 
finance in the global south can be highly damaging, because sub-national governments have clear mandates 
to provide certain public services and infrastructure (which can often be chief among the factors driving 
internal migration from rural to urban areas, as found and documented by the International Observatory on 
Participatory Democracy and the Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention’s Migrants on the 
Margins initiative).12 While the responsibilities delegated to local governments by law vary considerably 
from one country to the next, cities in developing markets often have mandates to provide the following 
services: (1) local basic services and infrastructure, including water, sanitation, public transportation, public 
lighting, and solid waste management, among others; (2) resilience-building, and climate mitigation and 
adaptation, including energy efficiency, flood management, and public building retrofitting, among others; 
and (3) local social services and infrastructure, including health, education, and childcare facilities, among 
others. These services, however, are expensive and require investments that are often far more expensive 
than what a municipal budget can support from its own resources or from transfers from higher levels of 
government.  
The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and New Urban Agenda13 underscore the 
recognition that cities are critical in the successful management of human development, particularly through 
the designation of one goal – Goal 11 – as specifically devoted to making “cities and human settlements 
 
12 Interview with Beatriz Tembe, International Observatory on Participatory Democracy, June 2016, Maputo, 
Mozambique.  
13 See http://habitat3.org/the-new-urban-agenda, accessed in October 2018. 
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inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.”14 In fact, during the lead-up to the finalization of the Goals, critics 
argued that there is a flaw in this conceptualization, namely that there should not be a unique goal that 
applies specifically to cities, but rather that all of the objectives of the SDGs should be applied in cities and 
viewed as underpinning the successful achievement of all 17 of the Goals by 2030 (Commonwealth Local 
Government Forum Pacific n.d.; Peirce 2014; Scruggs 2015a, 2015b). They argued that the growth of cities 
and towns makes functional and fiscal decentralization more viable and more necessary, and in many 
countries, local autonomy is growing. Increasing the capacity of local officials not only improves urban 
resilience and quality of life; it empowers cities and towns to contribute in important ways to national social 
and economic development goals. From a financial perspective, fiscal devolution is critical in allowing 
Cities to demonstrate to potential sources of capital their commitment to City-level accountability for 
financial management and municipal efficiency in service delivery. In some instances, this can help to better 
institutionalize citizen expectations of government accountability and democracy, particularly when 
coupled with participatory budgeting (Cabannes 2004; Mberu, Beguy & Ezeh 2017).  
In the past, most cities in the global south would not have had the autonomy, information technology, or 
knowledge of trends in the urban sector worldwide to embark on significant development projects or to 
prepare multi-year investment plans. But with a growing number of cities in the global north successfully 
using a wide range of financial instruments that form the basis of best practices, and a more well-educated 
cadre of investors and municipal practitioners reversing the “brain drain” by returning home with skills 
picked up overseas, cities in the global south are more well-prepared to demonstrate their readiness to raise 
funds (Brown & Kirkpatrick 2002; Mapulanga-Huston 2014). The amount of borrowing by public and 
private entities alike has grown exponentially since the dawn of the 21st century, and the number of non-
local currency-denominated transactions (i.e., USD, EUR, etc.) has grown even more significantly. 
In the simplest terms, cities finance themselves in a number of different ways: taxes, tariffs, transfers, and 
external debt. The most traditional method is finance through the contribution of everyone who lives within 
the City’s limits by means of property taxes, whether directly paid by the occupant or indirectly paid to the 
property owner in the form of rent. If everyone contributes an equal share, this reduces the possibility of a 
“free rider” problem (Miceli 2011). However, it fails to accommodate the fact that different property owners 
will, by definition, have properties of differing values. As a result, an alternative approach to taxes, whereby 
property taxes are based on assessments of value, has taken hold in capitalist societies. Imposition of taxes 
goes back to the beginning of recorded history, since all states require economic resources to project their 
power and to provide internal security and other services. The role of taxation in the development of modern 
 
14 See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11, accessed in October 2018. 
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nation states, and its relation to the rise of democratic institutions, is significant within the broader history 
of financial distribution and the critical task of raising funds for the provision of services that benefit the 
collective good, most notably within the context of this thesis for infrastructure. Acquisition of taxation 
powers by the sovereign, and later by legislative bodies, developed along with limits on the power of 
monarchs, suggesting strongly that taxation played a crucial role in the shift of power from the governing 
toward the governed. An important debate has emerged about the nature of, and causality among, the major 
factors that underlie the historical evolution of fiscal systems and their relationship to democratic 
institutions (Dincecco 2011; Epstein 2000; Schumpeter [1918] 1991). Although they pursue different goals, 
non-democratic governments face similar economic constraints in creating tax systems to those faced by 
democratic ones. Different objectives will lead to different outcomes, however. Some proponents of 
socialism, for example, theorize about how a government that attempts to maximize revenues would 
structure a tax system to exploit the private economy (Marx 1848; Ellman 2014). In actuality, non-
democratic governments will have more complex goals, since they must also concern themselves with 
maintaining power in a given political setting (Brennan & Buchanan 1980). Other theorists view economics 
as the basis of a theory of dictatorship, where taxation is one of the means used to stay in power (Wintrobe 
1998).  
There are two main principles around which systems of taxation can be arranged. One is the “benefit 
principle”, a long-held idea put forward by public finance theorists, which argues that “an equitable tax 
system is one under which each taxpayer contributes in line with the benefits which he or she receives from 
public services” (Musgrave 1989 : 219). This approach ties taxation to public service delivery, helping to 
develop a close correlation between the money generated in tax revenue and the money spent delivering 
the particular good or service.  
The “benefit principle” can be contrasted with an alternative approach: the “ability-to-pay principle”. As 
the name suggests, this principle entails that “each taxpayer is asked to contribute in line with his or her 
ability to pay” (Musgrave 1989: 219). The difference between this and the “benefit principle” is that in this 
case there is no direct connection with what is being paid for. Citizens contribute according to their ability, 
without necessarily seeing the result of their contributions. In reality, most tax systems combine elements 
of both approaches, with wealthier citizens contributing more, but some contributions being directly linked 
to services. The advantage of this approach is that linking taxation to services helps to generate a social 
contract between citizens and the government, such that citizens know what they are contributing to and 
are able to witness its effects (Rosen & Gayer 2014).  
Regardless of the level of state control, billing efficiency (the ability to accurately assess users of city 
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services, often manifested through taxes on property owners for their proportionate share of the budget 
based on the assessed value of their homes) and collection efficiency (the ability to collect the correct 
amounts from the users of services, again viewed through the common example of tax collection from 
property owners) is weaker in sub-Saharan Africa than in most other parts of the world. Using water utility 
companies as a proxy, particularly since access to water is essential regardless of the status of home 
ownership, even the best-performing utilities in Africa struggle to meet global benchmarks for operational 
and financial performance. More specifically, the traditional metric used in measuring efficiency for water 
utilities is the level of non-revenue water, or water that fails to generate revenue for the utility due to either 
physical leakage or failure of the utility to either bill or collect. As shown in Figure 1.1, in a study conducted 
by the World Bank (Van den Berg & Danilenko 2017), the level of non-revenue water in Africa in aggregate 
for the best-performing quartile of African utilities is significantly higher than that of the best-performing 
quartile of global utilities. 
Figure 1.1: Non-revenue water per connection per day (m3) 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Van den Berg & Danilenko (2017). 
A separate and equally striking comparison, conducted as part of a larger study by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), highlights the fact that tax revenues themselves are 
poorly collected across Africa relative to other sovereign countries. While tax revenues count for over 33% 
of GDP in OECD countries, they correspond to less than 20% of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa (Carter & 
Cebreiro 2011).  
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The above data highlight the disparity between the performance of utilities or governments in sub-Saharan 
Africa and that of their peers around the world; they indicate that cities in sub-Saharan Africa are not 
collecting as much revenue as their peers in other parts of the world. Donor agencies, foundations, and 
development finance institutions are attempting to solve this problem through the introduction of cadastral 
mapping, improved information management systems, etc., but the pace of uptake on this technology and 
new practices is unlikely to be sufficient to meet the immediate financial needs of the countries concerned 
(Floater et al. 2017; Moinuddin 2010). (Part of the reason why cities in the global south face such significant 
challenges with even basic delivery of services, let alone collection of revenue for the services provided, 
can be found in the limited knowledge of the existence and placement of homes, as demonstrated by the 
failures of systems for identifying streets, buildings and plots, which have been unable to keep up with the 
pace of urbanization. According to a comprehensive study completed in 2005, 50% or more of the city 
streets in the global south “have no names or addresses, and the problem is particularly acute in the poorest 
neighborhoods” [Farvacque-Vitkovic et al. 2005: vii].)  
When Cities are mandated to provide services to their population they will typically charge for those 
services, both to cover the costs of the services directly provided as well as to use such services as a cost 
center to cover municipal expenses that are not directly revenue-generating themselves. A World Bank 
study has shown that the infrastructure deficit in sub-Saharan Africa is far greater than that of other its peers 
elsewhere in the global south; in every metric used in the study, Africa’s infrastructure lagged well behind 
that of its peers (Yepes, Pierce & Foster 2008). Table 1.2 summarizes this information. 
Table 1.2: Africa’s infrastructure deficit 
Normalized units Sub-Saharan 
Africa low-income 
countries 
Other low-income 
countries in the 
global south 
Paved-road density 31 134 
Total road density 137 211 
Main-line density 10 78 
Mobile density 55 76 
Internet density 2 3 
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Generation capacity 37 326 
Electricity coverage 16 41 
Improved water 60 72 
Improved sanitation 34 51 
Source: Yepes, Pierce & Foster (2008: 2) 
Note: The table does not include standardized measuring units but instead tries to approximate the relative amounts between low-
income countries globally and those in sub-Saharan Africa.  The intent of the table, and the study, is to show the striking difference 
between sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world using indicative numbers.  
Compared to taxes, it is generally easier to tie user charges directly to the cost of producing services so that 
a perpetual funding shortage can be avoided. These charges are thus a more self-sustaining source in the 
long run. Imposing user charges can be politically sensitive, especially for sectors such as water supply 
where the services are often viewed as entitlements that should be subsidized. Despite potential public 
hostility, however, user charges can be the key to unlocking private sector capital and attracting innovative, 
self-sustaining financing solutions in the long run. Better-quality service, more service options catering to 
specific users, user vouchers, and automated collection systems are a few potential solutions that can help 
to incentivize users and increase their willingness to pay. 
City governments around the world benefit from transfers from central and state/provincial/county 
governments. These transfers are typically derived from a formula that combines the amount of money 
collected from a City with a weighting of the demonstrated need and the (often) subjective preference of 
the layer of government making allocation decisions. Interestingly, the amount of money sourced from 
local governments for local government projects is not closely linked to the development status of the 
country (Devas 2008; Devas & Delay 2006).  
Regardless of the examples set in Western Europe and North America, the biggest challenge for Cities in 
sub-Saharan Africa is not the level of funds that these Cities typically have available for financial 
commitment to their capital-intensive investment needs, but the fact that they cannot adequately predict 
the timing of the transfers allocated by central government. Nonetheless, it can be instructive to compare 
the level of sub-national government expenditure as a percentage of GDP of the two countries in Western 
Europe that left an indelible stamp on sub-Saharan Africa with that of sub-Saharan Africa itself (Figure 
1.3). Notably, there is more money spent at the sub-national level in the two Western European countries, 
but it represents money that was collected and then redistributed, whereas national and municipal 
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governments across sub-Saharan Africa are being strongly encouraged to rely more heavily on own-
source revenue (Bird 2010; Shi, Hendrick & Park 2018).   
Figure 1.3: African and European sub-national government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 
2012–2013 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from the UCLG’s Global Observatory on Local Finance (OECD/UCLG
 
 2016).  
In the face of insufficient finance from taxes, tariffs and transfers, Cities have developed creative 
instruments that can be used to cover the cost of their financial needs by borrowing from a number of 
different sources of capital: financial institutions, civic-minded citizens, and others. Public sector financing 
is almost always 100% debt financing (i.e., fully leveraged with no equity capital at risk). The cost of this 
debt financing is significantly lower relative to the private sector due largely to taxes and other public assets 
that effectively serve as collateral on the debt. Taxpayers are thus de facto equity holders of government 
investments, and any risks associated with these investments are ultimately borne by the taxpayers. These 
risks, however, are not reflected in the debt financing costs per se because they are considered relatively 
risk-free, implying that taxpayers are obligated to make the debt holders whole in one way or another. 
Traditionally, this borrowing has taken the form of loans (most typically, bilateral instruments between a 
sole borrower and a sole lender through a negotiated transaction between both parties) or bonds (most 
typically, instruments with a sole borrower and multiple sources of capital through a public transaction, 
refereed by a financial regulator and an advocate for the prospective bondholders, or a trustee). Municipal 
infrastructure is largely supported by this type of investment around the world, with more experiences of 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
50 
 
success in the global north than the global south.  
Cities in sub-Saharan Africa are increasingly benefiting from loans from bilateral and multilateral 
development finance institutions (DFIs) at concessionary rates, but this type of financing is ultimately not 
reliable in the long term as DFIs are increasingly challenged by shrinking budgets for investment. 
Unfortunately, in nearly all cases, the amount of money contributed by DFIs outweighs the amount of 
money invested by national governments in infrastructure (Figure 1.4).  
Figure 1.4: Total African infrastructure commitments by region and source, 2016  
 
Source: Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (2016) 
Note: The DFIs referred to include the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) bilateral members e.g. G8 countries (Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the USA), and multilateral members e.g. the World Bank Group, African 
Development Bank Group, European Commission, European Investment Bank and Development Bank of South Africa. 
More challenging than the unsustainability of concessionary-rate financing is the inability of Cities in sub-
Saharan Africa to launch municipal bonds. However, across sub-Saharan Africa, the use of bonds at the 
national level as a mechanism for raising debt for long-term infrastructure projects has nearly doubled over 
the past eight years (from 14% to 27% of total debt), as shown in Figure 1.5.  
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Figure 1.5: Sources of debt financing in sub-Saharan Africa, 2008–2016 
 
Source: World Bank Group (2017) 
The next chapter of this thesis will demonstrate the power of municipal bonds as financial instruments for 
Cities, and highlight the fact that such bonds are less expensive options for Cities to consider than other 
sources when looking for creative ways to cover their financial costs.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that, while their needs and aspirations may grow, the financial options available to 
Cities in most countries in the global south have not kept pace with the growth and increasing complexity 
of the cities themselves. Cities are stuck in a vicious cycle of limited resources leading to constrained 
responses, while the population of the city and the demand for services continue to grow. Ironically, many 
local government capital investments have high economic and social returns, and therefore should be 
prioritized both by decision-makers at the local and central government levels (seekers of capital) as well 
as by the businesses that may ultimately benefit from a more productive workforce (sources of capital). For 
instance, transportation signals that reduce congestion free people’s time and reduce time in commute, 
improving their quality of life and work-life balance. Investments in drainage that reduce flooding in 
commercial areas reduce trading days lost to post-flood recovery. In these cases, domestic private capital 
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should be available to finance municipal investments that cannot be financed through grants. At the heart 
of the challenge for cities still remains the lack of autonomy, often through the incomplete attempts at 
decentralization common among governments in the global south (Gorelick 2018). 
Within the context of the thesis, this chapter introduces the idea that decentralization can be beneficial both 
for sub-national governments that are eager to take on additional responsibilities and act responsively to 
their citizens and for national governments that are overburdened with a host of responsibilities which, 
often, relegate concerns about urban infrastructure to a diminished status.  Adding the ideas of 
decentralization with the other two theoretical areas of municipal bonds as a mechanism to raise funds and 
the concept of African exceptionalism, theories of decentralization constitute one of the three pillars of the 
theoretical exploration of this thesis.   
  
53 
 
Chapter 2: Municipal Bonds 
 
“In this world, nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.”  
– Benjamin Franklin15 
 
Closely linked with the previous chapter’s focus on decentralization and its impact on financial autonomy 
and decision-making, this chapter builds on many of the initial points raised and begins to explore the idea 
of municipal bonds themselves as an appropriate tool for the financing of urban infrastructure in 
geographies like sub-Saharan Africa. Without understanding the reasons why decentralization faces 
detractors, the debate about municipal bonds would, at an initial glance, deal primarily with the financial 
preparedness of a sub-national government; with the backdrop of decentralization firmly established, the 
implications of a municipal bond issuance as a manifestation of a devolution of power over decision-making 
become clear, with the City starting to rival the once-exclusive power of the national government (in 
activities like bond issuance). In essence, this chapter helps the reader begin to think about the fact that the 
often-quoted indicators of municipal creditworthiness and readiness for issuing a bond are fundamentally 
dependent on the creation of an appropriate enabling environment for such a transaction, and that non-
decentralized governments where there is ambiguity about the roles of cities create a poor situation for such 
financial experimentation. 
Mobilizing resources to finance investments and improve services at the municipal level is one of the most 
challenging aspects of local development, especially if the goal is to provide resources in market-like 
conditions in a sustainable manner, for instance from loans or bonds. Even when government transfers are 
predictable and generous (which is the exception), they are rarely adequate to finance major infrastructure 
improvements in growing cities (Arezki & Sy 2016). The capital investment financing that is available to 
local governments is often provided by national agencies whose own access to capital is highly constrained. 
Winning funding allocations from national budgets requires local governments to compete with line 
ministries and other priorities of the government in power. Regardless of the source of funds for central 
governments – whether own-source or from an outside body – the amount of money spent by local 
governments in the global south on capital expenditure is inadequate (UCLG 2010). Therefore, in many 
 
15 Franklin (1789). 
54 
 
countries in the global south, cities are increasingly looking to the capital markets as a potential additional 
source of finance; for sub-national governments, these transactions take the form of municipal bonds. 
The conditions required to provide local governments with capital market access have been tested and 
perfected in North America and Europe, initially in Italian city-states in the pre-Renaissance era and with 
a more recent resurgence as early as the first decades of the 18th century for the construction of New York’s 
Erie Canal (Temel 2001). And yet, these conditions have not so far been met in sub-Saharan Africa, largely 
because of incomplete decentralization. However, there are other extenuating factors that further complicate 
matters for these cities in their ongoing quest for finance, although the argument in this thesis is that these 
come into play only once the issue of decentralization and national government commitment to encouraging 
financial autonomy has been dealt with.  
Lack of a framework for investment 
Because financial institutions want to be reasonably secure in their decisions on long-term capital 
investments, the establishment of a transparent and sound regulatory framework for investment is a 
prerequisite for attracting capital flows (Kantrow 2014). Such a framework ensures that financial 
obligations are upheld for all parties to transactions. In the absence of this framework, institutional and 
individual investors lack confidence in domestic capital markets. 
Sources of capital have responsibilities as well. To be effective investors in municipal projects, institutional 
investors should be prepared to mobilize adequate resources to meet local governments’ investment needs, 
be transparent about their expectations by creating risk/return trade-offs that are clearly understood by and 
agreeable to all parties, and encourage the involvement of capable intermediaries, analysts, and trustees 
who are prepared to facilitate transactions in both the primary market and throughout the lifetime of the 
bond (i.e., through providing liquidity in secondary markets). These conditions are often absent in sub-
Saharan Africa due to the nascent nature of the financial markets, lack of investor confidence, and lack of 
tools to mitigate risks. Effectively, these factors come together in a catch-all term – financialization – which 
references the growing influence of capital markets, their intermediaries, and processes in contemporary 
economic and political life (Gorelick 2016). 
Lack of creditworthy local governments and bankable plans/projects 
With few exceptions, Cities are political entities led by politicians who serve at the pleasure of the 
electorate, and this can have significant impact on the ability to raise finance from risk-averse investors. 
Cities cannot pierce the sovereign ceiling established by the economic and financial performance – the 
creditworthiness – of their respective countries. Accordingly, the potential pool of capital sources for cities 
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is limited to those investors who already view the sovereign government as offering an acceptable return, 
commensurate with the investors’ respective perceptions of the risk of default. Further, because most central 
governments in sub-Saharan Africa are responsible for tax collection from residential and commercial 
properties, with subsequent transfers to municipal governments, all purchasers of municipal obligations 
need to analyze the likelihood of regular and in-full payments to cities; this typically manifests itself in the 
form of a premium over the stipulated returns pledged by the sovereign government in its debt issuances 
(viewed in aggregate as the sovereign bond treasury curve). 
For most cities in sub-Saharan Africa, achieving access to capital financing at a reasonable cost from 
sources other than transfers and own revenues will require sustained attention to improving the policies and 
practices underpinning both their creditworthiness and the projects requiring funding. A World Bank study 
found that only a small percentage of the 500 largest cities in developing countries could be deemed 
“creditworthy” – about 4% in international financial markets and 20% in local markets (World Bank 
2013b). Municipal bonds can either finance specific investments (such as a water treatment facility, a 
parking garage, or a convention center), or finance an investment plan or a program of capital investments 
that vary in size and sector. With the former, local governments would often repay the transactions from 
revenues associated with the investment itself (water tariffs, parking fees, or convention costs); in the latter 
case, repayment would be from all municipal taxes, fees, tariffs, or other sources that capitalize a general 
account from which the principal and interest related to debt service can be withdrawn. 
To make a convincing argument for a municipality’s commitment to its most bankable projects, cities often 
need to demonstrate that they have a larger “wish-list” of projects that constitute a more ambitious capital 
investment program. From that overall list, and in concert with a more comprehensive vision, municipal 
leaders need to garner support for this vision from the general electorate to ensure the longevity of a master 
plan beyond any given municipal administration. Simultaneously, Cities need to commit to building their 
own local capacity to: (1) provide accurate information about the operational and financial activities of the 
local government; (2) identify and prepare sustainable bankable projects; (3) provide a strong repayment 
stream and demonstrate or mobilize local willingness to pay; and (4) manage the financed projects during 
the life of the bond issue or other financing to ensure continued operation and maintenance of the 
investments, and collection of associated revenues, where relevant. The magnitude, sophistication, and 
linkages between all of the projects that are elements in the overall master plan help to underscore the 
creditworthiness of the municipality itself (Kaganova 2011).  
Lack of capacity to accurately assess financing options 
Even if a City is successful in creating the template for a bankable project (either independently or with 
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technical assistance from an outside agency), municipal leaders are often at a disadvantage when 
considering the most appropriate financial instrument to use to deliver their long-term financing goals. 
Approached from all sides by development finance institutions, investment banks, and other well-meaning 
but often contradictory advisors, Cities are challenged by the need to make swift and responsible decisions 
without being accused of corruption or other undue influence. Further, success in designing a pioneering 
issuance, particularly if executed with the help of an external aid agency or foundation, is not a guarantee 
of future success without the institutionalization of a process for subsequent issuance and sufficient 
capacity-building to address these concerns. 
All of these challenges to the enabling environments of municipalities are amplified through the use of 
municipal bonds, which are among the most public and transparent of financial instruments at the disposal 
of municipalities in sub-Saharan Africa (Noel 1999). However, it is this free flow of information between 
all stakeholders in and observers of such a transaction – one which shows the inconsistencies in the enabling 
environment or the weaknesses in municipal financial management – that reminds all participants of the 
need for a clear policy on the role and responsibility of the City, particularly in a decentralized system. It 
can also, in many cases, be revealing about policy-makers’ lack of education about and awareness of the 
pivotal role and impact that municipal bonds in particular can have in closing the financing gap between 
available resources and capital investment needs in the municipal budget. Nonetheless, as previously 
highlighted, this thesis argues that the challenges listed above are ones to consider only once the enabling 
environment has been created. More importantly, these issues can be fixed on a bespoke basis as cities 
mature and are able to see that improvements in their financial planning and creditworthiness can lead to a 
definitive and measurable result.  During an interview with Babacar Thioye Ba, the legal advisor to the 
mayor of the City of Dakar, following the failure of the City of Dakar’s bond to launch, he shared that 
municipal leaders “cannot commit to a long-term strategy of improved financial performance” which 
“carries with it a re-allocation of funds from more demonstrable and immediately impactful social 
investments” unless there is “confidence that the long-term result will lead to permanent and easily 
explainable outcomes”.16 
The history of municipal bonds 
To better see how municipal bonds could be introduced in sub-Saharan Africa, it may be instructive to look 
at how they were first deployed elsewhere. The first recorded municipal bonds were originated in 
autonomous city-states, where there was little sense of national identity and princes held power in the 
 
16 Interview with Babacar Thioye Ba, 10 August 2017, Dakar, Senegal. 
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absence of kings. In 1150, the Italian city-state of Genoa structured a transaction to improve its central 
business district. The municipality owned some stalls in the public marketplace, which it rented out to 
money exchangers. Needing 400 lire for capital improvements, the municipality ceded the rental income to 
private investors for 29 years upon the expiration of which, having returned the original amount of the loan 
to them, it reacquired possession of the stalls. If the municipality wished to reacquire possession before the 
29 years were up, however, it would have to pay the creditors 500 lire (capital repayment plus a penalty of 
100 lire for loss of income up to the date contracted to in the original agreement).  
In two contracts dated 1150, the municipality was given the right to repossess its income stream at a date 
earlier than that in the agreement by paying a higher sum of money than the sale price – in other words, a 
loan paid back with interest.  
Nos consules comunis Ianue Capharus, Obertus Spinula, vobis Guillelmo Vento, Oberto 
Turri, et vestris consortibus nominative vendimus ab ista proxima Purificacione sancte 
Marie usque ad annos viginti novem expletos usufructum de banchis comunis Ianue; precio 
accepimus a vobis consortibus libras quatuor centum denariorum Preterea nos predicti 
emptores, gratuita et bona voluntate et amore Comunis Ianue, ... volumus ut si Comune 
Ianue infra predictos viginti novem annos dederit nobis libras quingentas ... vendemus 
Comuni Ianue pro precio de suprascriptis libris D usufructum quod nobis de predictis 
banchis deinde pervenire deberet.17  
We, Caffaro, Oberto Spinola etc., consuls of the municipality of Genoa, sell to you, 
Guglielmo Vento, Oberto Torre and to your consorts the income from the municipal stalls 
for 29 years, starting from the 2nd of February, for the price of 400 lire. And we, the 
purchasers, out of goodwill and love for the City, agree that upon payment of 500 lire the 
municipality has the right to repossess the public stalls even before the end of the agreed 29 
years.18 
Soon enough, these financial operations acquired a characteristic configuration that remained unchanged 
over time. The two parties to the contract were the municipality, which received a loan amount for a 
determined length of time, and one or more lenders who, in exchange for their loan, obtained the right to 
cash revenues from a tax (either one pre-existing or a tax set up specifically for the purpose) which would 
provide a yield proportional to the loan capital. In practice, the ceded tax revenue represented the interest 
on the loan and also acted as a lien for reimbursement since, if the agreed deadline for repayment was not 
 
17 I Libri Iurium della Repubblica di Genova, Vol. I/1 a cura di Antonella Rovere, Genova, 1992, Number 125. 
18 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are by the author. 
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met by the state, the creditors would keep on benefiting from the revenue stream until the state paid them 
back. The revenue received by the creditor could vary from year to year, depending on the economic 
situation, sometimes increasing but more often than not diminishing with respect to the sum initially 
envisaged. This brought an uncertainty to the relationship between capital and interest, and stopped 
creditors making an automatic illicit profit. Hence the use of the term “compera” (purchase, derived from 
“comprare” [to buy]) to define the purchase of a tax income of variable amount in exchange for a fixed 
sum of money (the corresponding capital). 
To avoid confusion, each compera was named after either the sum of money involved (compera of 20,000 
lire), the purpose of the loan (compera for maritime armaments), the tax on which it was based (compera 
of 1% on insurances), the name of a saint (compera of Saint Peter), and so on. Each compera had its own 
legal personality, surviving over time even if its creditors were to sell their shares to a third party. In most 
cases it managed directly the revenues on which it had been funded, and was administered in turn by 
“trustees” elected from amongst the lenders themselves. In order to simplify calculations on such large 
sums of money and attract investment, the capital was divided into shares with the same nominal value and 
the same privileges, and the subscriber could sell them on to a third party in exchange for cash. During the 
early 13th century public debt (“compere”) was divided into shares (“luoghi”, in Latin “loca”) with a 
nominal value of 100 lire. The luoghi could be disposed of at the owner’s will and, shortly after their issue, 
became tax-free and could not be confiscated by the state. These shares could be further sub-divided into 
smaller tranches or could be added together, as the subscriber desired. The amount of interest reflected the 
standard value of the share itself. Hence, a compera with a nominal value of 30,000 lire consisted of 300 
luoghi, and a profit of 7 lire on each luogo meant a 7% profit. Basically the currency-to-luogo ratio was 
100:1, to simplify the administrators’ calculations. The same 100:1 ratio can be found in many financial 
instruments negotiated up until the Second World War, both in Europe and in the United States. The luoghi 
were not material instruments, in that their existence was simply validated in writing within the public debt 
ledgers (“XY loca tres, sive £300”) and subsequent spin-off documents relating to purchases, legacies, etc. 
However, the luoghi were very similar to modern bonds because they were registered, transferable, and 
encumbered at the owner’s will. Furthermore, thanks to the fact that the state could not confiscate them, 
luoghi became popular instruments of exchange, sought after (as investments or speculation) by the upper 
class, religious institutions and private organizations. The market for luoghi would survive more than five 
centuries, until the fall of the Republic of Genoa. 19 
The first recorded United States municipal bond was issued by the City of New York in 1812 for the 
 
19 Archivio di Stato di Genova (A.S.G.), Manoscritti, no. 539, c. 668. A.S.G., Archivio di San Giorgio, no. 92. 
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construction of an almshouse and other public improvements (Durand 1938). A much larger transaction, 
and one often incorrectly quoted as being the City’s first municipal bond, occurred later in the year and was 
specifically designated to construct canals from the Hudson River to Lake Erie and Lake Champlain. 
Although the bond was issued for a specific purpose, payment was guaranteed by the City’s entire budget 
(and not specifically viewed as a corporate finance transaction, marking it as a general obligation bond and 
not a revenue-generating one). 
The canals, once complete, dramatically enhanced access to and from New York City and are in large part 
responsible for securing the City’s status as the United States’ financial hub, as it is known today. The 
legislative act that allowed New York to sell the bonds in order to finance the canals’ construction specified 
a maximum interest rate of 6%, which ended up being the interest rate that the bonds actually paid. By 
1843, when US cities had about USD 25 million in outstanding debt due to rapid urban development, bonds 
had grown in popularity to help finance both urban improvements and a growing system of free public 
education (Cockren, Vecchiotti & Zerbo 1979). 
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Institutional investors typically view municipal bonds as being relatively safe stores of wealth, with 
predictable returns on investment higher than that pledged by the central government. This pick-up in yield 
is counterbalanced by the potential for the City to be unable to satisfy its debt service obligations, which is 
manifested in either an outright default or a less contentious restructuring. The likelihood of default is 
exponentially higher among municipal services offered as competitive enterprises (hospitals and housing), 
particularly when viewed as revenue-generating bonds, when compared with municipal services as part of 
general obligation or utility transactions, as shown in Figure 2.1 (Moody’s Investor Service 2017). 
Differentiating between general obligation bonds and revenue-generating bonds 
Municipal bonds – or the debt issued by states, cities, and counties to fund projects – fall into several 
categories, with the two most frequently used being general obligation bonds and revenue bonds 
(Amadeo 2019). The key difference between these two types of municipal (also known as muni) bonds 
is the source of the revenue used to make interest and principal payments.  
General obligation bonds, also called GOs, are bonds that are backed by the “full faith and credit” of 
the issuer, with no specific project identified as the source of funds. In other words, the municipal issuer 
can make interest and principal payments using any source of revenue available to it, such as tax 
revenues, fees, or the issuance of new securities. This means that if the municipality encounters fiscal 
difficulty, it can raise taxes to offset the shortfall. GOs are therefore seen as being relatively safe, and 
defaults are rare. It is far less likely that an entire municipal government will face serious financial 
difficulty than that a specific municipal project will fail to generate its anticipated income. 
Revenue bonds are bonds that are backed by the revenue generated by the specific project being 
financed by the bond issue. In other words, the money raised by the bond offering finances the project, 
and the project – once complete – generates the revenues to pay the interest and principal on the bond. 
Projects could include hospitals, airports, toll roads, housing projects, convention centers, bridges, and 
similar endeavors. Revenue bonds are generally higher-risk than GOs, and as a result, they typically 
offer higher yields. Within the revenue bond category, there are also essential services revenue bonds, 
which include projects related to water, sewer, and power systems. Since the revenue from such projects 
is seen as being more reliable, essential services revenue bonds are seen as being lower-risk than bonds 
financed by revenue from non-essential services. That perceived lower risk is reflected in the slightly 
lower returns of essential services bonds compared with the returns of other revenue bonds.  
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Figure 2.1: Defaults by category (percentage), 1970–2011 
 
Source: Moody’s Investor Services: U.S. Municipal Bond Defaults and Recoveries, 1970–2011. 
Municipal defaults, while uncommon, are oft-referenced events. The 1975 near-default of New York City, 
which caused a dramatic rift between municipal and federal officials and would only be conceivable in a 
federal system where the central government offers no guarantee to sub-national borrowers, culminated in 
a speech by then-President Gerald Ford, in which he opined: 
What I cannot understand – and what nobody should condone – is the blatant attempt in some 
quarters to frighten the American people and their representatives in Congress into panicky 
support of patently bad policy. The people of this country will not be stampeded; they will 
not panic when a few desperate New York City officials and bankers try to scare New York’s 
mortgage payments out of them… 
I can tell you, and tell you now, that I am prepared to veto any bill that has as its purpose a 
federal bailout of New York City to prevent a default. (Ford 1975: 2301-3)  
The speech by Ford was captured in the New York Daily News’ cover headline – “Ford to City: Drop 
Dead.”20 Over the past 30 years, other borrowers have defaulted, or threatened to default, on their 
 
20 Van Riper, F., “Ford to City: Drop Dead.” Daily News, 30 October 1975. http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/president-ford-announces-won-bailout-nyc-1975-article-1.2405985, accessed June 2018. 
20.40%
6.80%
22.30%
43.70%
6.80%
General Government Utilities
Competitive Enterprises - Health Care Competitive Enterprises - Housing
Competitive Enterprises - Other
62 
 
obligations; recent examples include Detroit, Michigan (2013) and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
(2016). The increased occurrence of sub-national defaults in the United States has, however, not been a 
deterrent to the prospect of municipal bond issuance in Africa, due to the presence of guarantees (whether 
implicit or explicit) from national governments as well as the realization that urban finance needs cannot 
be met without a diversification of tools and instruments beyond traditional grants from donors or 
concessionary-rate financing.  
A more interesting case, perhaps, can be found by looking at the performance of municipalities in Argentina 
following the default in coupon payments by the national government. As sub-national governments are 
constrained by the rating ceiling set by their sovereign government, the default by Argentina in 2001 was 
particularly damaging to investors’ collective perceptions of the likelihood of repayment by cities like 
Buenos Aires in the aftermath of the default (Hebert & Schreger 2017).  As a result, even if municipal 
leadership and financial management in Argentina’s cities was strong, the default of the national 
government on its debt meant that all public entities, particularly sub-national governments with heavy 
reliance on fiscal transfers from the national government, would also receive a credit rating indicating the 
existence or high likelihood of default.  Such a credit rating would prohibit any issuing city from receiving 
a competitive interest rate from investors, significantly limiting the necessary flow of funds from sources 
of finance to municipalities seeking to invest in their urban infrastructure needs. 
Municipal bonds versus loans 
Separate from the question of municipal default is a view on the preference for bonds versus loans. Unlike 
North America, where municipal bonds have been the foundation of municipal borrowing, Europe relies 
on bank lending to fund municipal infrastructure. In Europe, banks have traditionally been viewed as the 
source of finance for city development, regardless of whether the banks were corporate entities or controlled 
by a single family (as in the case of the Medici in Renaissance Italy). In recent years, some European cities 
have experimented with municipal bonds. And yet, while the rationale of municipal leadership the use of 
banks to meet financing needs differs from country to country, some common themes have plagued many 
European countries attempting to diversify to include municipal bonds in their toolkit of available 
instruments. These challenges include: (1) an overly strong relationship between bankers and City 
management, such that City treasurers would leak insider information to bankers, with an expectation that 
entire bond transactions would be wholly placed at a single financial institution rather than widely dispersed 
through allocations to a number of banks and institutional investors; and (2) a reticence among City 
managers to match financial planning with long-term city development plans, where capital-intensive 
projects requiring a longer repayment period would benefit from the terms offered by a municipal bond 
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(Bordignon, Griglio &Turati 2015). 
 
Table 2.1: Bank lending versus bond issuance 
 Lending (Europe) Bonds (North America) 
Link between lender and 
borrower 
Relationship banking Competition among lenders  
Monitoring system Delegated (performed by 
bank) 
Third-party (not performed 
by lender) 
Pricing of transaction Bundled (lump-sum) Unbundled (itemized pricing) 
Interest rate  Floating (tracks benchmark 
treasury curve) 
Fixed (set at issuance by 
benchmark treasury curve) 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
Local capital financing through bond issuance is markedly different from that offered by banks in terms of 
the relationship between the lender and the borrower, the level of monitoring and transparency expected by 
the sources of finance, and the way in which the pricing is determined (Table 2.1). With regard to the link 
between the lender and the borrower, municipal bond underwriters try to achieve a long-term working 
relationship with their municipal clients. However, each bond is viewed as a freestanding instrument that 
does not necessarily build on a past history with a particular source of finance; neither institutional nor 
individual purchasers of bonds need to have a long-term relationship with the issuer. Similarly, the 
expectation of a confidential dossier on the borrower (as would be beneficial in a traditional banking 
relationship) is not required as it is made irrelevant through the higher level of transparency of a municipal 
bond transaction. Whereas banks typically seek to build loan departments that possess proprietary 
information and proprietary methods of analyzing creditworthiness, in a municipal bond market information 
on local financial conditions is provided by issuers to the market. To avoid information asymmetry, bond 
markets rely on public disclosure of municipal financial information to function effectively. Most financial 
systems utilizing bond issues have extensive public disclosure requirements that issuers must comply with, 
as well as requirements specifying accounting standards and independent audits of financial statements. 
Credit-rating firms have developed a presence in every municipal bond market of significant size. They 
report the content of their credit analyses publicly, and exert considerable influence over the market, 
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including the risk premium that municipalities have to pay for borrowing, based on their financial condition 
and credit history.  
Beyond questions of relationship between a source of capital and the City, a municipal bond also encourages 
a significantly higher level of autonomy for a municipality relative to a loan. More specifically, a municipal 
bond market unbundles the various support functions that a municipality can receive from a traditional 
banking relationship. Local governments can make separate decisions about where to maintain their liquid 
deposits and where to obtain financial advisory services or technical assistance on project design. Bidding 
for each of these support activities can be competed for separately in their sub-markets. 
From the point of view of a City treasurer, the most striking difference between a municipal bond through 
the capital markets and a bank loan from a market-rate bank is in the interest rate that a City is likely to 
face. As previously stated, in most cases, a municipal bond will lock in the prevailing interest rate at the 
time of issuance, keeping that rate fixed for the entire duration of the bond’s lifetime, while a bank loan is 
likely to fluctuate based on the performance of the underlying benchmark interest rates or national treasury 
curve. In an environment where interest rates are anticipated to decrease due to a flight of capital from the 
debt to the equity markets (typically driven by an increased appetite for well-performing stocks) and where 
a City designs a project that can be repaid in a relatively short period of time, the City would be likely to 
opt for a bank loan, betting on the assumption that interest rates will be lower than the fixed coupon pledged 
by a bond issuance. The cost of capital for a bank loan in an unpredictable environment, particularly when 
viewed over a long period of time, creates a more rational argument for a bond issuance, and can be viewed 
as part of the argument for the prevalence of municipal bonds in the United States relative to their use in 
Europe (Peterson 2003). 
Despite the longstanding preference in each of the two regions analyzed (Europe and North America) for 
bank loans and bonds respectively, there has been an increase in the diversity of tools used by municipalities 
to raise money to meet their financial needs. In the United States, where cities have traditionally used 
municipal bonds to finance their infrastructure and development needs, there has been a noticeable uptick 
in the amount of direct lending by commercial banks and other financial institutions to municipal borrowers. 
This is driven by (1) a low-interest rate environment in which cities can refinance outstanding bond debt at 
more favorable terms than the coupon on bonds; (2) the relative pricing of origination fees for loans over 
bonds; and (3) the lower level of transparency required by bank loans. Nonetheless, cities across the United 
States continue to rely heavily on capital markets for finance (80% of municipal finance is in the form of 
bonds) because banks tend to avoid taking on long-term debt, which is necessary for large infrastructure 
projects (Farmer 2014; Malpezzi & Unkovic 2014). Central to this discussion is the fact that cities in the 
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global north have the power to make a decision about which instrument they prefer to use to raise external 
debt; cities across sub-Saharan Africa do not have the autonomy to choose between different forms, and 
are typically further handicapped by the fact that their constitutions mandate that the national government 
explicitly approve any borrowing prior to transactions. From a geopolitical perspective, the presence of 
bond issuance as the preferred method of raising capital for municipal infrastructure investment in the 
United States is important for sub-Saharan Africa because American aid to Africa has traditionally 
represented the largest source of donor investment by a single entity. Interviews with City officials in Dakar 
who participated in the Dakar Municipal Finance Program (DFMP) indicated that the decision to solicit 
funds from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and a credit enhancement from USAID, and not from 
the European Union or the Agence Française de Développement, was partially driven by the strategic 
calculation that municipal bonds were the preferred method for capital-raising for cities in North America, 
while loans were prevalent in Europe.21  
Figure 2.2: Foreign aid to sub-Saharan Africa (percentage of donor total), 2000–2012 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using OECD (n.d.: Table 29). 
Governments from the global south, particularly China, have become considerably more active in the 
foreign aid donor community since 2010 (Figure 2.2). By 2015, these emerging aid programs, rivaling those 
of the traditional donors from the global north, had already started to diminish the ability of the United 
 
21 Interviews with Dieynaba Thiam Ka, 14 August 2017, and Khady Dia Sarr, 16 November 2017, Dakar, Senegal.  
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States and Europe to leverage foreign aid to influence policy abroad (Collins 2015). As American influence 
in sub-Saharan Africa is eclipsed by China, African leaders are beginning to consider ways in which they 
might follow Chinese government policy. The Chinese themselves have only recently begun their own 
experiments with decentralization, which have resulted in inconsistent growth across the country and 
uneven success in achieving fiscal autonomy at the municipal level (Dexu & Wenlong 2017). That said, the 
Chinese government has mandated the introduction of municipal bonds as a mechanism to raise capital for 
cities while simultaneously offering an alternative instrument to keep Chinese investors from expatriating 
their money (Figure 2.3). Accordingly, municipal bonds in China are important because (1) they provide 
additional sources of capital to support City growth beyond the central government; and (2) they provide 
additional opportunities for Chinese investors to park their money domestically rather than invest it 
overseas, which can significantly reduce the instances of capital flight. In 2015, the equivalent of over USD 
676 billion of Chinese liquid assets were invested outside of China by yield-hungry investors seeking better 
rates than those available domestically (Institute of International Finance 2016). As a result, in 2016, 
Chinese legislators introduced strict measures to stop these outflows, and high-net worth individuals and 
institutional investors started to shift their resources into municipal bonds denominated in yuan. Since the 
introduction of this policy and the recognition by the Chinese government that municipal bonds can be a 
particularly effective tool for both financing cities and keeping yuan in China, cities have successfully 
launched approximately CNY 8 trillion (equivalent to approximately USD 1.17 billion) (Borst 2018).  
Figure 2.3: Chinese local government bonds issued, per semester (CNY billions), 2015–2017 
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Source: Compiled by the author from Bloomberg Data, February 2018. 
An increase in the number of municipal bond investors in China who become comfortable with investment 
in sub-sovereign issuances and who learn how to assess the creditworthiness of a City, regardless of the 
country, is likely to increase the appetite for all sub-sovereign issuances in creditworthy countries. This 
could have an important impact on overseas investors in sub-Saharan African city issuance. China’s 
development aid to sub-Saharan Africa has steadily grown over the past 15 years, matching the country’s 
appreciation for relatively low-cost natural resources (French 2014). China’s development approach is in 
stark contrast to that promoted through European and American bilateral philosophies: this is particularly 
pronounced in the respective attitudes towards decentralization and desire to institutionalize democratic 
processes (high in the West, low in the East) (Brautigam 2010; French 2014; Moyo 2009).  
Conclusion 
Regardless of whether leaders in sub-Saharan African cities choose to follow the rationale for municipal 
bonds set forth by the United States or China, or whether they adopt the European system of using bank-
originated loans, it is increasingly clear that municipalities cannot afford to deliver on their long-term 
capital investment plans without bringing in additional funds from external sources through debt 
instruments. Based on the arguments set out above, and the consideration of the additional transparency 
and high-profile nature of municipal bond issuance relative to bilateral borrowing (loans) from banks, it is 
more likely, and already proven across the global south based on sheer numbers of transactions, that Cities 
will have higher levels of success in loan origination than bond issuance.  
The first two themes of this thesis – decentralization and municipal bonds – juxtapose the experiences of 
countries that have undergone full decentralization against those of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, this analysis would be incomplete if it did not include a look at the factors that have shaped 
Africa, particularly given that the overarching argument of the thesis is that there is nothing exceptional 
about the way that African governments have been addressing decentralization and municipal bonds. 
Chapter 3 offers an examination of these factors. 
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Chapter 3: Decentralization and Municipal Finance in Africa: 
African Exceptionalism? 
“I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British 
exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism.” – Barack Obama 22  
 
Thus far, this thesis has argued that municipal bonds are likely to be the most appropriate financial 
instruments for cities in sub-Saharan Africa to use to reach their long-term investment goals, and that this 
is likely to be best achieved in tandem with political and fiscal decentralization. To understand why this 
has not yet happened, it is imperative to look at the political and historical trajectory of sub-Saharan Africa, 
particularly at the degrees of political autonomy at the local level and the attendant exceptionalism of 
Africa.  
The arguments in favor of African exceptionalism assert that sub-Saharan Africa, unlike its peers in the 
global South, lack good governance (or even an understanding of what good governance entails), prefer 
informality, and are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty (Engel 2005).  The prevalence of neopatronialism, 
a concept which legitimizes the idea of informal and non-transparent decision-making, is claimed to be 
more prevalent in Africa than in other parts of the world and is asserted to be the fundamental impediment 
preventing countries across the continent from socio-economic progression and development (Darnton 
1994).     The concept of African urban exceptionalism was first introduced in 2000 through a World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper that theorized that sub-Saharan Africa had suffered from a widespread 
phenomenon of rapid urbanization without similar growth (Fay & Opal 2000). However, the notion that, 
contrary to other regions, Africa has experienced “urbanization without growth” is probably overstated, 
holding true only for small African countries at low levels of urbanization or failed states that are 
experiencing “push” as opposed to “pull” rural-to-urban migration (Annez & Buckley 2008). But while the 
“urbanization without growth” paradigm is misleading, the region has experienced urbanization with lower 
levels of shared growth. Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula (2007) note that urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa 
has been associated with less poverty reduction than has been the case in other regions. And, alongside 
Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa experiences the highest levels of urban inequality in the world. 
However, this chapter demonstrates that, despite all of these discouraging pieces of data, there is little case 
 
22 Obama (2009). 
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to be made for African exceptionalism and, instead, that sub-Saharan Africa should be viewed as part of a 
longer continuum of development relative to other regions of the world. To say this is not to discount the 
unique history of Africa, but instead to help to use it as part of a contextualization of the reason why sub-
Saharan African cities are more constrained than their sub-national peers around the world. 
To build the historical narrative that more definitively sets up the narrative of the latter part of this thesis, 
this chapter addresses the question of the evolution of the political enabling environment through which 
sub-Saharan African cities access finance, by looking at the impact of colonial heritage on creating two 
distinct systems – the French concept of assimilation under a paternalistic state and the British approach of 
indirect rule and limited decentralization – across sub-Saharan Africa for internal political management. 
While other European countries also participated in the colonization of Africa (including Portugal, Italy 
and Belgium), the French and British represented the majority of the colonial holdings during the period 
from 1880 through 1960 (see Plates 3.1–3.3). In the years prior to colonization, sub-Saharan Africa was 
governed by political units led by kings and chiefs that controlled well-defined areas with highly desirable 
attributes, including arable land or easily navigable ports and rivers. These societies had collectively 
appointed leaders playing clearly defined roles who were responsible for the public goods that would have 
been beyond the feasible financial responsibility of individual members of society. Functionaries collected 
taxes (in the form of crops or other goods with tangible value) and ensured that families and clans had 
access to what was required to meet their basic needs, and to defense against other rival political units. With 
the arrival of European colonizers and the redrawing of borders to match colonial metropolitan needs and 
not those of the colonized, many of these political units disappeared and administration became more highly 
centralized over larger tracts of land. It is only during the post-colonial period that African sub-sovereign 
entities, created within the artificial lines drawn by European colonial forces, have begun to exercise their 
power once again and follow the path towards a multi-level system of governance of the kind that had been 
in existence for centuries. However, under the influence of the European systems and style of governance 
imposed during colonialism, the institutional direction of cities has been changed to reflect foreign ideas, 
particular those connected to the English or French system of rule. Relating back to the central question of 
this thesis, whether one system or another provides more fertile soil to engender municipal finance, this 
chapter will argue that the British system of indirect rule created a more natural transition for municipal 
finance decentralization through its institutions and political heritage than the French conceptualization. 
The purpose of this chapter is to argue that the political management of pre-colonial Africa through chiefs 
and kings who ruled over smaller areas was negatively impacted by European colonialism, and that the 
financial devolution of power and responsibility to cities across sub-Saharan Africa was subsequently 
profoundly impacted by the colonizers, who themselves hailed from highly centralized countries and 
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introduced systems that were both familiar to them and created a system of straightforward governance 
from their collective perspective (Breuillard 2016; Ebinger 2011; Jamet 2007; Sferlea 2013). The chapter 
begins with a contextualization of pre-colonial Africa, using the Ashanti of Ghana as an example to 
demonstrate power-sharing on a local level. From there, it reviews the political administration of the 
colonies and the expediency of centralized rule over large land areas before looking at the differences 
between the French approach of assimilation and the British approach of indirect rule. The chapter closes 
with a brief discussion of decentralization in the post-colonial era, and a look at how the failure to 
decentralize has significantly slowed the process of accessing much-needed finance by municipalities 
seeking to plan for their future growth. 
Pre-colonial Africa 
As late as 1870, there was little indication that the European powers were about to leave their isolated 
positions on the coast of Africa and partition the interior of the continent among themselves. Instead, it 
seemed more likely that indigenous political entities would consolidate their authority and eventually 
develop into nation-states. Pre-colonial Africa contained political organizations of diverse types and, 
concomitantly, customary leaders with a wide range of powers. The most well-known distinction between 
types of organization is that made by Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard in their book African Political 
Systems, published in 1940. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard compared societies with centralized authority, 
pyramidal judicial institutions, and paramount rulers who monopolized the use of organized force, to 
societies without these attributes. The latter societies, often referred to as stateless societies, were instead 
organized around different families or lineages, with leaders emerging to lead the group as a whole only 
during fleeting moments, such as times of war. Although anthropologists often focus on the stark contrast 
between stateless societies and centralized states, most pre-colonial African societies fell somewhere in 
between these two polar opposites (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1940). 
With the introduction of colonialism, African rulers became subject to higher-level leaders appointed by 
the colonial powers. Rulers’ initial reactions to this arrangement varied widely. In many places, they 
vigorously resisted incorporation and were only subjugated by conquest. In others, they sought alliances 
with Europeans in the hope that this would give them an edge in their military and political relations with 
other African rulers, not fully anticipating the reductions in their own autonomy this would precipitate. 
In West Africa, for example, the Kingdom of Ashanti had profited from its wealth in gold and the slave 
trade, and had acquired a central government, an advanced system of roads, well-defined boundaries, and 
a national language. More importantly, the Ashanti state featured a sophisticated bureaucracy which 
allowed for effective devolution of power to federalized levels of government (Valsecchi 2011). 
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The Ashanti government was built upon a sophisticated bureaucracy in the inland City of Kumasi, with 
separate ministries to handle various state functions. Particularly interesting is Ashanti’s Foreign Office, 
based in Kumasi; despite its small size, it allowed the state to pursue complex negotiations with foreign 
powers. The Foreign Office was divided into departments to handle relations with each of the leading 
powers of the day – the British, the French, the Dutch and the Arabic states (Davidson 1992). In contrast to 
European despots of the pre-colonial era (i.e., during the 18th and 19th centuries), the king of Ashanti, the 
Asantehene, was not an absolute ruler; instead he shared power with those holding office at lower levels of 
government. Below the king, local power was invested in the obirempon of each locale. The obirempon 
(literally “big man”) was responsible for handling the region’s administrative, economic and judicial affairs, 
serving as the Supreme Judge, and directly responding to the needs of his constituents. Citizens were able 
to express their desires and, whether or not they felt that these desires were all being met, the political 
provider-client relationship was arguably more functional than in Europe at the same time (Baldwin 2016). 
Elsewhere in West Africa, the Kingdom of Benin likewise was divided into smaller city-states which were 
autonomous and merely paid a small tax, often referred to as a tribute, to the king. All rulers of city-states 
within the kingdom needed to pledge fealty to the king, and were publicly executed if they failed to 
demonstrate their loyalty; but they were otherwise independent in their rule and were able to make decisions 
about how to finance and execute projects for the public good (Osae, Nwabara & Odunsi 1968). 
Further south, the Shona tribe established a trading hub to control the export of gold from Zimbabwe to 
overseas neighbors across the Indian Ocean, settling a large territory in the 12th century and continuously 
building it up into an empire until its collapse in 1600. Although the archaeological record is inconsistent, 
historians claim that the City from which this empire was governed was both the economic and political 
center of the kingdom, and that the king did not allow for devolution of power to allow for a more 
independent urban area (Beach 1980; Mufuka 1983).  
Although there are limited mentions in the historical record of taxation or financial management at the local 
level in sub-Saharan Africa, there is also no reason to assume that, had the territories not been colonized, 
cities across sub-Saharan Africa would have failed to develop a system of municipal finance similar to that 
found in the global north. In fact, given the level of diplomatic and cultural exchange between the Ashanti 
government and those of Europe and the Middle East, national-level borrowing would have been highly 
logical; the as yet unmined gold in the Ashanti Kingdom could have been used as a collateral pledge against 
future debt service.  
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Understanding colonial Africa 
Colonization effectively meant that cities in sub-Saharan Africa would not be able to develop independently 
and that, more importantly, there would be a level of centralization that would stifle any efforts they made 
to develop and to prioritize their own needs for financial investment (and which muted the need for 
municipal finance during the entire era). This is particularly evident in looking at the budgetary allocations 
made by the colonizing country, and intended to be sufficient to meet the economic needs of the mercantile 
system, both independently and in relation to the budget of a European country. Figure 3.1, lifted from an 
analysis of the Blue Books of the East Africa Protectorate (Kenya), shows that colonizers saw public 
expenditure in terms of commitments in large categories, not according to geographical divisions. However, 
investments in infrastructure were directed towards the areas where colonizers anticipated the highest 
return; public investment was targeted to benefit regions that colonial administrations believed would 
produce increased revenue with improved transport or other infrastructure (Gardner 2012). 
Figure 3.1: Budget allocations in East Africa Protectorate (in GBP), 1900–1910 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from East Africa Protectorate Blue Books (Economic Commission 1919). 
Comparisons between the budget allocations of the East Africa Protectorate for public services and those 
of Great Britain (Figures 3.2 and 3.3) further highlight the fact that the British sought to maximize the 
welfare of their citizens at home (through both education and social welfare, which are not captured in 
Victorian accounting as social services but instead would be categorized as “other”) while deprioritizing 
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
800,000
1900 1905 1910
Military and Police Administration Infrastructure Social Services Economic Services Other
73 
 
the improvement of the quality of life for those living in British colonies.  Essentially, the British 
government, as was the case for most of the colonial powers, saw its colonial holdings as properties to be 
exploited, only making minimal infrastructure investments to bring out the Protectorate’s vast mineral 
resources and raw materials. 
Figure 3.2: Allocation of central government expenditure (% of total), East African Protectorate, 
1901–1910 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from East Africa Protectorate Blue Books (Economic Commission 1919). 
Military and Police Administration
Infrastructure Economic Services
Social Services Other
74 
 
 Figure 3.3: Allocation of central government expenditure (% of total), England, 1905 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Mitchell (1988). 
The change in the approach of the colonial powers to sub-Saharan Africa – from one of opportunistic trade 
in support of European corporate interests to one of direct territorial control – dramatically changed the 
administration of the land and populations across the region. Plates 3.1–3.3 present three maps which show 
the change in the political landscape of Africa in the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The first 
map (Plate 3.1), depicting Africa in 1858, shows the continent as consisting of several large swaths of 
demarcated territory including Ethiopia, Soudan, South Africa, Senegambia, Upper Ghana and others. 
Although highly simplistic, and failing to take into account the presence of the kingdoms and sub-national 
entities in existence at the time, the map highlights the fact that European powers were largely non-existent 
on the continent from a political perspective, although there were some strategically placed colonies that 
were critical elements in the success of the European spice trade.  
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Plate 3.1: Mapping Africa’s kingdoms in pre-colonial Africa (1858) 
 
Source: Mitchell’s School Atlas (1863), “Map of pre-colonial Africa, 1858”. http://etc.usf.edu/maps/pages/000/32/32.htm, 
accessed October 2018.  
The second map (Plate 3.2), drawn in 1885, shows the start of the “scramble for Africa”. It highlights the 
fact that most of the continent was viewed as being available for settlement and colonization by Europeans 
and as otherwise unoccupied by humans. While this vision is inaccurate, it undoubtedly created a strong 
visual impression for European strategists imagining their conquest of these resource-rich territories.  
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Plate 3.2: Mapping colonial Africa (1885) 
 
Source: J. Bartholomew (n.d.), “Historical map of Africa in 1885”, Maps of Africa to 1900. 
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/africa-historical-map-1885.htm, accessed October 2018.  
By 1914, sub-Saharan Africa was entirely occupied by European powers. The map shown in Plate 3.3 is 
particularly relevant for the argument of this thesis, namely that the centralization of power, whether in a 
European capital city that remotely sets policy for a distant territory or in a post-colonial, highly centralized 
state, has negatively impacted the growth of sub-sovereign powers for the purposes of municipal finance. 
Even more interesting is the aggregation of over a dozen countries into a single large polity – French West 
Africa – without the sub-divisions that one finds in the protectorates of the British African holdings like the 
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Uganda Protectorate, the East Africa Protectorate, the Somaliland Protectorate, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, 
Rhodesia, or the Bechuanaland Protectorate. To this day, French West Africa is run in many ways like a 
federation of states, in that each country does not have its own currency or monetary policy (the countries 
all use the West African CFA franc, which is pegged at a fixed rate to the euro that succeeded the French 
franc as the currency of France) and all countries in the region support free trade and movement of peoples 
across borders under the auspices of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). 
Academics have been fascinated by the European colonial enterprises in Africa (Hodgkin 1956; Jallow 
2014). The colonial incorporation of tropical Africa was not so much remarkable as curiously disjointed, 
proceeding at an uneven pace for much of the 19th century until the much more rapid European penetration 
of the interior after 1880. A great change occurred in the attitude of European powers towards Africa at 
around this time. Prior to the end of the 19th century, Great Britain had led the way in the mass production 
of goods by machines in factories, in what became known as the Industrial Revolution. For many years, 
British goods met with little or no competition in markets throughout the world, and the raw materials of 
all parts of the world were at Britain’s disposal. This unique position led Britain to advocate and champion 
free trade. But then, after about 1870, the position changed. European countries, in particular France and 
Germany, began to industrialize rapidly and to challenge Britain’s hitherto privileged position. The 
industrial and commercial competition and rivalry which followed led to the feeling that, if each of the great 
industrial powers could monopolize the markets and raw materials in specific areas of Africa and Asia, it 
would be ensuring its advantage in a highly competitive world, where success was sometimes jingoistically 
measured in terms of the size and wealth of natural resources in a country’s colonial empire. In other words, 
the acquisition of areas of influence and of colonies was considered very conducive to the promotion of 
European commerce and industry (Butler 1997; Philips 1989). 
Other factors beyond economic competition and sustainability encouraged European expansion in Africa, 
including (1) the psychological aspect of the scramble for colonies; and (2) missionaries and their religious 
fervor. A kind of national prestige came to be associated with the possession of colonies, although in reality 
some colonies were by no means assets to the colonizing powers. Britain was seen by others to be a great 
country, and this greatness was connected with its possession of colonies, which likewise drove other peer 
countries in Europe to follow similar paths (Lewis 1987; Pakenham 1991). Operating on a parallel track 
but at a smaller scale, European missionaries located in various parts of Africa normally wished to be left 
alone to pursue independent action. However, when threatened in one way or another, they would petition 
their home governments to protect them and safeguard their interests by annexing the areas in which they 
were operating (Harries 2012; Taiwo 2010). 
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Plate 3.3: Mapping colonial Africa (1914) 
 
Source: C. Hammond (1917) “Africa in 1914: European Possessions”, Hammond’s Comprehensive Atlas of the World. 
http://pages.uoregon.edu/kimball/ggr.frn.MPR.gnr.htm, accessed October 2018. 
The impacts of colonialism: political theories in francophone and anglophone Africa 
Although there are many reasons why colonialism was such an irredeemable exogenous shock to Africa, 
for the purposes of this analysis, the impact of colonialism can be found in the reshaping of Africa’s political 
structure from smaller political units governed with appreciation for local concerns into remotely ruled 
larger polities without any accommodation for constituent expectations. John Mukum Mbaku (2003: 103) 
expressed the sentiment as follows: 
Colonialism was a cruel, exploitative, repressive and despotic system used by the Europeans 
to extract resources from the African territories for their benefit and that of the metropolitan 
economies. As a consequence, colonial institutional arrangements were not designed to 
maximize African values and interests or enhance the ability of the indigenous peoples of 
the colonies to govern themselves effectively. Instead, they were imposed on Africans and 
used primarily to maximize the objectives of the resident European population and those of 
the metropolitan economy. 
To enhance the ability of resident colonial officers and European entrepreneurs to manage 
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the new territories and their resources, the colonialists brought together through force the 
many ethnic groups within each colony to form a single political, economic and 
administrative unit. The language and culture of the resident European power, as well as its 
political and economic systems, became dominant. Traditional African practices were either 
banned, stunted or minimized by the new institutional arrangements. Each colony, thus, 
represented a gathering of indigenous communities that were kept together through the use 
of a significant amount of coercion. Peaceful coexistence was not secured or achieved 
through voluntary (and mutually beneficial) social arrangements but through the use of force.  
Africans believed that independence would be preceded by or coincide with the elimination 
of colonial institutional arrangements and the subsequent establishment of a new 
dispensation with laws and institutions that enhanced their ability to govern themselves and 
create the wealth that they needed to deal more effectively with mass poverty and 
deprivation. The new post-independent leaders were expected to engage the people in state 
reconstruction through democratic and consultative constitution-making to produce new 
governance structures that were based on African values, aspirations, traditions and customs. 
Unlike those prevalent in the colonial period, these new institutions would be developed by 
the people themselves. That is, rule-making in the immediate post-independence period 
would be bottom-up and not top-down; inclusive and not exclusive; as had been the case 
during the colonial period.  
European colonizers brought with them their own legal systems, which slowed the progress of smaller 
African polities towards well-functioning decentralized systems. The introduction of these foreign legal 
systems was driven by a wide variety of concerns, but never by consideration of the needs or expectations 
of the colonized people. Deng comments on this in his study on the impact of colonialism with regard to 
centralization, noting that 
[far] from recognizing the diversities of the African states and their legitimizing cultural 
characteristics, imported Western-oriented constitutions fostered the model of a 
homogenizing, centralized unitary state that was unscrupulously intolerant of the political 
and cultural aspirations of the numerous component identity groups within the state. Western 
legal systems, the English common law, and the French civil code were adopted as the law 
of the land, with Islamic law and customary law accommodated mainly in personal matters. 
Overall, there was no African cultural flavor to constitutionalism, the administration of 
justice, or governance. (Deng 2008: 20–21) 
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In some instances, concepts of control over colonies were driven not by political ideology but by financial 
inevitabilities. The following excerpt from a missive from Nigeria to London highlights that colonial 
unprofitability was a function of the fact that expenditure exceeded revenue, which was partially driven by 
two separate and competing interests which both manifested in the need to police borders: internal struggles 
between ethnic and tribal units and external threats of land grabs from other European colonizers. The 
missive further argued that centralization was politically and economically expedient, as this form of 
governance would eliminate local rule as was traditionally envisioned. 
Upon Northern Nigeria devolves the task of policing about 1,800 miles of French and 
German frontier as well as of controlling the Fulani, whose armies formerly laid waste the 
frontiers of both Southern Nigeria and Lagos. A very large force has in consequence to be 
maintained (and this may not unjustly be considered part of the Imperial defense scheme) 
while it enables the southern territories to dispense with any force except such as is required 
for policing their own comparatively limited areas. 
It appears obvious that the original proposals at the time that the inland fiscal frontiers were 
abolished should be given effect to, now that the administration of Northern Nigeria is 
sufficiently advanced to admit of it, and the revenue collected in all three Administrations 
should be spent in the interests of Nigeria as a single and indivisible entity. This can only be 
effected by complete amalgamation under a single Administrator.23 
Consideration of reports and arguments produced by colonial administrators often prompts a reader to 
ponder whether complete “ownership” of another country, with its attendant increase in responsibility for 
the colonizer, was the most expedient management style, particularly when so many of the decisions were 
made with an eye towards profitability. Walter Rodney proposes that the “non-monetary” benefits for the 
European colonizer were far greater than those in the domain of economics and finance; the prestige of 
expanding the “mother country” to include vast territories outside of Europe was dramatic, particularly for 
small countries with large holdings like Portugal. He writes: 
Analysis of the non-monetary benefits of colonialism to the colonizers can of course be 
carried out most readily within the framework of relations between each colony and its 
mother country. Using the conventional approach of European metropole in relationship to 
 
23 Administration of Tropical Colonies. Colonial Office File containing letters by Sir F. D. Lugard and Sir Charles 
Bruce and responses by A. Lyttleton, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1905. Viewed at the Johns Hopkins 
University Milton S. Eisenhower Library and online at https://libweb.grinnell.edu/vufind/Record/.b1700066x, 
accessed January 2017.  
81 
 
its own colonies, one finds a wide range of positive effects, although the benefits varied in 
extent from colony to colony. Portugal was the lowliest of the colonizing powers in Africa, 
and it was nothing in Europe without its colonies: so much so that it came to insist that 
Angola, Mozambique and Guinea were integral parts of Portugal, just like any province of 
the European country named Portugal. France sometimes propounded the same doctrine by 
which Algeria, Martinique and Vietnam were all supposedly overseas France. Neither 
Britain nor Belgium put forward any theories of a greater Britain or an overseas Belgium; 
but in practice they were as determined as other colonial powers to insure that sustenance 
should flow from colony to metropole without hindrance. Few areas of the national life of 
those Western European countries failed to benefit from the decades of parasitic exploitation 
of the colonies.(Rodney 2012: 185–6) 
When Europeans conquered new African territories during the late 19th century, they did so with little 
forethought as to how these colonies would be ruled. The two major colonial powers, Great Britain and 
France, espoused two opposite administrative philosophies. In respect of order, power in the colonies rested 
explicitly (as in the case of the British) or implicitly (as in the French) on the power of the native chiefs. 
British “indirect rule” sought to exercise power through African authorities. Local leaders – usually 
identified as chiefs – were granted political power and privileged access to resources, so long as they 
followed the instructions of their British advisors. Frankema (2011: 136) claims that “the British Empire’s 
much-discussed policy of ‘indirect rule’ emerged as a matter of practical necessity in the early years of 
colonial rule, when the European establishment which could be supported by local revenue was skeletal at 
best”. The French alternative to indirect rule was assimilation, an ambitious policy which aspired to rule 
Africans directly, thereby integrating them eventually into a larger French state. Such a policy had the 
potential to transform African societies culturally and politically to the point that they might one day 
constitute “100 million Frenchmen” (Ekpo 2010: 234). 
The principles of indirect rule were most clearly and eloquently articulated by one of Britain’s greatest 
colonial administrators, Lord Lugard, in his book The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa. Certainly, no other 
book of its time had such a profound influence on the formation of British colonial policy. To Lugard, the 
two most important administrative principles to rule subject peoples were “decentralization” and 
“continuity”. In his view, British district officers needed to maintain a balance between supporting the 
traditional and customary elements in African societies and at the same time encouraging the economic and 
legal innovations that served to support and justify British rule. Such a system required African authorities 
to be given the latitude to make political decisions based on local historical precedent. The role of the British 
officers, except in such critical areas as taxation, military forces, and the alienation of land, was to advise, 
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not to demand. To Lugard, the key to this system’s success was the strong relationships it would engender 
between British officials and the “native” rulers. Thus, continuity of personnel was critical to its success, 
as only colonial officials with lengthy experience with “traditional” peoples could be trusted to strike this 
delicate balance. Executed correctly, Lugard argued, such a system would slowly but surely advance the 
political maturity and economic prosperity of colonial peoples (Lugard 1965). 
Historian Sara Berry (1993) asserts that Lugard’s philosophy was predicated on the misconception that 
Africans lived in static, “tribal” communities. By treating them as such, indirect rule served to 
institutionalize existing conflicts and frictions. In thus arguing, Berry engages with a body of scholarship 
that has emphasized what Terence Ranger has referred to as the “invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm & 
Ranger 2012), the manner in which Europeans manipulated or, in some cases, manufactured symbols, 
rituals, institutions and identities to give indirect rule a gloss of historical legitimacy. For Berry, 
[the] effect of indirect rule was neither to freeze African societies into precolonial molds nor 
to restructure them in accordance with British inventions of African traditions but to generate 
unresolvable debates over the interpretation of tradition and its meaning for colonial 
governance and economic activity.  (Berry 1993: 32) 
Thus, ironically, indirect rule’s reliance on “traditional’ authorities did not encourage security, but rather 
promoted instability in local structures of authority and in conditions of access to productive 
resources. (Berry 1993: 25)  
Mahmood Mamdani posits a similar argument, stating that indirect rule reshaped society in such a way that 
it was neither reflective of the lines drawn by the colonized populations nor centralized within the 
boundaries set by the European colonizers. He writes:  
If direct rule aimed to assimilate elite groups through a civilizing mission, the ambition of 
indirect rule was to remake the subjectivities of entire populations. It endeavored to shape 
the present, past, and future of the colonized by casting each in a nativist mold, the present 
through a set of identities in the census, the past through the driving force of a new 
historiography and the future through a legal and administrative project. Through this triple 
endeavor, the colonial state created a system of state-enforced internal discrimination – for 
which it claimed the mantle of tradition – thereby effectively fragmenting the colonized 
majority into so many administratively-driven political minorities. (Mamdani 2012: 45)  
In analyzing the obstacles to democratization in post-independence Africa, Mamdani’s Citizen and Subject 
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offers a bold, insightful account of colonialism’s legacy – a bifurcated power that mediated racial 
domination through tribally organized local authorities, reproducing racial identity in citizens and ethnic 
identity in subjects. Many writers have understood colonial rule as either “direct” (French) or “indirect” 
(British), with a third variant – apartheid – as an exceptional case. This benign terminology, Mamdani 
shows, masks the fact that these were actually variant forms of despotism. While direct rule denied rights 
to subjects on racial grounds, indirect rule incorporated them into a “customary” mode of rule, with state-
appointed Native Authorities defining custom. By tapping authoritarian possibilities in culture, and by 
giving culture an authoritarian bent, indirect rule (decentralized despotism) set the pace for Africa; the 
French followed suit by changing from direct to indirect administration, while apartheid emerged relatively 
late. Apartheid, Mamdani shows, was actually the generic form of the colonial state in Africa (Mamdani 
1996). 
Some authors further argue that indirect rule encouraged a deeper sense of underlying community: 
People from particular villages, meeting together for mutual assistance, self-help and 
recreation, became aware of affinities with others who spoke different versions of their 
language. Consciousness of a wider common identity as members of a working class, though 
retarded by stronger loyalties to the village communities to which most African workers 
intended eventually to return, made some precocious appearances. Although trade unions 
nowhere enjoyed full legal recognition, laborers and government employees had taken 
effective industrial action in some West African towns since the nineteenth century; there 
were well-organized railway strikes in Sierra Leone in 1919 and 1926, in Nigeria in 1921, 
and in Senegal in 1926. (Hargreaves  1988: 15) 
France, the other great colonial power in Africa, initially sought to rule its African empire through a policy 
known as “assimilation”. The policy’s principles and goals were articulated by Hubert Jules Deschamps, a 
former governor of Cȏte d’Ivoire, who contrasted French and British approaches to colonial rule in a speech 
he delivered shortly after the independence of France’s colonies in sub-Saharan Africa (Deschamps 1963). 
At one point, he refuted this argument, referencing a piece by an English author that claimed 
the French had for their goal the political and cultural integration of the colonial peoples 
whereas the British have always had as their final goal the preparation of their colonies for 
self-government and independence. (Deschamps 1963: 296-7) 
The bulk of his speech, however, focused on the argument that the colonized Africans lacked cultural and 
political evolution of their systems and institutions; he closed by arguing that colonization had failed for 
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both the British and the French, for different reasons but with much the same outcome. The theory of the 
failure of assimilation is borne out in recent scholarly studies that assert that there is a marked difference in 
the success of the French approach in Canada (New France) relative to that in Africa, arguing that “as a 
settler colony, New France’s population became overwhelmingly European in short order” while Africa 
required policies that were “more stringent, less tolerant, and ostensibly more oppressive” (Bigon & Njoh 
2018: 949).  
Mamdani, writing with the benefit of historical perspective, differentiates between the European and 
African systems, explaining that the pre-existing societal expectations in each context created both a 
paradigm within which the Europeans could assume control and a mindset within which the Africans could 
be susceptible to colonization. 
The two legal systems – that of the colonizing Europeans and that of the colonized Africans 
– were entirely different in orientation. To understand the difference, one only needs to 
contrast English common law with colonial customary law. English common law was 
presumed to change with circumstances. It claimed to recognize different interests and 
interpretations. But customary law in the colonies assumed the opposite. It assumed that law 
must not change with changing circumstances. Rather, any change was considered prima 
facie evidence of corruption. Both the laws and the enforcing authorities were called 
“traditional”. Colonial powers were concerned first and foremost with establishing the 
credentials of their native allies as traditional and authentic. They were preoccupied with 
defining, locating and anointing the traditional authority – in the singular. We need to 
remember that African colonies did not share with early modern Europe the political history 
of an absolutist state. This means that the rule-making authority was not in the singular but 
always the plural. Instead of a centralized state authority whose writ was law – in all social 
domains – the practice was for different authorities to define the convention in different 
domains of social life. Besides chiefs, the definers of tradition could come from women’s 
groups, age groups, clans, religious groups, and so on. (Mamdani 2012: 49) 
The political and constitutional legacy left by the British and the French is summarized thus by Mamdani: 
The difference between early British and French colonial experience is summed up by the 
following: unlike the British, who in Nigeria and Uganda worked out alliances and “treaties” 
with rulers of precolonial kingdoms, the French were more often than not in direct conflict 
with these great aristocracies. When the majority of the great African states, like the 
kingdoms of Segou and Sikasso and the state of Samory, refused to submit to French claims, 
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they were suppressed. (Mamdani 1996: 83)  
The primacy of the political administration systems introduced by the European colonizers is still in effect, 
to varying extent, today – at least 50 years after the first wave of decolonization, as Plate 3.4 shows.  
Plate 3.4: Colonial legacies of modern Africa 
 
Source: Colonial legacies of modern Africa, 2015. http://mapmaker.rutgers.edu/studentprojects/ColonialLegacy.png, accessed 
October 2018.  
The French precedent of a highly centralized state has remained in effect; this was particularly pronounced 
during the first 25 years of independence (from 1960 to 1985). 
Actively schooled in the French political tradition and habituated to French legal and 
institutional norms and forms, the African leaders were not likely to reject the political 
culture in which they themselves had been nurtured. Most attractive, of course, were the 
provisions for a dominant presidency, a model consonant with both African leaders’ personal 
admiration for De Gaulle and their preference for strongly centralized leadership and control. 
(LeVine  1986: 84–5)  
Similarly, even as the British government permitted sovereignty amongst its African holdings, it 
simultaneously set forth the political terms for these newly independent political units. 
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The constitutions of Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanganyika had to be signed by the British 
monarch with the same stroke that granted independence. The native political elite who took 
part in constitution-making or lent their support to the new constitutions were themselves 
eager to draw upon metropolitan models. (Go 2002: 561) 
Inherent to this rediscovered independence was, for many African nations, a curiosity to introduce measures 
of decentralization, both politically and financially. As the colonial era ended, different countries 
experimented with decentralization of power differently, in response to both their colonial heritage and the 
demands of their citizens. Political leaders and academics alike considered whether or not decentralization 
was desirable, feasible, and economically sustainable. There was considerable fear that political 
decentralization would lead to destabilization across the continent; Marina Ottaway summarizes the general 
attitude and explains that 
thirty years ago, many African leaders predicted that Western-style, multi-party democracy 
would divide their countries along ethnic lines, encouraging tribalism and undermining the 
building of the nation. The fear of ethnic division was one of the major justifications provided 
for the adoption of more authoritarian styles of government. (Ottaway 1999: 88)  
From a financial perspective, there was a more balanced range of responses, with healthy debate on either 
side of the question. Supporters claimed that financial decentralization would have multiple benefits, 
including: (1) improved efficiency due to the fact that “decisions about public expenditure, that are taken 
by a level of government closer to the people that it is serving, are more likely to reflect the actual demand 
for local services, and thus appropriate resource allocation, than a one-size-fits-all approach more typical 
of a central government”; (2) improved political and financial accountability because “to the extent that 
sub-national services are financed through own-source revenues, citizens tend to closely monitor sub-
national authorities”; and (3) improved effectiveness stemming from the fact that this shift in power may 
“encourage experimentation and innovation in public policy and service delivery as individual jurisdictions 
have both the incentive and freedom to develop and implement new approaches or have incentives to copy 
successful sub-national governments”. Detractors warned of the potential for: (1) macro-economic 
instability caused by non-sustainable debt incurred by sub-national bodies; (2) declined investment in social 
infrastructure as in instances “(i.e. roads) whose benefits go beyond their geographical boundaries”; (3) 
increased horizontal inequities and conflicts where “some sub-national jurisdictions generate more revenue 
than others and provide to their citizens more or better quality services than is provided in poorer sub-
national governments”; or (4) increased corruption (Feruglio & Dallas 2008: 7–8). 
Although this was more fully explored in Chapter 1 of this thesis, on the history and politics of 
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decentralization, it is helpful to think through the traditional tools that are typically used by policy-makers 
to anticipate and project the types of revenues that could be used by sub-national authorities. They are 
summarized as follows: 
Sub-national governments seek guaranteed access to high levels of revenue. Access to 
revenue can come from own-source tax collection or from intergovernmental transfers from 
other levels of government. Among intergovernmental transfers, or revenues collected by 
the central government and distributed to sub-national governments, the most important are 
automatic, legally-mandated transfers. Transfers mandated by constitutions are the most 
desirable, followed by transfers outlined in ordinary law, and then by transfers over which 
the central government exercises discretion, since the latter may in principle by revoked by 
the center at any time. Alongside transfers, sub-national governments may seek tax authority. 
If the central government grants sub-national governments the right to enact taxes that were 
not previously authorized, this is treated as a move decentralizing revenues. (Dickovick 
2011: 17)  
If financial decentralization is viewed as a logical goal in the abstract, why are there so few examples of it 
across sub-Saharan Africa in reality? In many African countries, an important impediment to 
decentralization has been a lack of financial and human resources; these two deficiencies work interactively.  
Local governments find it difficult to raise enough revenue to meet the needs for both investments in 
internal capacity and long-term infrastructure investments, which therefore renders them unable to hire able 
administrators and other officials to manage programs. To ensure the provision of essential services, local 
leaders often have no alternative but to fall back on funds from the center. The combination of the lack of 
managerial resources, inadequate finances and poor access to markets implies that the concept of 
independence at the local level is illusory, with the center dictating the development agenda and local 
bureaucrats continuing to be beholden to the line ministries (Godola 2003).  
Comparing the British system of indirect rule with the French conceptualization of assimilation, it is not 
surprising to see that the anglophone lineage has led to more instances of successful financial and political 
decentralization than has been the case in francophone Africa. This can be specifically attributed to the 
relatively higher amount of power that rested at the sub-administrative level in British colonies than in 
French ones which, coupled with the oppressive centrist power of the French state, has led to complicated 
relationships between central and local governments in the former French colonies to this day (Bekker & 
Fouchard 2016). 
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The [final] political impact, and a very negative and regrettable one, is the delay that 
colonialism caused in the political development and maturity of African states. If colonialism 
meant anything at all politically, it was the loss of sovereignty and independence by the 
colonized peoples. This loss of sovereignty, in turn, implied the loss of the right of a state to 
control its own destiny; to plan its own development; to decide which outside nations to 
borrow from, associate with or emulate; to conduct its own diplomacy and international 
relations; and above all, to manage or even mismanage its own affairs, derive pride and 
pleasure from its successes, and derive lessons, frustrations and experience from its failures. 
(Boahen 1987: 99) 
Conclusion 
Underlying the argument throughout this chapter, and forming part of the overall thesis, is the 
demonstration that experiences in sub-Saharan Africa are not necessarily unique, whether one is 
considering the rate of colonial expansion in the late 19th century, the administration of colonial holdings 
through much of the 20th century, or the course of post-colonial history and its inconsistent efforts at 
decentralization. This chapter rounds out a discussion of the three major themes of Section 1 – 
decentralization, municipal bonds, and sub-Saharan African history – and shows how they are all 
interwoven. This interconnectedness will be demonstrated further in Section 2 of the thesis, in terms of the 
practical application of municipal finance in the case study cities discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  Effectively, 
the failure of the majority of sub-Saharan African governments to fully commit to decentralization in the 
post-colonial era has had damaging impacts on the introduction of municipal bonds as instruments for City 
finance. Without a constitutionally guaranteed enabling environment created by decentralization, municipal 
leaders in sub-Saharan Africa will not explore ways to raise money through the issuance of municipal 
bonds. 
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Section 2 : Practice: 
Theoretical Reflections 
The first section of the thesis, which broadly introduces the academic literature and theories that make up 
the argumentation for the appropriateness of municipal bonds for cities across sub-Saharan Africa, creates 
the backdrop for the second section of the thesis, which reviews four cases: Johannesburg, Douala, Dakar 
and Kampala.  In each instance, the respective experimentation from each City is driven by an appreciation 
and successive compilation of the nuances of these fundamental elements: (1) fiscal decentralization as part 
of a match to political devolution of power, (2) municipal bonds as a natural manifestation of the mechanism 
to deliver the finances required to meet the funding needs arising from decentralization and (3) the historical 
colonial legacy and how Africa’s past, exceptional or not, continues to frame the future. 
 
Understanding the Complexity of Municipal Finance 
Through Case Studies 
 
As a counterpoint to the first substantive theoretical section, this part of the dissertation provides a series 
of useful practical examples of both successes and failures in experiments in municipal bond issuance led 
by cities across sub-Saharan Africa.  It starts with a consideration of how the prerequisites of 
decentralization, whether nearly full (as in the case of South Africa) or nearly fully incomplete (as in the 
case of Cameroon), led to two successful bond issuances, based primarily on the implementation of and 
strict adherence to constitutional systems.  It then turns to two less-encouraging examples, those in Senegal 
and Uganda, as a demonstration of how mixed messages on decentralization at the sub-national level 
created confusion and, ultimately, led to failures to launch in both instances. 
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Chapter 4: Successful Bond Launches in sub-Saharan Africa 
Experiments to launch municipal bonds across sub-Saharan Africa have met with mixed success, often 
driven by the challenges identified in the first section of this thesis. To demonstrate this point, the argument 
continues in Section 2 with an intensive review of two cities – Dakar, Senegal, in Chapter 5, and Kampala, 
Uganda, in Chapter 6 – which have been chosen for their attempts to source debt finance through the 
issuance of municipal bonds for long-term, revenue-generating, capital-intensive projects.  
However, before presenting an in-depth consideration of Dakar and Kampala and their politically and 
constitutionally driven challenges with bond issuance, this section opens with an overview of the 
experiences of two other Cities: Johannesburg, South Africa, and Douala, Cameroon. Both of these Cities 
are instructive examples as they are placed at diametrically opposite ends of the sub-national government 
autonomy spectrum: South Africa creates an enabling environment where well-performing municipalities 
are expressly permitted to enter into long-term debt without government guarantees, while Cameroon’s 
government dictates a system where the sub-national government is only an extension of the national 
government. The location of these two Cities at two poles of the spectrum, with Dakar and Kampala being 
located closer to the middle (with insufficient devolution of power in both cases) underscores the argument 
that municipal governments cannot issue bonds without a full commitment to constitutionally empowered 
decentralization on the part of national leadership. 
Case study 1: Johannesburg, South Africa 
The City of Johannesburg sets a strong example in the sub-Saharan African context of a City that has 
successfully sourced finance for capital investments through bond issuance on the domestic capital markets. 
To understand why this is the case, one must consider several factors including, but not limited to, the 
constitutional enabling environment, the political will of national and sub-national leaders, and municipal 
financial viability. The confluence of these elements in the post-apartheid era allowed the City to 
experiment, and ultimately achieve success, with the use of this tool. 
Understanding the context 
Constitutional enabling environment 
Alone in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa explicitly and constitutionally enshrines the right of 
municipalities to borrow, through the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA, Act No. 56 of 2003). 
The MFMA, implemented in 2004, ensures that borrowed capital is used only for infrastructure 
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investments, as long-term debt can only be raised to finance capital expenditures and not to fund current 
expenses. Thus, a bond issuance cannot be used to balance the budget due to a shortfall in any given year. 
From the outset, there is no ambiguity about municipal debt, including bonds: the schedule of terms in 
Chapter 1 of the MFMA defines debt as “a monetary liability or obligation created by a financing 
agreement, note, debenture, bond or overdraft, or by the issuance of municipal debt instruments”. Chapter 
6 of the Act, which deals with municipal debt, differentiates between short-term and long-term debt, 
stipulating that short-term debt may be incurred “only when necessary to bridge shortfalls within a financial 
year during which the debt is incurred” or to meet “capital needs within a financial year”, while provisions 
for long-term debt are more permissive, allowing debt for “capital expenditure on property, plant or 
equipment to be used for the purpose of achieving the objects of local government” or for “re-financing 
existing long-term debt”. Through this legislation, municipalities became free to pursue transactions in the 
capital markets, with the understanding that “neither the national nor a provincial government” would 
“guarantee the debt of a municipality or municipal entity”, except in certain clearly defined circumstances. 
Therefore, unlike what happens in most of sub-Saharan Africa, local governments across South Africa were 
given significant latitude to creatively pursue municipal debt through capital market transactions, while 
simultaneously understanding that there would be no safety net in the case of an inability to meet the debt 
service requirements stipulated in the transaction documents (Bloch 2000). It is important to note, 
particularly when considering the difficulties faced by the Cities of Dakar and Kampala, that the system of 
local governance introduced in South Africa was almost revolutionary when compared with previous 
practices (Bond 2000) and that this makes replicability of these progressive constitutional reforms difficult 
to imagine in other countries.  
The explicit discussion of the powers of municipalities relative to finance in the Constitution makes 
decision-making about investing at the sub-national level easier for sources of capital. Zoya Sisulu, a 
member of the debt capital markets team at Standard Chartered Bank, asserted in an article in Africa 
Business that  
a lack of maturity in bond markets rather than stubbornly centralised governance is often 
the factor holding back municipalities from the bond market. I think it’s more a matter of 
regulatory and market maturity – in South Africa we have a highly regulated environment 
which quite clearly sets the base for municipalities issuing and the rules and regulations 
around how they can issue. I think it’s more about developing that framework for central 
governments to become comfortable to start having municipalities issue independently. 
(Thomas 2015:418) 
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Political will of national and sub-national leaders 
Historically, South Africa had a centralized form of governance, but the system of intergovernmental 
relations changed substantially as a result of the 1996 Constitution (Act No. 108 of 1996), adopted by the 
Constitutional Assembly on May 8, 1996, and signed into law on December 10, 1996, which stipulated the 
creation of a quasi-federal system, consisting of national, provincial and local tiers of government.24 The 
Municipal Structures Act (Act No. 117 of 1998) stipulated the creation of metropolitan governments for 
major cities, and there are currently eight metropolitan governments in South Africa. 
Strong local government is an integral part of the 1996 Constitution, which states that each level of 
government is distinct, and that all levels are interdependent and interrelated. The principle of cooperative 
governance underpins this non-hierarchical system of intergovernmental relations. Section 151(3) of the 
Constitution stipulates that a municipality has the right to govern on its own initiative the local community’s 
administrative affairs, subject to national and provincial legislation as provided for in the Constitution. 
Section 151(4) states that national or provincial government may not compromise or impede a 
municipality’s right or ability to exercise its powers or perform its functions.  
Manor (1999) observed that introducing new local governments without sufficient financial resources was 
a recipe for disaster. In turn, Cameron (2007) claimed that one of the consequences of the decentralized 
system was the emergence of local clientelistic and patronage interests that have not promoted service 
delivery to communities. Interestingly, at the metro level, Cameron (2012) notes that the strength of the 
Constitution has kept national-level politics out of local decision-making, citing the fact that the 
longstanding control of the Western Cape Province by the Democratic Alliance (the main opposition party 
at the national level) has not had negative repercussions for the delivery of services in cities in the province. 
This is important, as it demonstrates to prospective long-term financiers of City investments that the 
political system is secure and can be expected to withstand changes in leadership without impact on ability 
and willingness to repay. 
Municipal financial viability 
Even with the right preconditions, met in large part through a trusted constitutional and political enabling 
environment, the underpinning of a City’s ability to launch a municipal bond is in the real and perceived 
levels of investor confidence, as manifested through analyses of the municipality’s financial viability. 
Underscoring this confidence is the presence of experienced and competent chief financial officers (CFOs) 
 
24 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No. 108 of 1996). 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf, accessed October 2018. 
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in municipalities. Across South Africa, academics have documented that there is, unsurprisingly, a positive 
correlation between the length and stability of those in the top financial management position of the City 
and its audit outcome, which is viewed as a key indicator of the City’s ability to responsibly manage its 
finances; this phenomenon holds true whether considering the country’s largest cities – metropolitan areas 
like Johannesburg or Cape Town – or smaller units of local government – intermediary cities like 
Polokwane or Rustenburg (Palmer, Moodley & Parnell 2017). The City of Johannesburg, at the time of its 
initial consideration of a bond issuance, was no exception; the CFO, Jason Ngobeni, had held the position 
of City treasurer at the time of serious contemplation of bond issuance in 2003, moving on to serve as the 
Municipal Manager for the capital City of Tshwane for five years, until his resignation in 2016.25 
According to the financial statements for 2003 (which were incorporated into the prospectus), the City of 
Johannesburg had outstanding debts to banks totaling ZAR 1,153 billion (approximately USD 173.6 
million). The financial institutions involved included commercial banks (Standard Corporate Merchant 
Bank, Absa Bank, Nedcor Group, Rand Merchant Bank, First National Bank) and development banks 
(Development Bank of Southern Africa). The City was current on all of its debts at the time, but faced 
severe difficulties in trying to originate any new loans.  
The City’s annual revenue for the fiscal year, which ended immediately prior to the bond issuance, totaled 
ZAR 4,651 billion (approximately USD 700.45 million), with primary sources of finance being assessment 
rates, refuse removal fees, and subsidies/transfers from national and provincial governments. The two 
borrowings of 2004 – in aggregate ZAR 2 billion (approximately USD 308 million) – represented slightly 
less than 50% of the total annual revenue of the municipality. There was only a nominal discrepancy 
between the City’s budgeted revenues and those actually collected.  
It is important to note that the City had spent the better part of the previous ten years (from the end of 
apartheid in 1994) working on improving its overall cash flow position and demonstrating its 
creditworthiness to investors. However, the City still faced challenges in distribution of wealth and 
provision of wide-spread access to basic services, particularly for some of the most vulnerable members of 
society (Parnell 2004). Because most investors are concerned more about the likelihood of repayment than 
the uses of the proceeds, concern about municipal allocation to urban infrastructure was not as critical as 
the need to find alternative methods of raising capital to meet pressing financial needs (Schwarcz 2012). 
 
25 Ndlazi, S., “Why I Quit as Top Tshwane Official,” IOL, 30 August 2016. https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-
africa/gauteng/why-i-quit-as-top-tshwane-official-ngobeni-2062396, accessed October 2018. 
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Issuing its first municipal bond: oversubscribed and highly replicable 
The main motive for the initial consideration of bond issuance derived from an attempt to diversify the 
City’s funding sources beyond an almost exclusive reliance on commercial and development banks. As 
banks were over-exposed to Johannesburg, the City of Johannesburg had reached its credit limits with 
nearly every bank and was forced to issue at least one municipal bond to obtain more funds for capital 
investment. 26 During the apartheid era (pre-1994), the City had successfully launched a number of 
municipal bonds, but this was in the context of prescribed asset requirements, whereby insurance companies 
and other institutional investors were required to hold 54% of their assets in instruments such as municipal 
and other domestic government bonds (Ngobeni 2008). 
The City of Johannesburg, with its April 2004 issuance, marked the beginning of the post-apartheid 
municipal bond era in South Africa. The locally denominated, six-year transaction of ZAR 1 billion 
(approximately USD 159 million) was viewed as highly attractive for investors, particularly because it was 
offered at a rate that was 230 basis points over the government benchmark bond, or at a nominal interest 
rate of 11.95%.27 This relatively high price, coupled with a sense of national pride at pioneering Africa’s 
first municipal bond, generated overwhelming demand, and the bond was oversubscribed threefold at 
primary issuance (Coetzee 2013; Mantso & Blaauw 2009). The minimum increment size was ZAR 
1,000,000 (or USD 159,000), signaling an intention on the part of the City to have investors that were either 
institutions or high net worth individuals. Only two months later, the City issued a second bond, seeking to 
raise a total of ZAR 1 billion. To reassure investors that Johannesburg was not taking on an unsustainable 
amount of debt, and to extend the maturity to 12 years, the municipality solicited an aggregate guarantee of 
40% (with two matching guarantees of 20% each from the International Finance Corporation and the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa). Due to the credit enhancement, and despite a doubling in the bond’s 
length, the premium paid by the City over the benchmark treasury curve was reduced to 164 basis points, 
with a nominal interest rate of 11.9%, again based on prevailing interest rates at the time.28  
Figure 4.1 highlights the fact that municipal bonds, particularly those with external guarantees to reduce 
risk, will often track closely against sovereign bonds when considering yield to maturity. The second bond 
 
26 Interview with David Savage, Advisor to South African National Treasury, February 2017, Cape Town, South 
Africa. 
27 Interview with Matthew Glasser, Advisor to South African National Treasury, February 2017, New Delhi, India. 
28 A key difference between interest rates on bank loans and on bonds is that the covenants governing bank loans often 
allow for fluctuations in interest rates reflective of prevailing conditions in the financial markets, whereas bonds are 
traditionally issued with fixed interest rates throughout the entire period. This rate setting allows municipal leaders to 
make more predictable estimates of their long-term budgets, capital investment plans, and existing debt capacity. 
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from the City of Johannesburg was priced at 11.9% at the time of issuance in June 2004, and moved in line 
with the corollary sovereign government bond expected to mature in 2010. Although this is not always the 
case, it adds to the argument that municipalities will make to potential investors about the predictability of 
the performance of municipal bonds in the secondary (post-issuance) market. 
Figure 4.1: Spread between the interest rate on the Johannesburg municipal bond (COJ02) and a 
South African sovereign bond (R157) with similar maturity rates, 2003–2006 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Bond Exchange of South Africa data. 
Only 40% of the proceeds of the first two bonds were used to finance the City’s capital expenditure 
program.29 The rest was used to refinance existing, more expensive debt that Johannesburg had accrued in 
the late 1990s, when it was experiencing financial distress. The refinancing of the onerous debt 
arrangements through the bonds is anticipated to have saved the City interest payments of about ZAR 20 
million (approximately USD 3.25 million, calculated on average amounts per year based on fluctuating 
interest rates) annually over the six years from bond issuance to maturity (2004–2010).  
Investor appetite for municipal bonds issued by cities in South Africa remains strong more than a decade 
later. In 2011, Francesco Soldi, a Moody’s vice president, noted that “among the factors driving investor 
interest in bonds issued by large municipalities are strong investment-grade ratings on the South African 
national scale, their large and diversified budgets, and their above-average management expertise” (Soldi 
 
29 Interview with Konstant Bruinette, Development Bank of Southern Africa, January 2018, Pretoria, South Africa. 
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2011). Municipalities across South Africa continue to increase the level of sophistication of the financial 
instruments that they use to access capital for projects that are compatible with their visions for long-term 
growth. This is evidenced through the City of Johannesburg’s successful completion of a green municipal 
bond transaction in 2014 (Thomas 2016), which was followed three years later by the City of Cape Town’s 
issuance of a similar bond  in July 2017. In an interview with Neil Walmsley, head of partnerships at the 
Climate Knowledge and Innovation Community, he shared that “the initiative demonstrated by South 
African cities in launching green bonds at the sub-national level sets an example for the rest of the world,” 
but he lamented the fact that “other cities in sub-Saharan Africa are unlikely to be able to issue green 
municipal bonds if they are not successful in launching any municipal bonds, regardless of the color or 
intent”.30 
South Africa’s impact on municipal bonds in sub-Saharan Africa 
The City of Johannesburg has successfully transitioned away from exclusive reliance on loans from 
development finance institutions and commercial banks to source its long-term debt. As of 2015, more than 
half of the City’s long-term debt was sourced from the bond market (see Figure 4.2): 
Figure 4.2: Funding sources (percentage), City of Johannesburg, 2015 
 
Source: City of Johannesburg Presentation, delivered at the Urban Investment Partnership Conference, 27–28 August 2015. 
 
30 Interview with Neil Walmsley, April 2018, Paris, France. 
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Since the issuance of the first municipal bond in 2004 by Johannesburg, other large cities in South Africa 
have been relying on capital markets investors to provide financing for infrastructure as part of a larger 
suite of financial tools. South Africa’s success has inspired other countries across sub-Saharan Africa to 
look more closely at their experience and the potential for its replicability. Unfortunately, many 
opportunities for replication are thwarted in inception due to the lack of corollary commitment to a more 
complete devolution of financial decision-making power from the national government to sub-national 
government (ideally enshrined in the Constitution).  
Case study 2: Douala, Cameroon 
Of the four countries under review in this thesis, and in line with the central argument relating to the role 
of decentralization in municipal bond issuance, Cameroon demonstrates the lowest level of constitutionally-
empowered devolution of power. Yet, it is one of the only examples of municipal bond issuance in sub-
Saharan Africa. It is important to note that while the high concentration of power at the central level allows 
the national government to maintain a firm grip on any sub-national indebtedness, it also curtails local 
decision-making and ultimately does not provide a model for replication elsewhere on a continent that is 
increasingly attempting to devolve power to municipal governments.  
Constitutional enabling environment 
The 1972 Constitution created a highly centralized system in which cities are administered not by mayors 
but instead by political appointees; this is similar to the systems in a relatively small proportion of other 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (including Liberia and the Seychelles31). Part X of the Constitution, on 
Regional Authorities, indicates that “regional and local authorities … shall have administrative and 
financial autonomy in the management of regional and local interests”, but that the most senior officers in 
municipalities shall be “delegates, appointed by the President of the Republic”. These delegates shall 
“exercise the supervisory authority of the State” (Constitute Project 2008). Any funds borrowed by a sub-
national government are explicitly guaranteed by the central government and, accordingly, are viewed as 
financial transactions whose debts accrue to the national, not sub-national, government. 
Political will of national and sub-national leaders 
Unlike the situation in the other cities and countries reviewed in this thesis, there is little room for dissension 
at the local leadership level, driven by the fact that the mayor acts not as a representative of the electorate 
 
31 For Monrovia, Liberia, see http://monroviaCity.blogspot.com/ ; for Victoria, Seychelles, see 
http://www.statehouse.gov.sc/news.php?news_id=3252.  
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in the City (bottom-up) but instead as an appointee of the national government (top-down). Cameroon has, 
in general, been plagued by a lack of democracy and freedom of political thought; as recently as 2017, 
many Cameroonians felt disenfranchised by the system (Letsa 2017). This is a trend noted by several 
academics reviewing the centralization of power across Africa; in 2013, Roger Southall noted the drift 
towards authoritarianism and the emergence of a self-serving political elite that substitutes its own interests 
for the interests of the masses, and becomes focused on its own extraction activities (Southall 2013).  
Municipal financial viability 
According to the financial statement which was incorporated into the prospectus issued by the City of 
Douala in 200432, the City of Douala’s total receivables for its most recent audit were CFA franc 13 billion, 
or USD 17.7 million (from fiscal year 2003). Investors noticed, worryingly, that the actual revenue 
significantly deviated from the estimated revenue as proposed in the budget by nearly 50%33; the budget 
called for revenues of CFA franc 23 billion, whereas the actual collections were only CFA franc13 billion. 
This discrepancy underscored system-wide inefficiencies in accurate financial projections and collections, 
and could be viewed as indicative of a potential eventual inability to meet the debt service obligations called 
for in the bond agreement. Further, two of the City’s three main sources of revenue – transfers and taxes – 
that help to cover its operational and investment expenses are derived from the central government. In the 
years leading up to the bond issuance (from 1999 to 2003), tax revenues collected by agents of the sovereign 
government and transferred to the City represented – on average – more than 50% of the City’s total 
revenue, as shown in Figure 4.3. 
  
 
32 Prospectus for City of Douala CUD Issuance, 2004. 
33 Interview with Marco Kamiya, UN-Habitat, April 2018, Paris, France.  
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Figure 4.3: Tax revenues transferred from Cameroon central government, relative to total City of 
Douala revenue (percentage), 1999–2003 
 
Source: Administrative Accounts of the City of Douala; Prospectus for City of Douala CUD Issuance 2004 
Under the leadership of the central government-appointed delegate, the municipal council recognized that 
it was well positioned to raise finance in the newly formed stock exchange, particularly with the explicit 
guarantee of the national government. Prior to the bond launch in 2005, and as part of the documentation 
required to attract investors, the City’s financial advisors conducted a cost–benefit analysis to compare the 
costs of commercial bank financing and a municipal bond issuance, which helped to inform the ultimate 
decision taken.34 According to the prospectus made available to investors, the City planned to use the funds 
raised from the bond issuance for road infrastructure, waste water management, storm drains, solid waste 
management, and mass transit. The City and related City corporation had no direct loans from any 
commercial banks at the time, although it received financing in the form of concessionary finance from the 
World Bank and the Agence Française de Développement totaling approximately CFA franc 94 billion, or 
USD 128,000,000. These long-term funds were used for infrastructure improvements around the City, 
particularly around the port. The City’s successful servicing of this loan was an important indicator for 
potential investors who had little exposure to successful sub-national issuance in sub-Saharan Africa outside 
of South Africa. 
 
34 Interview with Guy Essome, Director of Structured Credit Products, May 2016, via Skype teleconference, from 
Dakar, Senegal, to London, UK. 
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Issuing its first bond: corrupt and one-off 
Because of the favorable conditions, which included responsible financial management, strong corporate 
governance of both the City and its municipal development corporation, and encouragement by the central 
government for Douala to diversify its sources of finance for capital investments, the City of Douala issued 
a five-year bond in 2005 through a special purpose vehicle called Communauté Urbaine de Douala Finance 
(CUD Finance). This was designed to assist the municipality in raising funds for urban management and 
development. This CFA franc16 billion bond (approximately USD 22 million) was jointly initiated by the 
central government and its representation in Douala in an effort to diversify the City’s financial resources. 
It was fully backed by the central government, in accordance with the constitutional constructs of 
Cameroon’s unitary government. The transaction was unique in that it represented not only the first 
municipal bond in the region, but also the first issuance at the Douala Stock Exchange since its inauguration 
in April 2003.35 
Unlike the bond issuance in Johannesburg, the smallest increment for the Douala bond transaction was far 
more accessible to retail investors; the minimum increment was CFA franc 1,000,000, or USD 1,400 
(compared with Johannesburg’s ZAR 1,000,000 minimum size, or USD 159,000). Additionally, the bond 
issuance was completed in three tranches, which differed in terms of the interest offered. The first tranche 
was offered with a fixed interest rate, the second with a variable interest rate, and the third without any 
coupon payments, but with a premium paid at the time of maturity. This approach afforded the City an 
opportunity to defer some of the costs of borrowing and helped to make the bond more appealing to a wider 
pool of investors.  Effectively, through the creation of three different tranches, institutional investors with 
limited risk appetite looking for regular returns (i.e., pension funds and insurance companies) purchased 
the first tranche while commercial banks and investors with optimism about the direction of interest rates 
on fixed-income instruments were able to purchase the second tranche.  The third tranche, without coupon 
payments, is a forerunner for Sukuk financing, which prohibits interest payments under Sharia law.   
Unfortunately, the City’s bond issuance was plagued with questions of financial and regulatory 
irregularities that ended in the dismissal and imprisonment of the national government’s delegate, Etonde 
Etoko, within 18 months. Allegations of fraudulent exchanges between tranches and improper licensing of 
the financial arranger of the transaction were investigated and deliberated in Cameroonian courts for 
months. Although this did not hamper the City’s ability to honor its debts, and investors received their 
 
35 Espesse, J (2005), “La CUD lance l’emprunt obligatoire,” Cameroon-Info.Net, 17 March, available at 
http://www.cameroon-info.net/article/developpement-la-cud-lance-lemprunt-obligataire-92235.html, accessed 
October 2018. 
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principal and interest in full and on time, perceptions of illegality have given municipal leaders reason to 
doubt the likelihood of a follow-on financial transaction (Nguemegne 2011).   
Cameroon’s impact on municipal bonds in sub-Saharan Africa 
Curiously, the bond issuance in Douala is not referenced in most of the academic literature on municipal 
bonds in sub-Saharan Africa, which in itself is concerning as, despite the outcome of the transaction, it still 
demonstrates the fact that bond issuance can occur when sanctioned by the central government. Despite the 
fact that it has not been replicated elsewhere in Cameroon or in francophone Africa, and despite the 
corruption charges and other legal issues associated with the transaction, it was nonetheless an example of 
a bond issuance originated by a municipal authority that fulfilled its financial obligations at maturity. 
However, based on the relative obscurity of the transaction, it would be reasonable to assume that it did not 
have any significant influence on the development of the African municipal bond market. 
Conclusion 
Although almost all African cities lack the power and authority to access the required resources to put in 
place the infrastructure necessary to drive economic growth or deliver a healthier environment for citizens, 
a few have turned to raising municipal bonds as a way of leveraging the cash needed for large-scale 
investment. For those that have attempted to issue bonds (and the even smaller sub-set of those that have 
succeeded in their efforts), the case of Douala is instructive in considering the impact of decentralization 
on the potential for bond issuance at the sub-national level in sub-Saharan Africa. More specifically, the 
two examples in this chapter, arguably success stories, do not represent the type of success that would be 
easily replicated across the region.  To replicate South Africa, with its well-developed legal system, would 
require a constitutional overhaul that is unlikely to be easily achieved in other countries, particularly given 
the reticence around decentralization.  Conversely, to replicate Cameroon would, in essence, be a 
recognition that the best opportunities for sub-national governments to raise finance through the issuance 
of municipal bond lies in an effective abrogation of the rights of municipalities to function independently, 
from a financial perspective, from their national governments.  The two case studies presented in the next 
two chapters – Dakar and Kampala – strengthen this argument by showing that the failure to launch was 
driven not by insufficient capacity or a lack of financially sustainable projects, but instead by an incomplete 
devolution of power for financial decision-making and execution of instruments to the sub-national level.   
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Chapter 5: The Senegalese Experience 
 
Well-planned infrastructure, with long-term financing sufficient to match the useful life of assets, is a 
prerequisite for sustainable economic growth (Alm 2015; Castells-Quintana 2017; Frick  2018). As 
demonstrated in previous chapters, however, cities across sub-Saharan Africa are struggling to make use of 
appropriate instruments that will realize and maintain these goals (i.e., to raise sufficient amounts of money 
to, at best, cope with growth or, at least, provide services to meet the current demands of their constituents). 
Effectively, without introducing financial tools that can be used as frequently and responsibly as needed 
and that are enshrined in national constitutions, African cities may find themselves unable to meet the needs 
of ever-increasing populations. One of the most striking examples of a nearly successful attempt at financial 
innovation can be found in Senegal’s capital City of Dakar, which made tremendous progress towards the 
introduction of a financial tool that would enable significant capital investment in urban infrastructure, 
designed to be in accordance with the City’s master development plan. Ultimately, the objections of the 
national government to the concept of a long-term financial obligation, originated and promoted by a quasi-
autonomous sub-national government, were driven largely by the failure to fully decentralize, which kept 
the City from using one of the most well-suited tools at its disposal.  
This chapter opens by making the case for why Dakar needs money to address its developmental needs. It 
then sets out a review of the conditions that made Senegal, viewed in aggregate, an appropriate host country 
for more progressive financial experiments at the sub-national level than some other sub-Saharan African 
countries: namely, its position as a stable democracy, its financial literacy, its position as part of a common 
currency bloc with clearly prescribed rules and regulations for publicly listed financial instruments, and its 
history of encouraging decentralization. Following this section, the chapter continues by considering the 
driving factors at the City level that indicated Dakar’s readiness for a municipal bond launch, including the 
integration of support from external aid agencies in institutionalizing best practices for financial 
management, strong leadership from the mayor and his municipal council, and steady progress in 
introducing long-term capital investment planning that featured the use of long-term debt instruments. The 
chapter proceeds with a more careful review of the work of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation-funded 
Dakar Municipal Finance Program (DFMP), a five-year initiative intended to culminate in the launch of the 
City’s first bond, and closes with a review of the challenges that the bond faced and the reason why it was 
ultimately unsuccessful. 
The chapter points out the curious disconnect between the City’s progress and the outcome of its nearly 
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successful efforts at the bond launch: although the City had followed all of the rules set forth by the market 
regulator and complied with Senegalese law, Dakar was still unable to realize its aspiration to use this new 
instrument to fund needed urban infrastructure. 
Why Dakar needed large-scale investment 
At the time of the proposed bond issuance in 2014, the City of Dakar was able to provide basic services 
(water, sanitation, power, health, education) to approximately 80% of its citizens. In the ensuing four years, 
this number has dropped to approximately 75%, and is likely to continue to trend lower based on a mismatch 
between available finances for rudimentary infrastructure services and rapid population growth, estimated 
at approximately 5% per year (Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Demographie 2018).36 This 
shortfall is indicative of the cost of operation and maintenance, with slight expansion, of existing capital 
infrastructure; it does not, however, allow for the type of large-scale investment in major network expansion 
or social service infrastructure required to meet the needs of such a rapidly growing population. 
Concessionary lending from development finance institutions like the Agence Française de Développement 
(AFD), whose loan (discussed in detail below) was able to help with incremental, socially focused and non-
essential infrastructure, is insufficient to meet the City’s requirements, and is further evidence of the need 
for larger capital injections like those provided through municipal bond issuances.  
Senegal as an appropriate breeding ground for municipal finance in francophone 
West Africa 
Although the archaeological record from the pre-colonial period is relatively sparse, academics have argued 
that the pre-colonial period in Senegal was one that was dominated by a significant amount of commerce 
and international exchange between both neighboring African kingdoms and external European traders. 
This exposure both knitted together the Senegalese people into what later became a stable, heterogeneous 
nation-state and, at the same time, allowed for the primacy of a predominantly Wolof-speaking, Muslim 
country (particularly if the more contentious Casamance region is viewed separately) (Richard 2013). 
Today, Senegal is a relatively homogeneous society, especially when compared with the other economic 
powerhouse in the region, Cȏte d’Ivoire (Figure 5.1).  
 
36 Interview with Thibault Rannou, French Development Agency, September 2017, Dakar, Senegal. 
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Figure 5.1: Religious distribution in Senegal and Cȏte d’Ivoire 
 
Source: CIA Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html, accessed 15 April 2018. 
This fact is compelling when considering that political stability is typically a prerequisite for the flow of 
funds from private investors to the public sector. The impact of uncertainty on fiscal flows is demonstrated 
by the difficulties faced by nearby Cȏte d’Ivoire in the months following the restructuring of its public debt 
in 2009, after its initial default in 2000 subsequent to internal political clashes (El-Khawas & Anyu 2014; 
Furness 2017). (Even though the majority of Senegal’s population is Muslim, the first post-colonial leader, 
Léopold Sédar Senghor, was Catholic; his presidency lasted for 20 years – from 1960 to 1980 – and his 
policies helped to shape the Senegal of today. He was also the first post-colonial African president to leave 
office voluntarily, handing the reins of power to his successor, a somewhat uncommon occurrence in 
countries in the region with a long-entrenched political leader. Although he favored centralization of power 
in the capital, he did encourage a degree of independence that expressed itself through the creation of 
agencies focused on sub-national development, described in greater detail below [Valantin 2016]). 
Financial maturity in Senegal around the independence process 
As countries across francophone West Africa began to declare their independence from France in the years 
immediately following the Second World War, the French government offered to create a currency bloc by 
means of which these countries would be able to ensure financial stability, through a direct peg which fixed 
the exchange of the French franc to the CFA (Communauté Financière Africaine) franc, ensuring total and 
free convertibility (Figure 5.2). Although this arrangement has been argued to limit francophone Africa’s 
growth (Malanda 2008), it has created a tightly-knit set of countries with open borders and free flows of 
internal investment.  
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Figure 5.2: Francophone West African participants in CFA franc 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CFA-Franc_BCEAO_in_Africa.svg, accessed October 
2018. 
Among its peers in the currency bloc, Senegal is one of the strongest performers, with steady growth of 
approximately 7% per year, which bolsters investor ease with Senegal.37 Investor confidence in Senegal is 
further strengthened by its relatively strong performance in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
Report and the annual Corruption Index published by Transparency International (Table 5.1). 
  
 
37 See https://data.worldbank.org/country/senegal, https://data.worldbank.org/country/cote-divoire, accessed 15 
April 2018.  
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Table 5.1: Ease of Doing Business Report and Corruption Index rankings for countries in the West 
African CFA franc currency bloc, 2017 
 Ease of Doing Business Report ranking Corruption Index ranking 
Benin 151, of 190 85, of 180 
Burkina Faso 148, of 190 74, of 180 
Cȏte d’Ivoire 139, of 190 103, of 180 
Guinea-Bissau 176, of 190 171, of 180 
Mali 143, of 190 122, of 180 
Niger 144, of 190 112, of 180 
Senegal 140, of 190 66, of 180 
Togo 156, of 190 117, of 180 
Source: Transparency International (2017); World Bank (2017a) 
Investors rely on more than general indicators to make decisions about how best to allocate their portfolio, 
and view credit ratings by ratings agencies as critical indicators of the likelihood of borrowers’ willingness 
and ability to repay their debt. More specifically, a credit rating relies on three pillars to evaluate the 
performance of the rated entity, with many sub-pillars (GCR 2018):  
1. Socio-economic environment (GDP growth, economic diversification, employment levels, income 
levels, household wealth, demographic composition, provision of social services, rate of urbanization). 
2. Legal and institutional framework (laws, regulations, and practices that govern ability to generate 
income/raise funding, assumed support from national government, undue political influence, low 
degree of fiscal and operational independence, corporate governance, strength and capabilities of 
oversight bodies, extent to which corrupt or wasteful activities are investigated and guilty parties held 
to account). 
3. Income/expenditure/financial forecasts (internally generated income (rates & taxes, services) versus 
external sources (grants & subsidies), diversification of sources of revenue, economic base, 
identification of new sources, reliance on grant funding, ability to collect on debtors critical to cash 
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flow, relationship between discretionary expenses (non-essential capex) and non-discretionary 
expenses (such as debt service payments), staff cost to total cost ratio, repairs and maintenance versus 
depreciations, analysis of published budgets, accuracy and reliability assessed based on the historical 
performance of an entity relative to forecast). 
Unsurprisingly, Senegal and Cȏte d’Ivoire are the highest-rated of the countries in the West African bloc, 
performing at the high end of the speculative scale based on the above commonly accepted criteria.  
National credit ratings are graded on the international scale; the least risky issuers – like the United States 
government – are awarded AAA by S&P and Fitch, and Aaa by Moody’s.  A rating of Ba3 by Moody’s for 
Senegal is equivalent to a rating of BB- by S&P or Fitch, and is higher than a score of B1 (Moody’s) which 
tracks to a score of B+ for S&P or Fitch.  For S&P or Fitch, a score of B+ is higher than a score of B or B-
(correlating to a Moody’s score of B2 and B3, respectively). 
Table 5.2: National credit ratings for countries in the West African CFA franc currency bloc 
 Moody’s S&P Fitch 
Benin   B 
Burkina Faso  B  
Cȏte d’Ivoire   B+ 
Guinea-Bissau    
Mali   B- 
Niger    
Senegal Ba3 B+  
Togo    
Source: Countryeconomy.com ratings (2018).   
Note: The chart lists all member countries of the West African currency bloc, despite the fact that some of the countries have, as of 
the date of writing, not commissioned credit ratings. 
From a financial maturity standpoint, and of crucial relevance to the argument of this chapter, Senegal’s 
regular issuances in the local currency market (regulated by the Conseil Régional de l’Epargne Public et 
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des Marches Financiers [CREPMF]) depict the country as a well-regarded borrower able to repeatedly find 
a willing cadre of investors eager to purchase national debt. Since 2005, Senegal has borrowed in local 
currency six times for a total of CFA franc 377.04 billion (EUR 573.3 billion) with a nearly constant 
nominal interest rate that fluctuated from a low of 5.5% to a high of 6.75%.38 The Ministry of Finance, 
through its constitutional mandate, keeps “close watch on debt service ratios” and makes sure that the 
country’s indebtedness never exceeds 40%; the country’s current debt to GDP ratio is approximately 39% 
(Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Demographie 2018.).39  
Table 5.3: Local currency bond issuance, Senegal, 2005–2015 
Date Amount (CFA franc) Coupon (nominal interest 
rate) 
August 2005 45,000,000,000 5.5% 
December 2010 76,800,000,000 6.75% 
October 2012 88,103,000,000 6.7% 
June 2013 66,937,180,000 6.5% 
December 2015 100,200,000,000 6.3% 
Source: Compiled by the author using Bloomberg Data. 
What emerges from tracking the growing national borrowing profile of Senegal is an increasingly robust 
and sophisticated engagement within the regional fiscal system, denominated in the regional CFA franc and 
governed by a regional regulator. The same governance structure dictating the rules for the Senegalese 
government in the local market, developed and implemented by the regulator, is designed to apply to all 
public entities, including sub-national governments. More specifically, the CREPMF, established in 1996, 
has firmly established rules and regulations governing the issuance of debt by any public entity, and clearly 
allows for sub-national entities to borrow in the market once it can demonstrate that it has met prevailing 
conditions (CREPMF 1996). In theory, therefore, there are no barriers to municipal borrowing. What is 
unclear is how the configuration of powers and functions and the less formal devolution of power impact 
 
38 See http://www.crepmf.org/Wwwcrepmf/Emetteurs/Liste.aspx, accessed 15 April 2018.  
39 Interview with Ed Roche, US Treasury Office of Technical Assistance Senegalese Lead, February 2016, Dakar, 
Senegal. 
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on what cities, even large cities like Dakar, are actually able to initiate on the fiscal front.  
Contextualizing Senegal’s decentralization 
Sovereign demonstrations of financial strength and maturity are positive indicators when considering the 
appropriateness of a pioneering sub-sovereign financial instrument; the juxtaposition of an ever-increasing 
level of decentralization against financial strength at the City level helps to underscore the likelihood of 
Dakar’s success in attempting a municipal bond issuance as a pioneer in francophone Africa. The French 
political model, which favors intense centralization (Gilbert & Taugourdeau  2012), was the cornerstone 
of Senegal’s post-colonial Constitution; it took over a dozen years for the creation of functional lower levels 
of governance (communautés rurales) across the country in 1972. The 1972 creation of the rural 
communities was a top-down move that nevertheless established a precedent of modern government and 
the principle of two tiers of government. The 1960s and 1970s also saw pressure for increased urban 
autonomy, which in Senegal manifested itself as demands from local leaders across the country for more 
power over decision-making and more assurance of regular fiscal transfers from the central government, 
particularly for unfunded mandates (Ndegwa & Levy 2003). Throughout these decades, demands for local 
autonomy were most acute in the capital City, Dakar (Dafflon & Madies 2012). The City had the only truly 
viable City budget; whereas other cities floundered when required to perform such basic tasks as 
constructing and subsequently maintaining rudimentary urban infrastructure, Dakar found the requisite 
resources more easily.  This is, in particular, borne out in the relatively low collection rate of the Senegalese 
government’s initiative to fund municipalities – the Programme de Renforcement et d’Equipement des 
Collectivités Locales (PRECOL) – through which the government collected only 54.5% of its outstanding 
debt; a significant portion of this loan repayment was from the City of Dakar.40 
The primacy of Dakar is not merely a function of its economic preeminence, but also of its political 
centrality. The threat posed by Dakar’s autonomy to national party leadership was already in evidence in 
1964, when Senghor suspended the City’s municipal status, bringing it directly under national control and 
thereby avoiding any political competition from rival factions with a strong local power base. Throughout 
the following decades this tension continued to grow, with token efforts by the national government to 
transfer power to municipalities. For example, the ruling party passed laws reforming the government 
structure in 1996 by creating elected regions and by delegating major public service responsibilities to sub-
national governments (OECD 2016). The 1996 reforms were acclaimed in Africa as a “major advance in 
 
40 PRECOL was initiated by the Agence de Développement Municipal, following successful predecessor programs 
where the City of Dakar was the main borrower (the Compte du Crédit Communal and the Programme d’Appui aux 
Communes). The information on the recovery rate was current as of May 2017, included in a presentation delivered 
by Amadou Ndiaye of the Agence de Développement Municipal in Somone, Dakar. 
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decentralization”, but on the whole the reforms decentralized responsibilities without transferring the 
revenues necessary to realize these functions.41 In fact, most government activity, including the payment 
of civil service salaries, remained in the hands of state-appointed administrators. The laws were, in effect, 
a set of unfunded mandates; in cases where local areas were ruled by opposition parties, the central 
government used these laws as a means to reduce the autonomy of local government where they were 
performing well (Resnick 2014b).  
One of the achievements of this legislative decentralization was the creation of a Decentralization Fund – 
Fonds de Dotation de la Décentralisation (FDD) – intended for distribution as grants to all local 
governments. The FDD was coupled with the legal dispositions of Law 96-0742, which made local 
government responsible for the provision of basic services in nine major social service areas, including 
health and education.  
Similarly, as previously referenced, the Senegalese government created two national agencies to support 
local governments in accessing finances for long-term, capital-intensive projects: the Agence de 
Développement Municipal (ADM) and the Agence de Développement Local (ADL). Although well-
capitalized through the financial support of international donors like the World Bank and supplemented by 
allocations from the central government, both organizations have suffered from limited recovery of funds 
on-lent to subnational governments (with Dakar being a major exception) (Paulais 2014). Senegal provides 
an interesting comparison with other countries experiencing their own forms of fiscal decentralization at 
the same time; South Africa, as discussed in Chapter 4, saw a much greater devolution of power whereby 
municipalities took control of their financial decision-making and were able to prepare for experimentation 
with a wide variety of tools, including municipal bonds, based on constitutional changes and political 
empowerment. (In contrast, Brazil, through its constitutional revision of 1988, pursued a different path that 
created 1,016 new City governments, some of which suffered significantly due to the loss of benefits 
derived from economies of scale, a phenomenon likely of interest to decision-makers in Dakar [Lima & 
Silveira Neto 2018].) The divergent paths taken by South Africa and Senegal with regard to empowerment 
of local governments had direct implications for their ability to consider municipal bonds decades later. 
As a result of the 1996 decentralization, local governments across Senegal were encouraged by the central 
government to seek financing from a plethora of sources. A World Bank review of sub-national financial 
autonomy in Senegal outlined the legal empowerment of the country’s sub-national governments, but noted 
 
41 Interview with Babacar Thioye Ba, 10 August 2017, Dakar, Senegal. 
42http://www.servicepublic.gouv.sn/assets/textes/loi-transfert-region.pdf, accessed 10 April 2018. 
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the practical constraints that somewhat invalidated this power: 
The sub-national governments are quite free to borrow from the banking and capital markets. 
However, this possibility is subject to prior approval by the central government through its 
local level representative when the borrowings reach CFA franc 100 million (approximately 
USD 170,000) and when they result from a loan agreement through international 
cooperation. This provision, which restricts the binding force of these decisions taken by the 
sub-national governments, represents progress compared to the situation that prevailed 
before 1996, since control is no longer exercised by the central authority but rather by the 
state’s representative at the local level. (World Bank  2000 : 29)  
Yet, the apparently sanguine reaction of local governments to the idea of greater financial autonomy does 
not obscure the fact that the change simply shifts responsibility for monitoring borrowing from the central 
government in Dakar to the central government agent outside the capital (Resnick 2014b). This is a 
deconcentration, rather than a devolution, of power. State representatives have numerous prerogatives with 
respect to sub-national loans, with the center (acting through deconcentrated officials at the regional level 
and below) retaining the right to view borrowing schedules a priori, and to approve any guarantees offered 
on the loans. 
Despite reforms, the autonomy of the sub-national state was further undermined, as the structure of revenue 
distributions did not allow sub-national governments to generate the revenues necessary to repay the loans. 
Since the annual FDD distributions were entirely for use on current expenditures, sub-national governments 
would have to rely on own-source tax revenues to repay any debt obligations. The theoretical right conferred 
on a City by national government to enter into capital market contracts was thus largely irrelevant; only 
guaranteed transfers of funds for capital investment or the transfer of tax authority will increase sub-national 
borrowing autonomy. While distinct, each area of autonomy constitutes a part of a whole fiscal system, and 
a lack of autonomy in one area can moot an otherwise high level of autonomy in another area. In this case, 
the lack of revenue autonomy can render de jure borrowing autonomy irrelevant without a similar expansion 
of budget authority for the municipality as a whole. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 demonstrate the chain of authority 
relating to local government issues, and highlight the fact that, even with decentralization, there is still 
significant national oversight of all local government decision-making. As the figures show, with specific 
reference to the argument in this chapter, the prefect retains authority to review and approve all budgets 
developed by the municipality prior to execution, particularly those that show any debt obligations; this 
point will become critical in later considerations of the municipal bond transaction in Dakar itself. 
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Figure 5.3: Territorial organization in Senegal 
 
Source: Gilbert & Taugourdeau (2012: 214) 
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Figure 5.4: Relations of central government, ministries, deconcentrated government services, and 
local governments in Senegal 
 
Source: Gilbert & Taugourdeau (2012: 215) 
Of additional interest is the role of the percepteur, an official appointed by the Ministry of Finance to 
validate financial decisions in the City of Dakar through reviews of the budget-making process as well as 
comprehensive periodic reviews of progress against financial indicators.  Effectively, despite being 
permanently embedded in the City on a day-to-day basis, the percepteur is ultimately responsible to the 
national government and functions as a safeguard on municipal financial decision-making in a way that 
prohibits unsustainable borrowing.  
Dakar as a municipal leader in francophone West Africa 
Amongst the international financial community, Senegal is considered “a highly competent country with 
the ability to regularly source funds through the domestic market based on investors’ perceptions of the 
country’s stability and ability to repay its debts”.43 Further, the political decentralization process created an 
environment within which a city like Dakar would be able to meaningfully replicate the success of the 
national government. However, the presence of these conditions does not guarantee that the City will be 
 
43 Interview with Rodrigo Gonzalez, Head of Debt Capital Markets, Standard Chartered Bank, 15 August 2016, New 
York, United States.  
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capable of issuing a municipal bond. The indicators of success are found within the City itself, namely in 
its own efforts to demonstrate the strength of its internal financial management, its political leadership, and 
its ability to develop and implement long-term master planning schemes in line with a multi-year budget. 
Financial management in Dakar 
Because of the relative stability of the Senegalese economy and the forward-thinking approaches of 
municipal leadership, international aid agencies and charitable foundations have often viewed Dakar as a 
natural partner for experimentation with the idea of a municipal bond in sub-Saharan Africa, building off 
of the success of South African city issuances. In 2008, the World Bank’s Public-Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility underwrote a diagnostic review of the City’s financial management system using the 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment tool. The findings from that report 
were incorporated into the City’s financial management practices, and provided the backdrop against which 
the City would be able to borrow from a wider pool of lenders (Diou, Caprio & Chomentowski 2009). 
Initially, the national government was explicitly supportive of the PEFA process, requesting the World 
Bank’s support in helping to make Dakar more financially independent and able to access finances from 
willing lenders/investors).44 The results of this commitment by the City can be seen through a review of its 
financial performance from 2008 to 2014, as shown in Table 5.4. 
  
 
44 Interviews with Babacar Thioye Ba, legal advisor to the mayor of the City of Dakar, 10 August 2017, Dakar, 
Senegal; Dieynaba Thiam Ka, administrator for the DFMP, 14 August 2017, Dakar, Senegal; Salim Rouhana, World 
Bank, January 2017, Dakar, Senegal. 
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Table 5.4: Financial information, City of Dakar (thousands of CFA francs), 2008–2014 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Row 1 - 
Operating 
revenues 
24,188 26,118 22,459 27,839 36,583 26,804 27,525 
Row 2 -
Operating 
expenses 
16,017 16,536 18,461 22,843 25,199 26,192 21,103 
Row 3 - Gross 
savings 
8,171 9,582 3,998 4,996 11,383 612 6,422 
Row 4 - Loan 
repayments 
0 0 0 1,232 2,359 2,525 2,652 
Row 5 - Net 
savings 
8,171 9,582 3,998 3,765 9,024 -1,913 3,770 
Row 6 - 
Investment 
income 
0 0 1,876 6,800 6,972 8,019 10,726 
Row 7 - 
Capital 
expenses 
7,195 3,965 5,791 11,199 9,023 9,235 11,881 
Row 8 -
Investment 
requirement 
-7,195 -3,965 -3,915 -4,399 -2,051 -1,216 -1,154 
Row 9 - Year-
end balance 
976 5,617 83 -634 6,974 -3,129 2,616 
Source: Compiled by the author from City of Dakar Financial Statements (2008–2014). 
In essence, the City’s internal financial performance opened up external financial markets for Dakar; 
through demonstrations of the likelihood and willingness of repayment, new sources of finance for urban 
infrastructure investments began to appear.  The information in the above table is particularly important 
when considering three important elements: 
1) The city’s operating revenues (Rows 1 and 2) have remained relatively stable, with minor variation, 
during the period analyzed, demonstrating strong financial management and reassuring investors. 
2) The city has effectively budgeted for its long-term investment needs (Row 8), with a shortfall of 
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less than 3% of the city’s total revenue (sum of Rows 1 and 6).  
Dakar experimented with municipal finance through transactions as early as 2008; as one of his final acts 
in office, Pape Diop, then mayor of the City of Dakar, had signed a loan with the AFD to fund a 
EUR 10 million program to furnish the City with street lights along well-traveled thoroughfares. This loan 
was the first of its type from the AFD to a West African capital city without a central government guarantee 
of repayment. It demonstrated a belief on the part of external lenders that the City of Dakar could be viewed 
as a creditworthy borrower. This loan was possible without a central government guarantee because 
language in the Constitution granted municipalities across the country the power to enter into long-term 
debt obligations without central government intervention. Subsequently, the City borrowed from other 
concessional lenders (like the West African Development Bank, which agreed to a loan of CFA franc 1.2 
billion for the rehabilitation of roads) and from commercial banks (like the Islamic Bank of Senegal, which 
provided a loan of CFA franc 2.65 billion for the installation of traffic lights at the City’s busiest 
intersections) (Gorelick 2018). All of the financial undertakings were directly supervised by the respective 
mayors in Dakar, as each recognized that the City’s sustainability and potential responsiveness to future 
growth depended on its success in raising funds from a diverse market.  
Political leadership in Dakar 
Since independence, Dakar has been led by progressive leaders who have rallied for and embraced increased 
levels of political autonomy at the sub-national level. Current (2018) mayor Khalifa Sall has endeavored to 
continue this tradition by introducing and institutionalizing processes of participatory budgeting, ensuring 
that the typically disenfranchised urban poor have a role in long-term decision-making across the City and 
that it would be politically unpopular for the national government to re-legislate and remove these powers 
(Cabannes 2014).  
An interesting and telling clash between the national and local government occurred in the 2016 municipal 
election cycle. To be elected mayor of the City, as per the abovementioned act of decentralization of 1996, 
a candidate must first win his/her district (arrondissement). In an effort to ensure that Khalifa Sall would 
not be eligible to continue as mayor, Senegalese president Macky Sall strongly backed his prime minister, 
Aminata Touré, in her ultimately unsuccessful challenge to Khalifa Sall in Grand Yoff (Figure 5.5).45 
 
45 Ba, D. “Senegal Prime Minister Sacked After Losing Election”. Reuters, 5 July 2014. 
https://www.yahoo.com/news/senegal-prime-minister-sacked-losing-election-194520227.html, accessed 10 June 
2018; internal Electoral Results Review document made available to the author in February 2018. 
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Figure 5.5: District electoral results, Grand Yoff (percentage), 2016 
  
Source: Compiled by the author from Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Demographie (2018).  
In 2012, under the leadership of Khalifa Sall, Dakar established a sub-municipal agency specifically tasked 
with City planning: the Department of Sustainable Development (Paice 2016). The department’s first tasks 
were to develop a long-term master development plan to ensure that the City’s growth strategy was well-
orchestrated, and, in conjunction with the City’s treasury, to appropriately sequence the timing of the City’s 
investments. The idea of Dakar as a well-planned City was of course not a new one; the French had 
introduced the idea of master planning in the mid-19th century during the initial years of their colonial 
occupation, encouraging the development of the strategically located peninsula from a sparsely populated 
area into a major trading hub (Bigon & Hart 2018). This new plan focused on an incorporation of capital 
planning, with an eye towards the concern that “infrastructure needed to respond to the rapidly growing 
population” while “marrying capital planning to capital investment planning”, to ensure that growth and 
development plans were not “designed in a vacuum” or based on the assumption that “large sums of finance 
were … available”.46 One of the additional benefits of the new plan was a view towards integration with 
the larger region, an idea championed by many academics (Beall, Parnell & Albertyn 2015; Pelling & 
Wisner 2012; Watson & Odendaal 2012).  
 
46 Interview with Rokhaya Sarr, Department of Planning and Sustainable Development for the City of Dakar, 
January 2017, Dakar, Senegal. 
57.3%29.6%
13.1%
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Putting the pieces together: a municipal bond in Dakar 
Having borrowed successfully from lenders in bilateral transactions and demonstrated its creditworthiness 
(particularly in its ability to repay a market-rate loan from the Islamic Bank of Senegal), the leadership of 
the City of Dakar was confident that it would be able to successfully source finance from the debt capital 
markets for long-term debt.47 More importantly, a municipal bond would help to fill the gap between 
commercial bank lending (which was relatively more expensive and shorter-term than a municipal bond) 
and development finance institution lending (which was more restrictive and did not allow for a single large 
injection of capital into a project).  
As part of the overall review of financial instruments, the City of Dakar compared the financials of the 
above-mentioned loans from the AFD (at a rate of 2.23% over 20 years) with the loan from the Islamic 
Bank of Senegal (at a rate of 8.5% over 3 years). When plotted graphically, the proposed municipal bond 
falls between the commercial loan (Islamic Bank of Senegal) and the development finance institution’s loan 
(AFD) (Figure 5.6). Using the same logic discussed in the first part of this thesis, reviewing not only the 
terms of the loan but also the terms of disbursement of funds, the City recognized that a bond issuance 
would be more attractive than a commercial loan and would be a better fit for the capital-intensive 
investment envisaged by the City.  
 
47 Interview with Dieynaba Dabo Mbaye, Coordinator for DFMP, January 2017, Dakar, Senegal. 
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Figure 5.6: Financial instruments considered by the City of Dakar  
 
Source: Compiled by the author from City Archives, City of Dakar. 
Because of the financial strength and stability of Senegal in the region, the clear powers allocated to the 
sub-national entities under the Constitution, and the financial maturity of Dakar and its regular repayments 
to lenders in traditional one-on-one relationships, the City was well-poised to demonstrate its readiness to 
issue a municipal bond. Notwithstanding, the municipal bond path was fraught with difficulties, and an 
international donor stepped in to assist in mediating and ensuring that Dakar as an early adaptor was 
successful.  
The lead-up to bond issuance 
Building off of its demonstration of success in on-time and in-full debt service, the City embarked on a 
process to launch a municipal bond, which started in late 2011 after a careful review of the Constitution, 
and confirmation with expert lawyers and government representatives that a municipal bond issuance was 
legal and fell under the definition of rights provided in the legal codes governing the rights of cities. In 
2011, the City of Dakar received a USD 500,000 grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to 
analyze the feasibility of launching a municipal bond. Dakar was presented as being uniquely positioned 
amongst its peer primary cities in the region due to (1) its visionary leadership, (2) its adoption of a strategy 
to address urban planning, and (3) its past performance as a borrower from external sources (Paice 2016). 
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The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation provided an aggregate grant of USD 5.5 million (which included 
the USD 500,000 for a project feasibility study) for a period from 2011 through 2017, with the intended 
outcome being an improvement in the quality of life for the urban poor through the mobilization of domestic 
finance via a transaction in the regional capital market. Throughout this period, international experts worked 
alongside City staff to improve the City’s financial management systems, its approach to comprehensive 
planning, and investors’ perception of the City’s creditworthiness. Part of this process included investor-
sounding exercises, through which the City learned that it would be most likely to achieve full capitalization 
of the transaction with the aid of a credit enhancement (i.e., a guarantee from an external body); after a 
thorough cost-benefit analysis, the City opted for a 50% principal guarantee from the United States Agency 
for International Development’s Development Credit Authority (USAID DCA). In a 2014 speech on the 
US government’s commitment to supporting development finance, then-USAID administrator Raj Shah 
explicitly referenced the catalytic impact that the agency’s guarantee was anticipated to have on municipal 
finance across sub-Saharan Africa (Shah 2016). The international development community was encouraged 
to see the City’s progress, and was committed to ongoing support, particularly because they viewed a 
success in Dakar as being one that could be replicated elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. This support was 
tied in with a “strong belief” that the “City of Dakar was part of an ecosystem driven by the central 
government” and “stood to benefit from the pathway of ever-increasing decentralization started under 
Senghor and continued under Dakar’s successful performance under the ADM and the ADL financing 
programs.”48  
Perhaps most crucial in this process were two elements that directly tie in with the concept of 
decentralization within a unitary state as described above: the explicit agreement and recognition of the 
proposed bond issuance by both national departments and intermediate oversight agencies. In May 2012, 
the City concluded its negotiation with the national department overseeing local governments (Le ministère 
de l’aménagement du territoire et des collectivités locales), which culminated in the receipt of a letter of 
non-objection to the proposed bond launch by national government. This non-objection was discussed and 
reconfirmed on an annual basis with national government. Similarly, the budget in the year preceding the 
bond launch included an accommodation for the repayment of the interest associated with the bond as part 
of future municipal obligations. As previously stated, by law, all municipal budgets must be approved and 
validated by the central government’s representative, the prefect, as well as the appointed representative 
from the Ministry of Finance, the percepteur. 
 
48 Interview with Dieynaba Dabo Mbaye, Dakar Municipal Finance Program Coordinator, June 2017, Dakar, 
Senegal. 
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By 2015, the City had successfully completed all regulatory steps required to issue a bond in the Abidjan-
based capital markets, and built sufficient demand from institutional investors through roadshows and other 
individual appeals to be confident that the transaction would be a success (Gorelick 2017). Further, the 
2015 credit rating, conducted by Bloomfield Credit Ratings (a local ratings agency based in Abidjan), 
showed increases in revenue, decreases in operating costs, steady repayments of loans, and a net surplus 
relative to the prior year.  
Table 5.5: Year-end accounting, City of Dakar (all amounts in CFA francs), 2014–2015 
 2014 2015 
Operating revenue 26.8 million 27.5 million 
Operating expenses 26.2 million 21.1 million 
Loan repayments 2.5 million 2.7 million 
Surplus/Deficit -3.1 million 2.6 million 
Source: Compiled by the author from City of Dakar records. 
Although the City’s rating remained unchanged over the period of time when the municipal bond was being 
actively considered (2011–2015), its capacity – both objectively and relative to its municipal peers in the 
region – significantly increased, as noticeably demonstrated by the ratings of the City of Dakar (investment 
grade) in comparison with that of the Ivorien capital of Abidjan.49 According to Babacar Thioye Ba, legal 
advisor to the mayor of the City of Dakar, “the City of Dakar recognized that, at the start of this [municipal 
bond issuance] process, it would need to change its approach from ‘business as usual’ and instead learn to 
be more transparent in its decision-making and activities. This shift in mentality was particularly important 
for the activities of the City’s Financial and Administrative Department, and required a redoubling of the 
City’s commitment to the efficiency of its human capital.”50 Dieynaba Thiam Ka, administrator for the 
DFMP, observed that the “municipal bond was an impetus for change in the City” and that the “opportunity 
to diversify the City’s funding sources came at an opportune time when loans from development finance 
institutions and commercial banks were insufficient to meet the funding demands of the City”. Additionally, 
she observed that “launching a bond requires a long-term municipal strategic plan and … it requires 
 
49 Tonga, J. 2013, 2014, 2015.  Rating for Dakar; Rating for Abidjan (Plateau),  http://www.bloomfield-
investment.com/credit-rating/?lang=en, accessed June 2017.  
50 Interview with Babacar Thioye Ba, 10 August 2017, Dakar, Senegal. 
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coordination between many of the City’s departments, including administration, finance, planning, urban 
development and communication. The DFMP’s legacy is apparent beyond the transaction itself.”51  
Designed for full accessibility to retail investors, the Dakar bond’s minimum increment was 
CFA franc 10,000 (or approximately USD 18). Large institutional investors had the option, however, of 
placing a large order at the time of subscription; this asset class, based on pledges to purchase from these 
investors (also known as soft orders), made up approximately 72% of the total demand for the transaction 
on the eve of issuance (Figure 5.7) (Forster 2015). Marie Odile Sene, managing director of CGF Bourse 
(the transaction arranger), explained that there was “significant investor appetite for the transaction” 
because of the “relative lack of fixed-income instruments available in CFA franc for institutional investors”. 
This pent-up demand in the market, coupled with the guarantee from USAID and the international aid 
community’s commitment to Dakar, “made the transaction of strong interest for many local pension funds 
and insurance companies”.52  
Figure 5.7: Expected distribution of Dakar’s municipal bonds in the primary issuance, according to 
CGF Bourse, syndicate lead for bond issuance 
 
Source: Interview with Marie-Odile Sene, managing director of CGF Bourse, 21 August 2017. 
According to the filing with the local market regulator (the CREPMF), the City planned to use the funds 
 
51 Interview with Dieynaba Thiam Ka, 21 August 2017, Dakar, Senegal.  
52 Interview with Marie-Odile Sene, 21 August 2017, Dakar, Senegal. 
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raised from the bond issuance for the installation of a new marketplace, with stalls and kiosks offered for 
rent at subsidized rates to provide a wider range of opportunities to the city’s many street vendors.53 
Approximately 25% of the funds would be spent on the acquisition of the centrally located parcel of land 
(already demonstrated to be under contract to the City) with the remaining 75% used for the design and 
construction of the physical marketplace.  
The failure of Dakar’s municipal bond 
Unfortunately, the City of Dakar ultimately did not launch its bond in 2014 as originally planned, because 
of a last-minute intervention by the central government.54 This unexpected challenge, based first on 
questions of constitutionality and later amended to reflect concerns about the impact of the bond on the 
country’s overall level of indebtedness, derailed the entire process (Forster 2015). External agencies like 
the World Bank, USAID, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation immediately sprang into action, 
attempting to negotiate an outcome whereby the City could proceed with its proposed bond issuance while 
still allowing the national government to save face on its initial opposition.55 When these talks did not end 
in an agreement between all interested stakeholders, the City filed a lawsuit against the central government 
in the country’s Supreme Court. The case, which was repeatedly delayed until finally heard by the 
adjudicating bench, found in favor of the central government, placing an indefinite hold on the prospective 
bond launch.  
Although the City was unsuccessful in overturning the central government’s opposition to the bond 
issuance, the situation has left the door open for future attempts to introduce municipal bonds in Senegal 
(Neureiter & Jordan 2017). Some claim that a new attempt, with even more integration of national 
government stakeholders, would be more successful, if only because of the fact that a “joint effort between 
national and sub-national leaders would be difficult to derail”.56 Others, including some of the mayor’s top 
advisors involved in the transaction from the municipal side, are less circumspect, insisting that “Dakar’s 
failure to launch a municipal bond was not a function of poor underlying financial fundamentals but instead 
 
53 Filing of City of Dakar with CREPMF, submitted in August 2013. Accessed, from CREPMF, in June 2017.  
54 City of Dakar. “Financement des Collectives Locales: Khalifa Sall Preconcise L’Emprunt Obligatoire”. 
http://villededakar.org/pages/financement-des-collectivit%C3%A9s-locales-khalifa-sall-pr%C3%A9conise-
l%E2%80%99emprunt-obligataire, accessed August 2018.  
55 Interviews with Dieynaba Thiam Ka, administrator for the DMFP, 14 August 2017, Dakar, Senegal; Dieynaba Dabo 
Mbaye, DMFP Coordinator, June 2017, Dakar, Senegal; Rokhaya Sarr, Department of Planning and Sustainable 
Development for the City of Dakar, January 2017, Dakar, Senegal. 
56 Interview with Christel Alvergne, United Nations Capital Development Fund, 15 August 2016, New York, United 
States. 
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driven by fear of Dakar’s mayor as a potential challenger for the presidency”. One of the advisors further 
shared that “the failure of the bond to launch is not only a problem for Mayor Khalifa Sall and his political 
allies to introduce a new financing tool,” but is a “blow for the intended beneficiaries: poor street vendors 
who looked at the creation of a new, less expensive marketplace as an opportunity for a new life”.57 
Interestingly, the outcome of the aborted bond launch, coupled with other issues, had a surprising impact 
on the political trajectory of the mayor of the City of Dakar. With this failed launch as his banner, the mayor 
was simultaneously imprisoned on charges of embezzlement of public funds and elected to the national 
legislature, showing overwhelming support from his constituency even in the face of discord with the 
presidency.58 The local passion for the mayor, both personally and in his role as the face of the city, was 
further demonstrated by the previously mentioned overwhelming success of his bid for re-election in 2016 
against a nominee hand-picked by the president. The mayor’s conviction and sentencing to a five-year 
prison term has been rejected by his supporters due to a lack of evidence, with many claiming that this is 
yet another attempt by the national government to thwart Khalifa Sall’s efforts to be elected president.59  
The City of Dakar’s experience is perhaps the best exemplar of the immediate and negative consequences 
of the political friction between national and sub-national government, particularly when there are 
presidential aspirations involved. However, to argue that the sole motivation for the decision to block a 
successful municipal bond issuance is political and first-person would ignore the framework of decision-
making in a francophone country. Effectively, regardless of the desire to maintain a firm grip on the 
presidency, Macky Sall would have been unable to reasonably object to the transaction attempted by the 
City of Dakar were it not for the underlying expectations of Senegalese society which, as a francophone 
country with a strong French centralist tradition, favors a top-down approach to governance. As is the case 
in most unitary states, despite the level of localized grumbling, the expectation is that power will be 
concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite in the presidential palace. 
Conclusion 
Beyond the question of the issuance of a municipal bond in the City of Dakar, the failure of a bond launch 
in Dakar sets back potential bond issuances by other primary cities across francophone West Africa. This 
 
57 Interview with Babacar Thioye Ba, Legal Advisor to the Mayor, 10 August 2017, Dakar, Senegal. 
58 Christensen, S., “Corruption Trial Underway for Ambitious Dakar Mayor.” VOA News, 25 January 2018. 
https://www.voanews.com/a/corruption-trial-dakar-mayor/4224851.html, accessed March 2018.  
59 Musiyo, V., “Senegalese MP in Detention Over ‘Scathing’ Remarks on Judges in Khalifa Sall Case.” AfricaNews 
with Agence France Presse, 31 March 2018. http://www.africanews.com/2018/03/31/senegalese-mp-in-detention-
over-scathing-remarks-on-judges-in-khalifa-sall-case/, accessed April 2018.  
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is driven by two preponderant circumstances: (1) there are high barriers to entry for cities that would 
consider bond issuance that are often difficult to incorporate into already strapped municipal budgets, for 
example the need to demonstrate creditworthiness through transparency and credit ratings, and the 
engagement of long-term institutional investors; and (2) the failure of Dakar to launch a municipal bond, 
even with the support of well-endowed global foundations and bilateral aid agencies, scares off future 
charitable contributions or undermines the political self-direction and imperative from within cities to 
financially program such transactions. The result is that the leadership in cities, particularly those that are 
driven by sensitivity to political pressure and fearful of repercussions from experimentation with non-
traditional financial instruments, are likely to opt to rely on transfers from central government, and 
occasional loans at concessionary rates from development finance institutions or at market rates from 
commercial banks. In this way, the prevailing attitude that runs contrary to decentralization continues to 
triumph over most innovations that rely on sub-national autonomy stemming from financial 
decentralization. The following chapter, which focuses on Kampala’s attempts to issue a bond, tracks a 
different path followed by that City, driven primarily by the national government’s alternative approach to 
municipal leadership (i.e., co-rule by an elected mayor and an appointed City manager), but with a very 
similar outcome to that in Dakar (Gorelick 2018).  
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Chapter 6: Efforts in Kampala 
 
Having explored the situation in Dakar, and understanding the interplay between national politics and 
municipal finance in the Senegalese context, the thesis now moves on to a similar consideration of Kampala 
and its placement within Uganda. Although this chapter will underscore the striking similarities between 
Dakar and Kampala in terms of the overarching theme of the municipality’s inability to issue a municipal 
bond, due to the conflicted relationship between the national and sub-national government as well as each 
City’s commitment to, and demonstrated results in, increasing its own-source revenue since the recent 
devolution of power, it will also show that there are differences between the experiences in Senegal and 
Uganda, and examine the way in which these differences have manifested themselves. What the Ugandan 
case reveals that is distinctive is the particularly challenging interplay between the national and sub-national 
government when there is power-sharing at the municipal leadership level between an appointed City 
manager and an elected mayor. Unlike the situation in Senegal, this dynamic creates an opportunity for tacit 
approval of innovations like a municipal bond, but only when there is accord between the elected and 
appointed individuals filling the positions accompanied by a direct endorsement from the appointing body, 
the office of the president. 
As in the case of the previous chapter, this one begins with a consideration of Uganda as a nation-state, 
reviewing its history from the pre-colonial era through to the modern one, with a particular focus on the 
progress made towards decentralization. Following this review, the chapter moves on to a review of the 
country’s financial status and activities in the capital markets, highlighting the fact that investors are 
comfortable with Ugandan debt and that the country itself is poised for continued economic growth due to 
the discovery of fossil fuels in the north. Next, the chapter considers the financial performance of Kampala 
itself, particularly in the handful of years since the creation of the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) 
but with a sidebar on the City’s default on its indirect loan from the World Bank (via the national 
government), which stands in stark contrast to Dakar’s financial performance and diligence in honoring its 
debts. The chapter concludes with a close examination of the municipal bond considered by the KCCA and 
how the concept of such a transaction has impacted the unique power-sharing arrangement established 
within Uganda’s capital City. 
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Contextualizing the Ugandan nation-state and its uneasy attempts at 
decentralization 
During the pre-colonial era, the concept of “Uganda” did not exist; like much of sub-Saharan Africa, the 
borders of present-day Uganda were imposed by colonizers for better territorial management and 
maximization of resource extraction. The territory that is now Uganda encompassed pieces of three different 
kingdoms: the Hima (a highly hierarchical society with power concentrated in the western parts of the 
country, extending into the neighboring lands of present-day Burundi and Rwanda), the Bito (a more 
egalitarian society dominated by nepotism in the granting of power over “sub-sovereign” districts) and the 
Buganda. The inhabitants of Buganda, who controlled the area where Kampala is now located, and were 
the direct antecedents of the society in place at the time of European colonization, organized their society 
under a centralized kingship and, from their capital on the northern shores of Lake Victoria, were able to 
participate in the burgeoning cultural development fostered by their relative isolation (Bandyopadhyay & 
Green 2016; Stephens 2009).  
The presence of a highly centralized state with a strong monarch made the transition to colonial status far 
less traumatic for most of the population located in what is now Uganda than in other parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa, and there were only limited instances of resistance to the growing European presence (Reid 2002). 
In 1888, for example, when a new ruler (Mwanga) attempted to halt the foreign ideologies that he perceived 
as a threat, he was quickly deposed by internal factions more sympathetic to the British and the French 
(Byrnes 1990). Instead, threats to the kingdom were internal in nature, and driven by religious civil war 
between Protestants, Catholics and Muslims.  
When British colonizers eventually assumed control of the so-called “Uganda Protectorate” in 1900, they 
did so with the expressed intention of reliance on local, native leaders: a perfect example of the policy of 
indirect rule. Again, and in contrast with the French example of assimilation explored in the case study of 
Dakar in the previous chapter, the continued prevalence of local leaders who maintained control over 
smaller sub-Protectorate areas laid the foundation for decentralization of power to sub-national levels of 
government. By the time power was handed over to an African successor government in 1962, Uganda had 
become a patchwork of district administrations, sub-divided into counties and consolidated into provinces. 
The entity as a whole was administered, as it had been from the inception of the British Protectorate, from 
a capital situated at Entebbe on the northern shore of Lake Victoria, or by departments with headquarters 
situated 20 miles further inland at Kampala (Hansen & Twaddle 1998).  
The ongoing presence of lower levels of government during the colonial era, and the Protectorate’s 
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attendant self-governance to a significant extent, created the impetus for the post-colonial struggle for 
decentralization that affected Uganda during the second half of the 20th century. From independence 
through the early 1980s, the country was dominated by a military dictatorship that allowed for no dissent 
and only limited, non-democratic sub-national powers; the military regime of Idi Amin (1971–1979) 
dissolved district and urban administrations and, in their place, established provincial administrations led 
by governors, most of whom were high-ranking military officials (Dauda 2006). As a result of these 
experiences with totalitarian regimes, the Ugandan government introduced a new Constitution in the mid-
1990s which incorporated a clear delineation of power to sub-national governments. Curiously, in 
comparison with the previously discussed examples of decentralization during the same era in Senegal and 
South Africa, power shifts in Uganda occurred more comfortably between the national government and the 
secondary cities of Jinja and Entebbe than with the primary City of Kampala. This was primarily due to the 
fact that there were longstanding rivalries among the political stakeholders: the Buganda kingdom (which 
continues to play a pivotal role in the urban politics and polices of Kampala to this day), the president, and 
other elites. This would later manifest itself in the development of the guiding principles for the KCCA, 
and, in particular, the debt limits accorded to Kampala relative to its peer sub-national entities as described 
below (Gore & Muwanga 2014). Two particularly important pieces of legislation stemming from that era 
which enshrine decentralization and ensure a formalization of the use of land within an urban area are:  
1. The 1997 Local Government Act, which defined the structure of local governments, as well as the 
powers and functions devolved to them. Later amendments have increased the extent of devolution and 
aimed to provide for implementation of decentralization. 
2. The 1998 Land Act, which established legal provision over ownership and management of land. 
Regarding urban development, the Land Act established that once urban land has been zoned and a 
plan becomes law, registered landowners have to conform to approved plans (UN-Habitat 2016). 
Both of the above pieces of legislation paved the way for the creation of the KCCA and the concept of 
additional decentralization of power to actors at the sub-national level. In fact, Uganda’s decentralization 
policy, as laid out in the 1995 Constitution and the 1997 Local Government Act, placed it among Africa’s 
most decentralized countries (Dickovick 2005; Ndegwa 2002). However, while a number of legal and 
policy powers have been devolved, revenue raising remains dominated by central government. As a result, 
local governments rely upon the center for 80% of their funding – this comes largely in the form of multiple 
conditional transfers channeled by the center to specific policy areas. In contrast, own-source revenue 
accounts for less than 10% of local government funds. As municipal borrowing is capped at 25% of own-
source revenues by Ugandan law, low local revenue generation restricts the ability of local governments to 
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raise finance through borrowing (World Bank 2016). 
The large number of conditional transfers created a substantial administrative burden for local governments 
– the conditions of each funding stream adding to the complexity of reporting processes and funding 
formulae (World Bank 2016). In 2002, the Fiscal Decentralization Strategy (FDS) was adopted with the 
aim of giving local government greater autonomy and accountability by simplifying the transfer system. 
Implementation of the FDS was initially limited; however, since 2015 there has been a renewed focus on 
it. This has included reducing the number of transfers to 20, and giving local policy-makers greater 
flexibility in how grants are spent. Plans are in place to build on this success by further improving the 
efficiency of the transfer system (World Bank 2016). However, there are still significant challenges to be 
dealt with in resolving the ongoing debate over how much autonomy local governments across Uganda 
should enjoy, both politically and financially (Green 2015; Kiwanuka 2013). The World Bank describes 
what the next stage might include, explaining in its conceptualization of its support to local governments 
that the next stage of the reform launched in 2016, which focuses on reducing horizontal inequalities and 
enhancing the efficiency of the transfer systems, includes some innovations intended to streamline 
processes. This includes the introduction of the Straight Through Process, which aims to speed up the 
allocation of grants that finance development spending; these grants can currently take up to six weeks to 
process. However, there remain some issues with the government’s capacity to implement the FDS. 
Currently, one of the key issues with fiscal transfers is that, under this new regime, the focus on spending 
shifts dramatically from infrastructure to social services, leaving either one or the other of the policy areas 
with a deficiency in budget. This highlights the fact that the central government is not adequately consulting 
local governments as to where best money can be spent. In addition, local governments have little control 
over where they spend their revenue (World Bank  2017). In Jinja, the conditionality on grants and transfers 
leaves the municipality with only UGX 10 billion (USD 2.8 million) of own source revenue to spend in 
areas of its choosing, with stipulations as to how the vast majority of the transfer must be spent.  
The improved efficiency and flexibility of intergovernmental transfers in Uganda over the last two decades 
has given local government greater autonomy to finance urban infrastructure. Nevertheless, due to their 
size and conditional nature, transfers alone cannot meet Uganda’s urban infrastructure needs.  
In order to meet backlogs and achieve the official and popular aspirations for Kampala, it is clear that local 
governments must increase their own-source revenue generation, which has led to the argumentation behind 
the attempt on the part of Uganda’s capital City to issue a municipal bond. The debate about the municipal 
bond must, however, be seen in the context of the wider national fiscal policies and performance. Before 
considering the municipal bond in relation to Kampala, one must look at the macro-economic environment 
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and Uganda’s financial performance, with the understanding that economic activity in Kampala makes up 
the majority of Uganda’s GDP. 
Uganda’s financial performance  
Uganda typifies an East African country as regards its financial performance on many fronts: it benefits 
from rapid economic growth, driven in part by its young population, and has predictable inflation patterns. 
It differs from its neighbors, however, in two key areas: its recent discovery of fossil fuels in the northern 
part of the country and its highly conservative approach to sovereign debt, which has manifested itself in 
the country’s decision to avoid commercial borrowing in any currency other than the local Ugandan shilling 
(CNBC Africa 2014). More specifically, Uganda is the only African country that has spoken of the 
acquisition of Eurobonds60 as too risky for countries on the continent. Governor of the Bank of Uganda 
Emmanuel Mutebile has said: 
We should not be complacent about the dangers of big projects built on sovereign debt 
because it would be unwise for African countries, which will never again get debt relief. 
From what we are seeing in Ghana, we are not yet ready to issue sovereign bonds.61 
Although the Eurobond market offers a higher diversity of investors and typically larger amounts of money 
on a particular issuance, the risk inherent in borrowing internationally with revenue generated in local 
currency creates a worrisome mismatch that the Ugandans have rejected in favor of a more cautious route. 
Economic growth in Uganda has been steady and comparable to its peers in the region, but far ahead of 
global averages.62 This can primarily be attributed to the country’s effective management of its natural 
resources, and is an important indicator for investors seeking reliable returns on government fixed-income 
products. This is a critical consideration when looking at Uganda’s national borrowing because, as in the 
case of Senegal, this can form part of the basis for investment decisions on the part of institutions 
considering debt issued by sub-national governments in well-performing countries.  
Both of these factors are important not only in considerations of national financial matters but also in a 
review of the likelihood of success in sub-sovereign debt, as they are important indicators of the potential 
 
60 Eurobonds are bonds issued in a currency other than the one in which the bond issuer traditionally conducts its 
work.  For example, in this case, a bond issued by the Ugandan government in USD, EUR or GBP would be 
considered a Eurobond – only a bond issued in UGX would not be considered to be a Eurobond. 
61 Hambayi, T. 2016. “Africa’s Ticking Time Bomb: $35-billion worth of Eurobond debt.”  Financial Times.   
https://www.ft.com/content/a5adfb84-cd23-35b8-8e18-df62a38fdf68, accessed October 2018.  
62 See https://tradingeconomics.com/uganda/gdp-growth-annual, accessed June 2018. 
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confidence of investors who may purchase municipal bonds. 
Uganda has three primary sources of revenue: (1) taxation (central and local), (2) debt financing, and (3) 
donor funding. While Uganda’s current debt levels are manageable (the International Monetary Fund rates 
the risk of external debt distress as low, and judges that this is not augmented by significant risk from 
domestic debt), government borrowing is crowding out the private sector – meaning that further reliance 
on debt finance is not an attractive option (International Monetary Fund 2015). As a result, it is clear that 
the bulk of the required investment for sustainable urban development must be funded by domestic taxation, 
including sub-nationally generated revenue sources.  
There are a number of different factors which contribute to low tax revenue rates within Uganda. The most 
important factor is the government’s limited ability to identify and register the tax base liable for payments 
and to then collect taxes from the population. Uganda has significantly increased its total tax revenue in the 
period from 2011/12 to 2015/16. However, compared to other East African Community countries63, 
Uganda’s tax to GDP ratio is one of the lowest (World Bank 2015). This is largely as a result of Uganda’s 
informal economy, which contributes up to 43% of GDP and employs 91% of the population (World Bank 
2012), ultimately constraining the government’s ability to collect taxes (Uganda National Planning 
Authority 2015). To add to this, Uganda has undeveloped tax registries, which increases the risk of tax 
evasion. As a result, at the start of the 2016/17 financial year, the government enacted the Tax Procedures 
Code Act which guides and harmonizes the administrative procedures of the current tax laws, hence easing 
the compliance process for taxpayers (Seatini Uganda 2017). Furthermore, there is often a lack of 
coordination between central and local governments as to how tax collection is split between levels of 
government. This is coupled with low staffing, limited funding, low motivation at local government levels 
and a lack of autonomy of the Uganda Revenue Authority, which results in inefficiencies and a reduction 
of tax revenue at all levels of government (Seatini Uganda 2017). 
Domestic revenue collection in Uganda represents an average of 11.4% of the country’s GDP over the last 
decade.64 This figure is slightly lower than those of neighbors Tanzania and Rwanda (12.4% and 13.5% 
respectively), and below the 12.5% average for middle income countries – a group that Uganda aspires to 
join.65 However, as this revenue is largely raised at the central level through income and corporate taxes, it 
 
63 The East African Community is an intergovernmental organization composed of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South 
Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
64 According to data available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS?year_high_desc=false, 
accessed July 2018. 
65 According to data available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS?year_high_desc=false, 
accessed July 2018. 
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is likely to rise as Uganda’s economy develops and more enterprises move into the formal sector. 
Revenue collection at a local government level is minimal – meaning that local governments are reliant on 
central government transfers for around 90% of revenues (World Bank 2015b). However, the methods used 
to gather revenue at the local level mean that a similar increase in revenue collection at this level requires 
significant structural changes. Rather than levying a few lucrative taxes, local government revenues in 
Uganda are raised through an assortment of fees, levies, and taxes that vary across the country; these include 
local service taxes, trading licenses, property rates, occupation permits, administrative fees (e.g., parking, 
livestock, and abattoir fees), and the rental of government facilities (World Bank 2015c). On top of this 
complex picture of a large number of low-value revenue generation measures, local governments are 
characterized by limited capacity to design and administer taxes and levies. The combination of these two 
factors results in small local government own-source revenues and in small outgoings per resident of the 
City.  
Local governments seeking to reduce their reliance on central government transfers by increasing their own 
revenue generation streams face two systemic barriers. First, Uganda’s legal framework does not facilitate 
revenue generation at the local level. A key barrier in this regard is that control over many of the most 
substantial means of taxation (e.g., general sales tax, income tax) is held by central government, while local 
governments are left to administer more burdensome revenue sources that require substantial administration 
costs and deliver lower yields.  
Even where local governments are not constrained by the legal framework from implementing revenue-
generating measures, a lack of capacity substantially hinders effective administration of taxes. The 
governance structures surrounding local revenue often lack both coordination and clearly defined functions. 
As a result, local governance in Uganda’s cities is often characterized by weak institutions that are incapable 
of enforcing existing laws and regulations, let alone implementing and administering new ones.  
In addition to facing the challenge of coordinating with external bodies, local governments face substantial 
internal capacity barriers. For example, it has been estimated that up to one-third of posts within Ugandan 
local government administrations are vacant (World Bank 2016). This figure illustrates the fact that local 
governments lack both the personnel to operate effectively and the financial resources to adequately address 
this capacity gap. 
The intergovernmental fiscal transfers that local governments depend on for the vast majority of their 
income are delivered in a fashion that prevents them from being spent to greatest effect. For example, the 
large number of separate transfers results in a substantial administrative cost for capacity-constrained local 
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governments, which have to demonstrate that they are spending transfers in line with central government 
conditions. This burden is exacerbated by the complex historical processes and formulae on which the 
distribution of such transfers is based (World Bank 2016). The complexity of the processes of obtaining 
and demonstrating the use of transfers, as well as the conditional nature of many of them, can inhibit local 
governments from channeling funding towards locally recognized infrastructure needs. 
As part of an analysis of the underlying challenges facing Kampala, politicians recognized that the system 
needs to be overhauled to ensure proper financial flows that can shore up municipal financing. In an 
interview in June 2017, District Mayor of Kampala’s Nakawa District Ronald Balimwezo shared that 
“stronger control over financial issues at the local government level is essential for two reasons: (1) to better 
manage available cash resources to deliver better services to constituents; and (2) to demonstrate to potential 
lenders and investors that the City is a responsible entity that can be trusted as a custodian of funds received 
from financial institutions expecting a full return of their funds”.66 These concerns echo those of politicians 
in Dakar, and demonstrate a forward-thinking attitude which would be welcomed by sources of finance 
interested in sub-national governments. 
In seeking to borrow, Uganda’s cities are hindered by low revenue bases, legal constraints on borrowing, 
and poor or non-existent credit ratings (Government of Uganda & New Climate Economy Partnership 
2016). Significantly, Ugandan law currently restricts Ugandan municipality-level borrowing to 25% of 
own-source revenues, and this percentage is even lower for the KCCA (Munawwar 2010). Nonetheless, 
Kampala’s leadership is prepared to work within the existing constitutional system in an effort to source 
the finances required to deliver on the City’s long-term development plans and needs.  
Understanding Kampala and the development of KCCA 
Kampala is Uganda’s dominant city: it contain one-third of Uganda’s population (Lall et al. 2011), it is the 
seat of government, and 80% of Ugandan industrial and commercial activity occurs in Kampala (Global 
Rating Co. 2015). Despite Kampala’s size, smaller cities and towns make up a significant proportion of 
Uganda’s growing urban population – 69% of Ugandan urban dwellers live in cities with populations 
smaller than 500,000 (World Bank 2015c). While Kampala and the broader Entebbe – Kampala – Jinja (E-
K-J) corridor are developing rapidly, development is not distributed evenly across the country; 70% of the 
country’s 1,200 manufacturing plants with 5 or more employees are located in the E-K-J corridor. This 
uneven development is reflected in the infrastructure provision in urban areas of varying sizes: in 2013, 
 
66 Interview with Ronald Balimwezo, District Mayor of the Nakawa District in Kampala, June 2017, Kampala, 
Uganda. 
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45.8% of Kampalans had access to piped water, compared to 24.2% in other big cities and 10.2% in small 
towns. This pattern is repeated for access to electricity for lighting (79%, 41.3%, and 24.7% respectively) 
(Musoke 2016). 
Much of Kampala’s infrastructure backlog has resulted from years of neglect and under-investment, 
combined with the rapid growth and urbanization of the population. In addition, prior to the introduction of 
the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) discussed below, the City was plagued by corruption and 
maladministration, which severely impacted its ability to deliver services to residents. To stem the erosion, 
a study was commissioned by the World Bank-sponsored Kampala Institutional and Infrastructural 
Development Programme in 2009, to investigate ways of corporatizing the management of the City (World 
Bank n.d.). The recommendations of this study informed development of the legislation known as the 
Kampala Capital City Authority Act (“the Act”), which Parliament passed in 2010 (Gore & Muwanga 
2014). Under Section 4 of the Act, Kampala ceased to be a local government entity, and under Section 3(2) 
it became a central government entity administered by the central government. In practice, this meant that 
the central government would have direct authority over Kampala, with the minister in charge of the 
presidency also being made responsible for the City. Thus, the old Kampala City Council (“KCC”) was 
transformed into the Kampala Capital City Authority (“KCCA or the municipality”). The Act came into 
effect on 1 March 2011. The key feature of the Act (and the one which provided the impetus to reform the 
City’s operations) was the separation of the political arm of the City from the managerial functions. The 
political arm of Kampala City, i.e., the KCCA, comprises 34 elected councilors, representing specific 
electoral districts, special interest groups (such as youth and persons with disabilities) and various 
professional bodies (architects, medical practitioners, and the legal community). At the helm of the KCCA 
is the lord mayor, who presides over all KCCA meetings, performs various ceremonial functions and helps 
formulate strategies and programs for the development of the City. Divisional mayors are also elected to 
represent the five divisions in Kampala City. Primarily the role of the divisional mayors and elected 
councilors is to maintain contact with the residents of the electoral area, and thereby gain an understanding 
of the needs and challenges facing the population, as well as overseeing the impact of programs that have 
been implemented. Based on these interactions, the councilors can make recommendations and proposals 
to the KCCA, which can be included in its development plans. 
Challenges relating to the reform of Kampala are longstanding, and are driven by a history of poor service 
delivery, as well as deep-seated tensions and historic frustrations between multiple interests involved in the 
governance of the City: central government, Kampala politicians and administrators, the Kingdom of 
Buganda, civil society organizations, and government and business elites based in the City. For example, 
in 2011 President Yoweri Museveni converted the governance of Kampala from one based on the 
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conventional structure of a local council and a mayor to the status of a national ministry, headed by a 
technocrat whose first act was to re-staff the administration (Collier & Venables 2016). 
The KCCA’s executive director and the deputy executive director are appointed by the president on the 
recommendation of the Public Service Commission. This ensures independence from the political authority 
as their positions are not dependent on the councilors or the lord mayor. The administration of the KCCA 
is split into ten directorates, covering such areas as engineering and technical services, public health and 
environment, physical planning, legal affairs, treasury, revenue collection and internal audit. For each 
directorate, a director and deputy director are appointed, under whom a team of managers oversees the 
various aspects of the City’s operations. Through these bodies, the KCCA increased revenue collection in 
Kampala by 89% between 2010/11 and 2014/15, created a strategic plan outlining a vision of the future of 
Kampala, and set out the projects required over the next five years to achieve this vision (Global Rating 
Co. 2015).  
 As per the Act, the KCCA is responsible for the day-to-day management of the City, as well as its financial 
wellbeing and strategic direction. Thus, its responsibilities broadly include: 
• initiating and formulating policy, setting service delivery standards and monitoring the 
administration and provision of services;  
• enacting legislation for the management of the City;  
• constructing and maintaining roads, storm drainage, street lights and other transport 
infrastructure;  
• supporting public institutions such as schools, hospitals, libraries, museums, public parks and 
the like; 
• promoting economic activity within its jurisdiction, including the establishment of 
slaughterhouses and markets, as well as supervising and licensing street vendors and transport 
operators;  
• regulating and licensing various types of establishments, including bars, clubs, and lodgings.  
Although the KCCA has the power to enact legislation, any ordinances passed have to first gain the approval 
of the attorney general and then be signed off by the lord mayor. The municipality can also institute and 
collect on certain taxes, fees and charges, but in many cases the tariffs that can be charged are determined 
by the national government. Nevertheless, the KCCA does have the power to raise and determine certain 
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fees (including those for utilities and other services), and is actively engaging the national government on 
tariff rates where increases are deemed appropriate, particularly for businesses. Along with the directorates, 
the legislation that created the KCCA also created a political system in which there are checks and balances 
between the will of the people (through popularly elected local politicians) and the desires of the national 
government (through appointments made directly by the office of the president) (Gore & Muwanga 2014). 
More specifically, the Act calls for the positions of: 
• a lord mayor (Sections 9 – 11), who shall “be elected by universal adult suffrage” to “be the 
political head of the Capital City”, and “head the Authority in developing strategies and 
programmes for the development of the Capital City” but also be “answerable to the Minister” 
from national government responsible for overseeing the City; and 
• an executive director (Sections 17 – 19), who shall “be appointed by the President” and serve 
as the “chief executive”, providing leadership as the “head of the public service in the Authority 
and to head the administration of the Authority” and to “be responsible for coordination and 
implementation of national and council policies, laws, regulations, bylaws, programmes and 
projects”. 
This system, initially established to ensure sufficient checks and balances, has instead stymied the City in 
achieving some of its long-term goals, including fiscal power, as the municipal bond efforts outlined later 
in this chapter reveal (Lambright 2014). In an interview in June 2017, Kampala-based political advisor 
Bernard Luyiga shared that “the KCCA was designed more as an effort to curtail Kampala’s autonomy” 
while “giving a semblance of increased power through the lip service of constitutional change”.67  
The KCCA and its borrowing capacity 
According to Luyiga, one of the “clearest ways to see that the KCCA was created without full power” was 
through “significant limitations on its power”.68 Section 54 of the Act provides the KCCA with specific 
borrowing powers, stating that “the Authority may, from time to time, with the approval of the Minister, 
raise loans from financial institutions, by way of debenture, issue of bonds or any other method, in amounts 
not exceeding ten percent of the locally-generated revenue of the Authority; provided that the Authority 
demonstrates ability to meet its statutory obligations”. Curiously, and frustratingly for the KCCA, less 
financially restrictive legislation exists for all local governments in Uganda, which are allowed to borrow 
and to issue bonds in Ugandan shillings subject to the rules under Section 20 of the Local Government Act 
 
67 Interview with Bernard Luyiga, political advisor, June 2017, Kampala, Uganda. 
68 Interview with Bernard Luyiga, political advisor, June 2017, Kampala, Uganda. 
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of 1997, and with the approval of both the Ministry of Local Government and the Capital Market Authority.  
According to KCCA’s Deputy Director for Strategy, Patrick Musoke, this decision is driven by a “fear of 
losing control, of allowing KCCA to eclipse the national government in its decision-making ability about 
the future growth and financial needs of the city.”69   In terms of this Act, borrowing is allowed by law, but 
confined to a maximum of 25% of own-source revenues. The 1995 Constitution further commits, in section 
197, that “urban authorities shall have autonomy over their financial and planning matters.”70 
In Kampala, the local own-source revenue situation is markedly different to that in the rest of Uganda. The 
KCCA raises around 50% of its budget from own-source revenues (World Bank 2015c). This proportionally 
high scale of revenue has been achieved by substantial investment in the capacity of the Directorate of 
Revenue Collection, which now operates at a level comparable with that of many developed countries 
(Kopanyi 2015). Unlike local governments outside Kampala, the KCCA focuses revenue collection on a 
limited number of sources (namely property taxes and user fees), as shown in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: Sources of income for Kampala Capital City Authority, 2012–2014 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from City Archives, KCCA. 
Recognizing the centrality of predictable revenues and collection efficiency, within months of its formation 
 
69 Interview with Patrick Musoke, KCCA, 3 June 2019 (Kampala, Uganda), and 28 July 2019 (London, England). 
70 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. 
http://www.parliament.go.ug/images/stories/constitution/Constitution_of_Uganda_1995.pdf, accessed in August 
2018. 
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the KCCA designed, validated, and implemented a plan to overhaul the existing system of tax collection. 
Although there was initial resistance from some of the delinquent taxpayers, revenues have steadily 
increased from UGX 30 billion (USD 9 million) during the 2010/11 financial year to UGX 81 billion (USD 
24 million) in 2015/16; this growth of 89% after inflation in just five years is largely attributable to the 
current financial stability of the KCCA.71 Internally generated revenues over the period from 2012 to 2014 
have grown dramatically, from UGX 39,523 million in 2012 to UGX 72,222 million in 2014 (Figure 6.2).  
Figure 6.2: Total income for Kampala Capital City Authority, 2012–2014 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from City Archives, KCCA. 
Figure 6.2 shows the City’s total income, demonstrating an unsustainable percentage of the total coming 
from grants (averaging around 62% per annum from 2012 through 2014), and the KCCA’s administrative 
leadership committed to exploring new sources of funding to meet long-term capital investment needs. 
Table 6.1 shows the results of a corresponding increase in focus on financial sustainability based on own-
source revenues, which created an impetus for the City to “look at what the impact might be of a significant 
capital investment into infrastructure anticipated to generate revenue”, the sort of investment that would be 
 
71 Taylor, L. “How One African City is Flipping the Script on Urban Development”. Next City, 26 July 2016. 
https://nextCity.org/features/view/kampala-africa-urban-development, accessed in July 2018. 
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“achieved through a financial instrument like a municipal bond”.72 As a result of its financial size and 
governance maturity, Kampala succeeded in obtaining a local credit rating of A– from an external agency, 
Global Credit Ratings (Global Rating Co. 2015), making borrowing through a municipal bond a potentially 
viable financing option.   
 
72 Interview with Bernard Luyiga, political advisor, June 2017, Kampala, Uganda. 
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Table 6.1: Financial information, City of Kampala, 2011–2015* 
 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 
Operating revenues 98,836.59 113,589.24 165,187.74 226,494.34 304,192.01 
Operating expenses –86,632.08 –107,889.55 –146,772.36 –224,558.77 –249,442.30 
Gross savings 12,204.51 5,699.69 18,415.38 1,935.57 54,749.71 
Loan repayments 0 0 0 0 0 
Net savings 12,204.51 5,699.69 18,415.38 1,935.57 54,749.71 
Appropriations/taxes 
for the year 
0 –11,956.43 16.17 0 -24.42 
Year-end surplus/ 
deficit 
12,204.51 –6,256.74 18,431.55 1,935.57 54,725.29 
Source: Compiled by the author from Financial Statements, City of Kampala, 2010–2015 
Note: * All amounts shown are in Ush  thousands.
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Simultaneously with the measures designed and implemented to increase own-source revenue, the KCCA 
leadership carefully reviewed options for financing long-term debt, and ultimately settled on a municipal 
bond because of the relative length of the repayment period of bonds compared to loans; with a longer 
period, the City would be able to better manage its financial needs and potentially build in a grace period 
(similar to that incorporated into the City of Dakar’s proposed issuance).73 The idea of municipal bond 
issuances in Uganda has been circulated for over ten years, longer even than the existence of the KCCA. In 
2007, the Economic Policy Research Centre published a report, “Municipal Bonds for Financing 
Development of Infrastructure: A Way Forward for KCC and Local Governments in Uganda” (Mayanja & 
Mayengo 2007), which argued that a municipal bond was the most appropriate instrument for Kampala; 
ironically, this was published before the KCCA was even established and may have influenced the thinking 
of all decision-makers on the amount of power and financial autonomy ultimately granted to it.  
Unlike the other municipalities or municipal corporations considered in this thesis, the KCCA is the only 
one that has no self-initiated debt. Since its establishment, the KCCA has not borrowed from any entity, 
although its accounts show a loan inherited from its predecessor, the City of Kampala. This loan, originated 
in 1991 for an infrastructure project completed in 2000, represented a portion of a larger transaction between 
the Republic of Uganda and the World Bank. Although the national government has repaid the World Bank 
in full for the transaction, the loan between the national and sub-national government has not been satisfied. 
For some investors, this non-existent credit history for the KCCA (and weak credit history for Kampala) is 
a concern, as it fails to demonstrate the likelihood or predictability of on-time payments by the KCCA as 
an issuer in the capital markets. “Investors are usually skittish around virgin municipal bond issuers, and 
this concern is only heightened when an independent assessment shows that the City only has experience 
with borrowing on one other instance,” according to Marc Joffe, chief executive officer of Global Credit 
Ratings. The fact that “the City ultimately defaulted on this loan obligation” only “worsens investor 
perception of municipal creditworthiness”.74 
Although the City is optimistic about its ability to raise funds from investors through a bond payment, the 
constitutional questions on debt limits raised earlier significantly constrain the potential for a successful 
issuance. To reiterate, current legislation restricts the amount of debt that the KCCA can assume to 10% of 
internally generated revenue on an annual basis. Therefore, despite the strong growth in internally generated 
revenue from the inception of the KCCA in 2012, a municipal bond of USD 2.4 million (or 10% of the 
USD 24 million raised in 2015) is unlikely to be viewed as attractive to the municipality due to the high 
 
73 Interview with Leonard Mathu, Head of Nairobi Office for Lion’s Head Global Partners, June 2016, Nairobi, Kenya. 
74 Interview with Marc Joffe, chief executive officer for Global Credit Ratings, March 2018, Johannesburg, South 
Africa. 
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fixed transaction costs to issue a bond relative to the fees associated with the origination of a bank loan.  
The City has not formally progressed with initiating the transaction because of anticipated challenges 
relating to the constitutional debt limits, and there is thus limited information available on the way in which 
the proceeds of such a transaction would be used. In an October 2014 interview with the Daily Monitor, the 
Ugandan Capital Markets Authority’s spokesperson indicated that he understood that the City planned to 
“issue a municipal bond to finance infrastructure in the City”.75 The African Securities Exchange 
Association similarly reported that the KCCA planned “to issue the country’s first municipal bond by June 
2015 to finance the infrastructure development needed to change Kampala into a modern commercial 
hub”.76 The City’s inability to launch its bond has proven particularly frustrating to City leaders, who point 
to the unfair disadvantage to Kampala of being restricted to an amount of debt that does not exceed 10% of 
internally generated revenue (compared to the significantly higher debt provisions for all other Ugandan 
cities, which can borrow up to 25% of their annual revenues), as well as to the strong investor appetite 
coming from institutional investors like pension funds and insurance companies for this more competitively 
priced long-dated instrument. Stephen Kaboyo, a financial sector analyst in Kampala, warned in 2014 that 
there might be a “challenge for KCCA in making a good case that they are in good financial condition and 
that they have a reliable surplus of revenues over expenditures that can be used to make interest and 
principal payments”.77 More troubling is the political power play currently occurring in the City; although 
not as dire in consequence as the jailing of the Senegalese mayor for a five-year prison term, the City 
manager is rumored to be at risk of losing her position, due partly to her strong advocacy of the bond 
issuance. In 2014, Collier and Haas explained that 
KCCA is an artificial construct. It was a way for the national government to recentralize 
power after decades of being impotent relative to other stakeholders (i.e., the decentralized 
districts, the Kingdom of Buganda, etc.). There have been some positive short-term gains in 
City efficiency, but at the cost of the popular voice. (Collier & Haas 2014)  
 
75 Kulabako, F., “KCCA Finalising Plans for Municipal Bond”. Daily Monitor, 17 October 2014. 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Markets/KCCA-finalising-plans-for-municipal-bond---official/688606-
2489180-m92oc5z/index.html, accessed July 2018.  
76 Mwaniki, C., “Kampala Plans $6 bn bonds issue”. The East African, 16 October 2014. 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Kampala-plans--6-bn-bonds-issue/2560-2488166-8nl6bx/index.html, 
accessed July 2018.  
77 Musoke, R., AllAfrica.com, “KCCA’s Bond – Mileage or Mirage?” 8 December 2014.  
https://allafrica.com/stories/201412082524.html, accessed July 2018. 
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Conclusion 
Although the case of Kampala presented in this chapter is different from the case of municipal bond 
issuance in Dakar discussed in Chapter 5, in terms of the ultimate repercussions for key sub-national 
government stakeholders in the process the results for the urban population are the same: central 
government interventions and distrust of the actualization of decentralization have led the City of Kampala 
to be in a position where it is unable to issue a municipal bond that would unlock additional capital for 
infrastructure investment. This chapter has demonstrated that there is an overwhelming need for urban 
infrastructure provision, particularly in an environment where such a large concentration of the population 
lives in and around the capital city, and that the sole obstacle to municipal bond issuance stems from an 
inability on the part of the national government to create an appropriate enabling environment. 
Taking the case of Dakar together with that of Kampala, it is clear that the challenges to bond issuance in 
both instances are not a function of municipal capacity or investor appetite, but rather of the political 
interplay between national and sub-national counterparts, related to decentralization and the devolution of 
power.  
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Conclusion 
Municipalities in sub-Saharan Africa are currently challenged in their efforts to expand the tools available 
to raise funds for long-term, capital-intensive investments.  Money is needed at the city scale to meet the 
local expectations of residents, and these challenges place significant limitations on the ability of 
municipalities to respond effectively to rapid population growth, before even trying to meet the international 
community’s expectations for the global achievement of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development 
Goals. Further, the introduction and subsequent chapters demonstrated that the inability to raise finance 
through tools like municipal bonds, which are well-suited for long-term, capital-intensive investments, 
stems not from internal capacity deficits or poor financial management in municipalities, but instead from 
a critical external factor not under the control of sub-national governments: the discomfort of the national 
governments with allowing a comprehensive decentralization of power to sub-national governments. 
Considering the barriers to sub-national governments’ abilities to raise funds for city development and 
urban infrastructure in greater detail, Section 1 of the thesis began with a review of the early history of 
cities and the reasons for the development of urban concentrations, manifested through human settlements. 
Chapter 1 examined the growth of the City within a larger context, acknowledging that there is a constant 
friction between city-level government and that found at the national scale, often driven by the desire for 
decision-making accountability at a level where the citizens feel that they can have meaningful impact. For 
the purposes of this thesis, the most apparent of these frictions were identified as factors in the realm of 
financial and fiscal decentralization; however, the basis of this ongoing debate centers on questions of 
power, and on an explicit underlying question of political decentralization. It is for this reason that the 
opening chapters considered both the monetary and the institutional, politically sensitive sides of the 
decentralization argument. 
As a complement to the discussion of decentralization, and again core to the case studies presented in 
Section 2, Chapter 2 explored financial instruments available for cities to meet their capital investment 
needs. Taking a long view of history, the chapter both defined the instruments most commonly available to 
cities and highlighted the fact that, although initially satisfactory to meet sub-national government needs, 
traditional tools and mechanisms – including transfers from government, own-source revenue collection, 
concessionary loans from municipal development funds or development finance institutions, and 
commercial banks – cannot meet the needs of rapidly growing cities or cities where there is a mismatch 
between the useful life of capital-intensive assets and the investment horizons for the aforementioned 
instruments. The chapter argued that, although first piloted in Europe hundreds of years ago, municipal 
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bonds have had a checkered past, failing to take hold as a well-accepted tool until the early 19th century 
experiments with municipal finance in the relatively more decentralized United States.  Nonetheless, 
municipal bonds themselves are well-suited to the task of long-term, capital-intensive investments as 
required by sub-national governments.  
To provide a fully comprehensive view of sub-national finance in Africa, with a pronounced emphasis on 
municipal bonds in the sub-Saharan context, Chapter 3 reviewed the political dimensions of the 
development of the African nation-state, considering examples from the pre-colonial period, the colonial 
era, and the modern, post-colonial period. In all instances, it was argued, the experiences of states in Africa 
are not necessarily unique; rather, they are simply progressing at a different pace from peers in the global 
north or elsewhere in the global south. The often-cited example of the comparative performance of South 
Korea and Ghana in regard to GDP levels in 1957 and 1987 is a perfect case in point: Ghana’s per capita 
GDP in 1957 was USD 490 and, 30 years later had fallen to USD 481, while South Korea’s per capita GDP 
rose from USD 491 in 1957 to USD 4,832 in 1987 (Werlin 1991). While many insist that this difference 
can be attributed in part to external challenges, the differing approaches to development and 
decentralization adopted by the two countries further support the argument that the finance required for 
necessary urban infrastructure development in sub-Saharan Africa will not be obtained without the creation 
of additional opportunities for capital-raising, through instruments that depend on a greater degree of 
autonomy at the sub-national level.   
Section 2 of the thesis explored the interplay of the thematic concerns set out in Section 1 in greater detail, 
using the case studies of the cities of Dakar, Senegal, and Kampala, Uganda, as exemplars of the challenges 
that incomplete decentralization can introduce into visionary cities which have exhausted the finances 
available to them from other, more traditional sources. While the experiences in the two cities differ, the 
end result in both has been the same: failure to allow for full decentralization, driven by a wariness of the 
loss of power, has led to situations in which the municipalities have invested considerable time and 
resources to attract financial capital, only to have transactions halted by the national government. 
Responding to the concept of citizen engagement, City leadership in both Dakar and Kampala has 
committed to consensus-building with the entire population, which, coupled with internal capacity-
building, demonstrates an ability to effectively manage debt. Curiously, and in line with the second thematic 
area of municipal finance considered in the thesis, the expression of interest coming from potential 
purchasers of bonds remains consistent; this is driven by the understanding that, in both cases, the cities 
have well-considered master development plans from which the projects to be undertaken, which 
themselves are financially sustainable, have been selected. The experiences in these two case study cities 
that have not yet issued municipal bonds – Dakar and Kampala – as well as the counter-examples discussed 
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in Chapter 4 of cities that have done so – Douala and Johannesburg – strengthen the argument made in 
Chapter 3 in regard to the third thematic area: namely, that the uniqueness of the African context is relevant 
only for the level of development and decentralization across a longer spectrum of time, not for anything 
inherently exceptional about sub-Saharan Africa. 
The central argument of the thesis itself – that sub-Saharan African cities are being unnecessarily 
constrained from raising funds for long-term, capital-intensive investment projects due to national 
government limits on decentralization – has merit for at least three types of scholars: those interested in (1) 
the incomplete devolution of power and its impacts, (2) the ability of municipal bonds to finance urban 
infrastructure, and (3) the relevance of decentralization and finance within the context of African 
exceptionalism. 
For scholars interested in devolution, a review of the examples of both Senegal and Uganda will 
demonstrate that incomplete decentralization leads to the development of a non-sustainable handicap 
through which cities feel that they are constitutionally and institutionally prevented from undertaking some 
of the most valid forms of financial capital-raising. Contrasted with the two countries at opposite ends of 
the spectrum – South Africa, where full decentralization and a commitment to non-interference have 
occurred, and Cameroon, where extremely limited decentralization has triumphed and cities are fully 
controlled by the central government – this analysis underpins the need for governments to take decisive 
action on decentralization and adhere to their approaches. 
Scholars interested in municipal bonds who consider the cases of Senegal and Uganda are likely to be more 
satisfied with the findings because (1) these cities have recognized the need to expand their tools for raising 
finance for urban infrastructure to encompass municipal bonds; and (2) institutional investors are eager to 
invest in long-term City debt. For most academics interested in finance, this is not a surprise: there is a 
distinct lack of local currency-denominated fixed-income instruments available for investors who are 
mandated to allocate a certain percentage of their portfolio to that sector. This directive, coupled with the 
fact that cities pay a higher risk premium than national governments due to calculations of inherent 
additional risk, makes municipal bonds even more attractive. 
For Africanists, the argument made by this thesis is likely to be unsettling: it undermines the argument of 
African exceptionalism and instead simply highlights the fact that sub-Saharan Africa is at a different point 
on the decentralization and sub-national finance trajectory than other parts of the world. This realization 
does not come with an insistence to increase the pace of decentralization or to be more accepting of 
municipal bonds; it does, however, show that the failure to incorporate municipal bonds into their range of 
available financial instruments or to achieve complete decentralization will limit the ability of cities to raise 
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additional finance for their own urban infrastructure projects, which in turn will weaken these hubs of 
finance and employment opportunities for governments that are struggling to meet the needs of their 
populations. 
This thesis has been crafted to fill a lacuna in the academic literature around municipal bond issuance in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  Building from, and occasionally rebutting, the generally-held perception that the 
reason why cities have been unable to access financing for their urban infrastructure projects based on 
capacity issues and poor financial management, this thesis demonstrates that a select number of Cities are 
fully prepared and ready to issue municipal bonds.  Reflecting on the questions introduced in the 
introductory chapter, this thesis has reviewed and answered each item: 
1)  What are the reasons why bonds are appropriate tools for municipal leaders to use in financing 
their urban infrastructure needs?  How do bonds differ from other tools and instruments that Cities 
have used, and continue to use, today? 
2) Why have there been so few successful (i.e., closed) municipal bond issuances in sub-Saharan 
Africa?  Is it due to internal factors, such as a lack of capacity at the municipal level to demonstrate 
financial responsibility and/or to launch a complex instrument, or is it driven by external factors, 
such as incomplete decentralization? 
3) How, and what, does the experience of municipal bond finance add to our understanding of 
intergovernmental politics in sub-Saharan Africa?   
By framing the answers to these questions from a theoretical perspective grounded in the realities of 
municipal bond issuance on the ground, this thesis introduces a fresh approach to academic consideration 
of the issue.  Equally important, as stated above, it bridges the gap between the interests of economists and 
financiers with those of political economists and policy advisors.    
A Final Word of Caution 
There is no guarantee that municipal bonds will work in every instance and, in the cases of some of sub-
Saharan Africa’s least developed countries, may never be attempted due to financial instability, political 
immaturity, and the presence of concessionary-rate lending from DFIs.  However, for Cities in countries 
that are no longer eligible for the most concessional financing available and have begun to borrow at market 
rates, municipal bonds represent one of the ways for Cities to access finance for infrastructure projects at 
more competitive rates and over longer terms than those offered by other sources of funds. 
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The entire discussion on the need for municipal bonds needs to be placed into a broader context, though – 
one that addresses questions of political economy as well as financial need and readiness.  This thesis has 
argued that municipal bonds are appropriate for funding long-term, capital-intensive investments in urban 
infrastructure where Cities have demonstrated their financial preparedness.  However, the stumbling block 
of intergovernmental politics, between national and-subnational levels, has limited the use of municipal 
bonds. Therefore, the thesis could have additional value beyond the academic world for decision-makers 
themselves, whether at the national or sub-national level. Learning from the experiences and efforts of sub-
national governments, and drawing from the arguments set forth in this thesis, policy-makers and politicians 
may find that there are ways in which collective efforts to collaborate can lead to a more reliable flow of 
funds for critical urban infrastructure projects, which can all positively impact the achievement and 
maintenance of political and financial sustainability.  
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